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Summary 
 
The subject of spirituality is growing in popularity within the field of mental health. 
A major aspect of our human experience includes striving for meaning, 
hopefulness and purpose – this process can be understood as a spiritual 
experience. Another aspect of our shared human experience includes 
psychological distress and alienation. This is understood in most contemporary 
mental health literature as mental disorders. In our contemporary era mental 
health has addressed the latter. Spirituality, as an integral component of human 
experience, involves tapping into the innate need for integration while paving the 
way forward towards a transformative experience. The present research explores 
important interpretive issues related to spirituality and mental health from within a 
historical perspective. The present research suggests that holistic trends in 
mental health cohere with contemporary, phenomenologically rooted trends in 
spirituality.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I felt a cleavage in my mind 
As if my brain had split; 
I tried to match it, seam by seam, 
But could not make them fit. 
 
The thought behind I strove to join 
Unto the thought before, 
But sequence raveled out of reach 
Like balls upon a floor 
 
Dickinson [1894]/1993:381 
1.0 NATURE AND AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
With increasing strides being made in the technology of pharmacology within 
mental health, as well as disenchantment with many psychoanalytical theories, 
many professionals are increasingly concerned that mental health is in danger of 
losing its identity as the most humanistic of the medical specialties. As 
technology advances there is concern that the human spirit is being eclipsed. 
One notes very public and increasing acknowledgement among both 
professionals and recipients of mental health services that an integral component 
of care is missing. That component is often referred to as spirituality (Nolan and 
Crawford 1997, Koenig 2001, Haug 1998). Culliford (2002:250) cites the World 
Health’s Organization’s (1998:7) ‘WHOQOL and Spirituality, Religiousness and 
Personal Beliefs: Report on WHO Consultation’ which says 
                                                 
1 The reader will note that above each chapter, including this one, a poem or segment of a poem by Emily 
Dickinson (d. 1886) that corresponds and summarizes the essential themes of the chapters. The poem 
preceding this chapter articulates well the experience of descending into a form of madness.  Dickinson, a 
nineteenth century American poet, lived and died an obscure and quiet life.  Her poetry was not publicized 
until after her death. Since then she has been acknowledged as one of America’s premier poets.  Dickinson 
typifies someone who experienced both profound spiritual experience as well as forms of what we would 
today call a mood disorder. Nonetheless, she was able to transform this experience into metaphor for 
transcendent hopefulness fully grounded in the reality of psychological suffering. McDermott (2001:690) 
writes ‘if Emily Dickinson was indeed the victim of the well-known Faustian bargain between affective illness 
and creative genius, it was her courage and imagination that enabled her to rise above the former and use 
the latter to transform powerful affects into metaphor’. That metaphor continues to resonate with a 
contemporary audience. Dickinson’s poetry describes well a contemporary understanding of spirituality in 
the area of mental health. With remarkable insight and a genteel manner, Dickinson’s poetry discloses both 
the peculiar nature of mental illness and life giving spirituality which reflects the impact of spirituality on 
mental health. 
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Until recently the health professions have largely followed a medical 
model, which seeks to treat patients by focusing on medicines and 
surgery, and gives less importance to beliefs and to faith – in 
healing, in the physician and in the doctor–patient relationship. This 
reductionism or mechanistic view of patients as being only a 
material body is no longer satisfactory. Patients and physicians 
have begun to realise the value of elements such as faith, hope and 
compassion in the healing process. The value of such ‘spiritual’ 
elements in health and quality of life has led to research in this field 
in an attempt to move towards a more holistic view of health that 
includes a non-material dimension (emphasizing the seamless 
connections between mind and body).  
These ideas, adds Culliford (2002:251), are supported by a clear and persuasive 
trend in the nursing literature (Narayanasamy 1993; Ross 1994, 1996; McSherry 
1998; Draper 1997; Nolan & Crawford 1997; Greasley et al, 2001). A strong 
suggestion emerges that spiritual care and mental health treatment must, of 
necessity, go together.  
While spirituality is popular within mental health the term is ambiguous. The 
question often posed is how is spirituality understood scientifically and clinically 
within mental health? Researchers in the field of mental health such as Cornah 
(2006) have undertaken significant literature reviews on behalf of mental health 
foundations to study specifically the impact of spirituality on mental health. Other 
researchers such as Helminiak (1996) have argued that spirituality qualifies as a 
science within the spectrum of mental health. 
 
The central aim of this research is to explore the value of spirituality in the field of 
mental health in a manner congruent with emerging research in the disciplines of 
both mental health and spirituality. In doing so, two core problems present 
themselves. The first problem is that the interpretation of each of these terms 
(spirituality and mental health) is wide and varied. In order for meaningful 
exploration to occur there needs to be clarity as to what these broad terms refer 
to. Consequently, clarifying the interpretive issues related to spirituality and 
mental health will be the first goal of the research. The second goal will be to 
then address the question of how spirituality expresses itself in contemporary 
 3
mental health. As a means of humanizing mental health practice the term 
spirituality is being used to denote a more organic and holistic understanding of 
the human person in contrast to the mechanistic and technological emphases 
that have been a dominant aspect of many psychoanalytic and psychiatric 
theories in recent history. Additionally, neuro-psychiatric researchers are 
exploring the effects of spirituality by researching the spiritual experience as it 
affects brain chemistry. Each of these approaches will be discussed and 
elaborated upon in this dissertation. Finally, an important contribution of 
spirituality to the dialogue is that it draws on the wisdom of mystics of the past to 
provide a contextual framework and language to articulate the mysterious depths 
of human and divine consciousness that is currently being explored by 
researchers within mental health.   
 
1.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
While spirituality and mental health are treated as distinct domains, in practice 
each are concerned with questions concerning the human person and the 
development of a body of knowledge to describe and help understand the human 
person’s experience in life. Nonetheless, each has their own distinct histories and 
terminologies. Consequently there will be significant and sustained inter-
disciplinary dialogue. Mental health is a broad category that includes diverse 
specialities such as psychiatry, psychology, sociology, social work, and 
neurology. In this research, spirituality will be engaged in a dialogue with each of 
these areas.  
 
A useful way to ensure that the necessary distinction between spirituality and 
mental health is maintained is by juxtaposing spirituality and mental health in 
terms of lived experience. A major aspect of our human experience includes 
striving for meaning, hopefulness and purpose – this process can be understood 
as a spiritual experience. Another aspect of our shared human experience 
includes the experience of psychological distress and alienation from our selves 
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and the community. This can be understood as madness2. In our contemporary 
era mental health has addressed the latter. Spirituality, as an integral component 
of human experience, involves tapping into a person’s innate need for integration 
while paving the way forward towards a transformative experience – sometimes 
rendered in traditional Christian theological vocabulary as salvation. Each 
experience carries with it its own history and language. The transformative 
experience, for example, has been described as mystical. The experience of 
madness or psychological dissolution has been described as psychotic. It will be 
important therefore to engage in analysis of how spirituality and mental health 
have been interpreted historically in order to grasp more clearly how spirituality 
expresses itself in contemporary mental health. 
 
The goal of the research is to understand the phenomenon of spirituality on its 
own terms, that is, as it is actually experienced in this historic moment. Social 
science researchers in the field of mental health have undertaken studies to 
determine the frequency of one aspect of spirituality – namely mystical 
experience. To avoid ambiguity with respect to what is meant by a mystical 
experience, researchers have studied whether people can knowledgably identify, 
through structured questionnaires that describe acknowledged psychological 
dynamics associated with mystical experience, if they have ever had one. 
Additionally, psychologists and psychiatrists have explored clinical criteria by 
which the mystical and psychotic experience can be differentiated. These criteria 
assist with facilitating the growth potential of the mystical experience. This 
research, in addition to scientific study on the effects that certain forms of 
mystical practice have on the brain, will be discussed.  
 
                                                 
2 The reader will notice the broad term ‘madness’ used in this research.  It is not intended to be 
pejorative.  The reason for selecting this term is because historically the term madness has been 
the description that has been given to what we refer to medically in our time as mental illness.   
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There is some dispute concerning the methods that can adequately be used by 
mental health to study mysticism. Kelley (1977:206) writes that considering the 
methods used by psychology which are those of observation and evaluation, 
psychology is, as a science, incapable of going beyond its objective, which is 
exclusively the study of mental phenomena and behavioural patterns in direct 
relation to those particular phenomena. Since its objective is strictly confined to a 
small portion of the domain of individuality, the mystical state necessarily and 
completely transcends its study.  
 
Lancaster (2000:53) retorts that aside from the issue of psychology’s status as a 
science, the rejection of observation and evaluation as valid approaches to the 
study of the mystical state could, for example, be challenged if we accept the 
value of the phenomenological enquiry.  
 
From a methodological perspective, phenomenology takes as its starting point 
primary experience prior to its secondary reflection which observes and 
categorizes the experience according to a particular social or intellectual 
construction. The primary experiences of madness and mysticism have been an 
aspect of human consciousness from our earliest recorded history. How it has 
been described has differed throughout millennia depending on the constructs 
that have developed to address the phenomenon. From a phenomenological 
perspective, therefore the science of spirituality and psychiatry that develops to 
interpret primary experience is descriptive not prescriptive.   
 
Two of the pioneers of the phenomenological method are Heidegger (d. 1976) 
and Husserl (d. 1938). A phenomenon is simply something that is presented to 
consciousness. Phenomenon, the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinct way 
in which something can be encountered (Heidegger [1926]/1962:55). The 
encounter of consciousness with a particular phenomenon requires a rigorous 
scientific approach. For the present research, Husserl’s criterion in the 
phenomenological method is a useful way to proceed.  
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Mathematics influenced Husserl's thinking, and thus, he sought a logical method 
to gain understanding of the experience of human consciousness (Byrne 
2001:1). According to Husserl there are the two poles of experience, noema and 
noesis. Noesis is the act of perceiving, while noema is that which is perceived. 
Noema can be reduced to their essential form or ‘essence’. Phenomenology 
aims at discovering the essential form (or eideia). To arrive at the eideia 
phenomenology engages in a process known as epoche in which the ‘natural 
attitude’ is placed aside so that the researcher may begin with ‘the things 
themselves,’ as Husserl said — or, in other words, in the phenomena as they 
show themselves in experience (eideia). Husserl contends that bracketing (ie, 
setting aside preconceived notions as well as cultural constructions developed 
from secondary reflection) enables one to objectively describe the phenomena 
under study. For Husserl all experiences inasmuch as they are presented to 
consciousness can be investigated according to this clear methodological 
framework. Robbins (2000:1) observes that phenomenology, beginning with 
Husserl, urges that the world of immediate or lived experience takes precedence 
over the objectified and abstract world of the ‘natural attitude’ of natural science. 
Science as such, thus, is secondary to the world of concrete, lived experience.  
 
From a phenomenological perspective, science is not a fixed entity. It is 
constantly shifting as history and interpretive models change. What is constant, 
however, is human experience. This is not to suggest that science itself is not 
meaningful. It is meaningful as an intellectual construct for human experience 
that allows for further study, research and dialogue. As noted above, science is 
constantly taking new forms through history as dominant paradigms and 
interpretations emerge. Consequently, science needs always to be understood in 
its historical and social context.  
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1.2. DELINEATION OF HISTORICAL TERMS 
The terms premodern, modern and postmodern are conceptual ways to delineate 
different horizons out of which our culture in the Western world began to 
conceive of science, politics, philosophy and religion. Bottum (1994:31) notes 
that with reference to the history of ideas, premodern refers to the long historical 
period before the Enlightenment while modern refers to the period of the 
Enlightenment.  The Enlightenment is broadly co-extensive with the eighteenth 
century, beginning with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and the writings of 
Locke (d. 1704) and Bayle (d. 1706). According to Pappe (2003) unlike earlier 
periods, which affected particular aspects of life or certain classes of the 
population, the Enlightenment witnessed and heralded sweeping social change. 
Its thought is basically a social philosophy, starting from social premises, 
concerned with social ends, and viewing even religion and art in social terms. It is 
also characterized by a strong emphasis on rationalism and empiricism. 
 
Postmodern refers to critical anti-Modernist thought that emerged post-World 
War II. Postmodernity had its genesis in the literary community as a method of 
critique but quickly spread from there to include philosophical approaches which 
tend to emphasize subjectivity, plurality and difference. Postmodernity is typified 
as a mistrust of grand systems that can explain every phenomenon. In recent 
times it has found expression in philosophers such as Levinas (d. 1995) and 
Lyotard (d. 1998) as well as historians such as Foucault (d.1984). Aspects of 
postmodernity can be found in the work of psychiatrists such as Jaspers (d. 
1969). Jaspers and psychotherapists such as Frankl (d. 1997) support a holistic 
and transcendental understanding of the human person that coheres well with 
phenomenologically rooted trends in contemporary spirituality. Additionally, 
aspects of what is now termed philosophically as postmodernity may be found in 
the thought of the Modernist theologian Tyrrell (d. 1909) as well as the 
existentialists Kierkegaard (d. 1855) and Nietzsche (d.1900). 
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1.3 DEMARCATION OF CHAPTERS 
The research is divided up into six main chapters. The present chapter deals with 
the introductory questions and literature survey.  
 
Chapter two critically examines how and why Christian spirituality is often 
understood in a phenomenological or existential context. By way of articulation of 
a contemporary understanding of spirituality, attention will be paid, inter alia, to 
the currents of Catholic Modernism in the early twentieth century, its antecedents 
in the currents of nineteenth century existentialism, as articulated by Nietzsche 
(d. 1900) and Kierkegaard (d. 1855), culminating in the contemporary currents of 
postmodernity as articulated by Levinas (d.1995).   
 
Chapter three critically examines the social history of madness. Indeed, the 
designation of madness as mental illness is itself a product of the modern period. 
In order to interpret the phenomena of madness, it is helpful to describe its social 
history by examining cultural attitudes towards madness and subsequently some 
of the social policies towards those labeled as mad in the premodern, modern 
and finally postmodern period. Critically examining the interpretations of 
madness that surfaced in these historical periods is helpful so as to more clearly 
grasp its elusive character.  
 
Chapter four discusses contemporary trends, challenges and crises within mental 
health and how a holistic understanding of the human person can lead to a more 
human treatment of people experiencing mental illness. This chapter offers as an 
antidote to the dehumanizing technology of modern bio-psychiatry the insights of 
Frankl (d. 1997), the father of logotherapy and Jaspers (d. 1969) the influential 
existential psychiatrist and philosopher. Both of these psychotherapists support a 
holistic and transcendental understanding of the human person that coheres well 
with contemporary, phenomenologically rooted trends in spirituality. 
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Chapter five illuminates the nature of mysticism and its role in facilitating a 
mentally healthy life. Here, how mysticism has historically played, and can 
continue to play, an important role in shaping a wholesome, life-giving, religious 
consciousness is discussed. Current research in mysticism by neuro-
psychiatrists will be explored. Additionally clinical criteria for addressing the 
differences between mental illness and mysticism will be presented.  
 
Chapter six will bring the divergent themes discussed in the dissertation together 
in order to assess the issues raised in addressing the value of spirituality in the 
field of mental health.  
 
1.4. LITERATURE SURVEY 
The literature survey locates the present research within the body of existing 
research in the area of spirituality and mental health. As the present research is 
located in a Christian context, certain primary literature sources which are 
foundational to Christian spirituality will be explored. The literature relating to the 
history and interpretation of mental health will also be reviewed.  
 
Finally, since the present research addresses the question of how spirituality 
expresses itself in contemporary mental health, a review of the literature related 
to mental health, spirituality and mysticism will be conducted.  
 
1.4.1 EARLY SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN SPIRITUALITY 
The earliest records of Christian spirituality come from the New Testament. All of 
the books of the New Testament were composed in the first and early part of the 
second century. No aspect of Christian spirituality can be understood apart from 
them. The early Christian community, through the teaching of the apostles, 
recorded the life of Jesus and the meaning this had for them in the form of 
gospels and letters.  
 
 10
From its earliest moments the early Christian community found itself in diverse 
settings. As a consequence, we begin to see differing spiritualities emerge based 
on differing sensitivities and approaches to the meaning of Jesus life, death and 
resurrection. This diversity is reflected in the four canonical gospels as well as 
the Pauline letters. The writers of the New Testament were steeped primarily in 
Hebrew culture although Greek culture exerted a strong intellectual influence. 
The influence of Greek culture on Hebrew culture is known as Hellenization. The 
extent to which Hellenziation is inherently part of the fabric of the New Testament 
scripture is debated, Nonetheless, in many important respects early Christian 
spirituality was steeped in Hebrew culture.  
 
For example, early Christian spirituality was heavily influenced by Hebrew 
understanding of history and one’s purpose within that history. In the Hebrew 
Scriptures, the world is presented as the field of humankind’s experience, the 
stage on which one’s work and destiny are played out. History is the major theme 
of Hebrew literature. History is not, as in Greek literature, the scientific study of 
the past as a means of finding out the eternal laws which govern all events.  
Rather, it looks toward the future, to a divinely appointed goal (Bultmann 
[1956]/1966:21). For Hebrew culture the culmination of human history rests in the 
notion of a messiah. Messianism is of ancient Hebrew origin and is the 
contribution of the Hebrew people to world history. The early Christians, who 
were steeped in Hebrew culture, saw in the historical figure of Jesus of 
Nazareth’s life, death and resurrection the final historical act of God in their 
history. This conviction became the source of their spirituality. This conviction is 
reflected in the New Testament. The decisive battle against the powers of evil 
had been won by Jesus and the final destiny of the world, a destiny of unceasing 
abundant life (John 10:10), of light (Matt 4:16), of justice (2 Peter 3:13), and of 
joy (Luke 2:10) had been granted to humanity and the entire creation in the 
person of the risen Christ (Zizioulas 2000:25). Humanity’s relationship with God 
is thus marked by the celebration of the risen Christ’s victory over evil and death.   
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Spirituality, for the early Christians, also involved interior renewal and 
transformation. We see in some of the letters of Paul that spirituality is 
interpreted as a personal and subjective transformation, an interior renewal and a 
change in being. For example in Romans 12:2, the apostle Paul exhorts the 
community not to be conformed to this world; this world meaning the prevailing 
customs and conventions of the society in which they find themselves.  They 
should instead be transformed by the renewing of the mind. Additionally, in one 
of the letters to the community in Corinth (1 Cor. 2:14-15) Paul contrasts the 
‘spiritual person’ (pneumatikos anthropos) with the ‘natural person’ (psychikos 
anthropos). This duality between the spiritual person and the natural person is a 
unique departure from traditional Jewish and Hebrew anthropology. According to 
Schneiders (1999:258), Paul’s usage makes it clear that he is not contrasting a 
person with a human spirit in the sense of a soul, that is, a living person, with one 
who lacks a soul that is, a dead person. Both are alive. The spiritual person, 
however is qualitatively different than the natural person. The spiritual person is 
one who is indwelt by the Holy Spirit of God. The consequence of this is that 
there is an ontological change of being in the spiritual person. The spiritual 
person is a new creature with a new relationship with God.  
 
Paul departed from Jewish tradition in that he did not exhort the new followers of 
Christianity to observe the law as outlined in the early sources of Jewish scripture 
and tradition. In a further departure from Hebrew culture Paul emphasized the 
importance of freedom and love (1 Cor. 13:13) over the law and regulation. The 
spiritual freedom given under grace and freedom from the law should not 
become a pretext for self-indulgence but should instead be directed towards the 
building up of the community through love for one another (cf. Gal 5:13). Paul did 
set out criteria by which one can know the fruits of the Spirit versus what he 
termed the ‘desires of the flesh’. Of the latter he notes, fornication, impurity, 
enmities, strife, jealousy, anger, quarrelling, and envy. Of the gifts of the Spirit he 
includes, love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, 
gentleness and self control (Gal 5:16-24). 
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The New Testament continues to be the primary source of Christian spirituality.  
Interpreting the meaning of New Testament texts is known as exegesis. Not 
surprisingly, considerable exegetical debate emerged historically. Schneiders 
contributes a chapter on ‘Scripture and Spirituality’ in Christian Spirituality – 
Origins to the Twelfth Century (Mcginn, B Meyendorff & Leclercq J 2000).  In it 
she outlines the various methods of Scriptural exegesis that have influenced 
Christian spirituality to this day. In particular Schneiders notes that in the 
twentieth century the limitations of the scientific method of exegesis characteristic 
of the modern period is being acknowledged. The rediscovery of the power of 
symbolism, the ubiquity of metaphorical thinking and the development of a more 
adequate understanding of the constitutive function of imagination is assisting us 
in appreciating anew the ancient biblical exegesis of the patristic period. This is 
not to say that a simple return to the methods of the patristic period is the way to 
proceed. However, a renewed appreciation of the reflections from this period 
reveals important insights. 
 
The historical period following the development of Biblical texts is known the 
Patristic period. Richardson’s (2002) work on the early fathers of the Church, 
Early Christian Fathers, outlines some of the pivotal figures of post-Biblical, 
second and third century Christianity who were influential in the approach of the 
Christian Church to questions of faith and spirituality. There emerged with the 
early Church fathers two distinct schools of theology to address spiritual 
questions. These schools are referred to as the Alexandrian and Antiochene 
schools based on their geographical and intellectual differences. The Alexandrian 
and Antiochene schools reflect convergent intellectual themes and approaches 
across geographical contexts. 
  
From the Antiochene school emerged early church fathers such as Ignatius of 
Antioch (d. 117) and Irenaeus (d. 202). The writers of the Antiochene School 
disliked the allegorical method, and sought almost exclusively the literal, primary, 
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or historical sense of Holy Scripture. The other school was the Alexandrian 
school. It was much more open to Hellenistic thought and the allegorical method 
of exegesis. The Alexandrian school is characterized by a much more 
cosmological approach to spirituality. One of the most influential representatives 
of this school is Origen (d. 254). The Alexandrian school also rooted itself in 
scripture but interpreted scripture much more allegorically; within a cosmic 
Platonic philosophical paradigm.  
 
In addition to the Alexandrian and Antioch school which were well established 
within the ambit of orthodox Christianity, there emerged another group known 
collectively as the Gnostics. Aside from the polemics against them from figures 
such as Irenaeus, little was known about the Gnostic’s doctrine, as they 
themselves interpreted it, until 1945 when the Nag Hammadi texts were 
discovered. The collected works can be found in a compilation edited by James 
Robinson and translated by members of the Coptic Gnostic Library Project of the 
Institute for Anitquity and Christianity in Claremont California. This work is 
entitled the Nag Hammadi Library – The definitive new translation of the Gnostic 
scriptures complete in one volume (Robinson 1988). It is a useful source in that 
we now have the complete texts that a particular community was using to 
understand spirituality. The Gnostic texts themselves have a certain neo-Platonic 
philosophical quality to them. The emphasis on interior illumination is ever 
present. The texts are marked by a non-historical, allegorical approach. 
Frequently Biblical figures important to the early Christian community such as 
Mary of Magdalene are juxtaposed against other figures such as Peter. The 
confrontation between Mary and Peter in gospels such as the Gospel of Mary is 
a symbolic representation of the confrontation between Church authority and the 
individual’s own mystical truth. There is little to support the historicity of texts 
such as the Gospel of Mary as they were written some time well into the second 
century (Robinson 1988:524). Nonetheless these texts illustrate the tensions that 
existed in early Christianity and shed light on the diversity and range of spiritual 
expression that existed in the early years of Christianity. 
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The importance of the various schools such as the Alexandrian and Antiochene 
as well as the presence of Gnostic sects is that they demonstrate that Christian 
spirituality has never been one single monolithic entity. While the main historical 
foundations from Scripture and the Patristic period assist in guiding 
interpretation, Christian spirituality is constantly evolving through interaction with 
various intellectual and cultural contexts. This dimension of spirituality is outlined 
in an important work that explores the historical evolution of Christian spirituality 
in an encyclopedic format.  It is entitled Christian Spirituality – Origins to the 
Twelfth Century – Volume I (Mcginn, B Meyendorff & Leclercq J 2000), Christian 
Spirituality – High Middle Ages and Reformation  – Volume II (Raitt, J ed.2000) 
and Christian Spirituality – Post-Reformation and Modern – Volume III (Dupre, L 
& Saliers, D. 2000). The collection is primarily a reflection upon the historical 
manifestations of Christian experience, namely Christian spirituality as an 
academic discipline. In the introduction, McGinn (2000:xvi) notes that traditional 
Roman Catholic ascetical or mystical theology covered much, but by no means 
all, of what is intended by the term spirituality. Spirituality, both as a lived 
experience and as reflections on experience is a broader and more inclusive 
terms than either asceticism or mysticism. Although spirituality is intimately tied 
to theology, particularly to what many today are calling practical theology, 
spirituality has an identity of its own. 
 
Spirituality is a relatively new area of speciality. Since the 1970’s, it is not 
unusual to find postgraduate specialties in spirituality at most theological schools.  
Spirituality favours an ecumenical and multi-disciplinary approach. It has become 
a specialty in its own right with many scholars developing the contours of this 
discipline for continuing researchers in the area. 
 
1.4.2 SPIRITUALITY AS ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE 
In her paper Theology and Spirituality: Strangers, Rivals or Partners? Schneiders 
(1986:270) notes that there has been a historic shift from the medieval synthesis 
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achieved by Aquinas (d.1274) when he placed what would later be called 
‘spirituality’ as a subdivision of moral theology. This medieval synthesis was 
maintained well until the middle of the twentieth century. The world-shattering 
events of two world wars, the technological revolution, liberation movements of 
all kinds, and rapid developments in philosophy, the humanities, and social 
sciences brought Aquinas’ comprehensive medieval synthesis hold on the 
Christian imagination to an end. Aquinas’ synthesis has been replaced by a 
holistic orientation. The holistic approach makes the study of spirituality infinitely 
more complex. From a holistic perspective, it is no longer possible for us to 
fragment the human person into parts and faculties, into inner and outer, into 
personal and social. The academic task of spirituality consists in bringing this rich 
multi-facetedness into unity. Schneiders notes that spirituality has dominated the 
Catholic consciousness since the 1970’s. Since spirituality is a relatively new 
discipline, Schneiders concludes that spirituality must make its own alliances but 
that it deserves to belong in the household of theology in the broad sense of that 
term.  
 
As a distinct specialty of study, most scholars acknowledge the challenge that 
exists in developing spirituality as a distinct discipline. Cousins (2000:xiii), in 
Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century, a series of essays on the 
subject of spirituality as it has been expressed in the Christian tradition notes  
that in the context of modern scholarship, spirituality has not been extricated from 
the history of religions, and the philosophy of religion and theology. Its central 
focus, its categories and concepts, and its methodology have not been 
established to the point of being commonly accepted as conventions. Aware that 
interest in spirituality is growing, additional research in spirituality is emerging 
within the academic community much as psychology and sociology emerged as 
distinct disciplines with specific methods at the turn of the last century. It would 
be hasty therefore to conclude that spirituality does not have a rigorous, 
scholarly, methodological approach for students and scholars.  
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Waaijman (2002) for example in Spirituality - Forms, Foundations, Methods 
demonstrates methods to describe and analyze different spiritualities. 
Additionally, he draws out certain themes within spirituality and suggests ways in 
which they can be distinguished to allow for meaningful study and engagement. 
Waaijman engages in substantive discussion of method in spirituality. He 
suggests that the preferred method for spirituality is the phenomenological 
approach derived from Husserl. Additionally he supports the dialogical style of 
Buber (d. 1965). Waaijman combines the ‘I-Thou’ approach of Buber with 
Husserl’s method suggesting that a foundational description for spirituality is the 
divine-human relational process as personal transformation. 
 
Another useful compilation of essays on method in spirituality is Minding the 
Spirit - The Study of Christian Spirituality edited by Dreyer and Burrows (2004).  
Minding the Spirit presents twenty-five essays by scholars in the field of 
spirituality who each address critical and methodological issues related to 
spirituality as an academic discipline. Three approaches are outlined. They are 
the historical, theological and anthropological. With the historical approach, 
researchers studying spirituality examine it in terms of it social context and 
cultural milieu. The theological approach is characteristic of the study of 
spirituality in seminaries and denominational schools where the spiritual 
experience is evaluated according to theological norms established by the 
denomination. This approach is utilized to assist people in applying faith as 
described and articulated by the religious community to personal life. The 
anthropological approach identifies spirituality as a universal human capacity for 
interpreting human experience according to its transcendental dimension. It is 
interested in methodological issues related to understanding and articulating 
spiritual experience. Christian spirituality, according to the anthropological 
approach, is one particular form among many in the world. The present research 
follows the anthropological approach.    
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In her paper Spirituality as an Academic Discipline, Schneiders (1993:11) notes 
that the field of spirituality is complex and that it is useful to identify one’s interest 
in studying it. For example, some people study spirituality in order to learn how to 
live the spiritual life; others to understand it theoretically, its structure and 
function, and its relation to theology or psychology or social context. Importantly, 
Schneiders distinguishes spirituality from psychology by way of analogy. 
Schneiders (1993:11) notes that the primary application of the term psychology is 
to that dimension of the human subject in virtue of which the person is a relatively 
autonomous self, i.e. a center of personal consciousness or subjectivity. In this 
sense, everyone has a psychology or is a psychological entity. The term 
spirituality refers to that dimension of the human subject in virtue of which the 
person is capable of self-transcending integration in relation to the Ultimate, 
whatever the Ultimate is for the person in question. In this sense, every human 
being has a capacity for spirituality or is a spiritual being. Academically, 
psychology applies to the experimental and theoretical study of human 
subjectivity and to the clinical disciplines aimed at the therapeutic fostering of 
healthy subjectivity. Similarly, from an academic perspective the term spirituality 
applies to the experimental and theoretical study of human efforts at self- 
transcending integration and to the pastoral practices aimed at fostering the 
spirituality of individuals and groups. Schneiders (1993:15) concludes that the 
academic discipline of spirituality serves as an intellectual resource for the living 
of the spiritual life. To Schneider’s statement that the field of spirituality can serve 
as a resource for living the spiritual life, I would also add that it could serve as a 
resource for living a mentally healthy life. In terms of spirituality as it relates to 
mental health it is important to note that the nature of mental health needs to be 
clarified before a discussion of how spirituality is to be understood in that context. 
There is an increasing body of research emerging that critically examines mental 
illnesses.    
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1.4.3 INTERPRETING MENTAL HEALTH 
Illuminating the nature of mental illness is a very complex enterprise. Some 
psychiatrists such as Szasz take the position that mental illness is a metaphor or 
a ‘myth’. One of Szasz’s better known works entitled The Myth of Mental Illness 
was first published in 1974. Szasz rejects the notion of mental illness as a distinct 
disease. He makes the point that during certain historical periods, explanatory 
concepts such as deities, witches, and micro-organisms appeared not only as 
theories but as self-evident causes of a vast number of events including the 
event of madness. He argues that today mental illness is widely regarded in a 
somewhat similar fashion. In mental health there is, as in every medical science, 
a complex matrix of historical and social interpretation that influences the 
epistemological categorizations of mental illness that are applied to specific 
individuals or populations. Szasz remains controversial and any description of 
mental illness will involve his perspectives. He is often cited by scholars and 
historians of mental health. For example, in the book, The Confinement of the 
Insane: International Perspectives, 1800-1965, Porter and Wright (2003:2) note 
that, according to Szasz, the medical profession over the centuries has been 
involved in a self-serving manufacture of madness. In this, Szasz indicts both the 
pretensions of organic psychiatry and the psychodynamic followers of Freud, 
whose notion of the ‘unconscious' in effect breathed new life into the obsolete 
metaphysical Cartesian dualism. For Szasz, any expectation of finding the 
etiology of mental illness in body or mind - above all in some mental underworld - 
must be a lost cause, a dead-end, a linguistic error, and even an exercise in bad 
faith. What the approach of Szasz assists in illustrating, Porter and Wright note, 
is that insanity is not a disease with origins to be excavated, but a behavior with 
meanings to be decoded. Therefore it is always necessary to place mental health 
in its historical and cultural context.  Additionally, it is very important to listen to 
first person accounts of people who are experiencing trauma, since the cause is 
often encoded in their speech or behaviour.   
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 A very good example of first person accounts is found in Porter’s (1987) work, A 
Social History of Madness: the World through the Eyes of the Insane. Porter 
(1987:3) notes, when we juxtapose the mind of the insane with that of reason, 
society and culture, we see two facets, two expressions, two faces, and each 
puts the question of meaning to the other. If normality condemns madness as 
irrational, subhuman and perverse, madness typically replies in kind, having its 
own tu quoque. As Porter (1987:3) states, the writings of the mad challenge the 
discourse of the normal, challenge its right to be the objective mouthpiece of the 
times. The assumption that there exists definitive and unitary standards of truth 
and falsehood, reality and delusion is put to the test. Porter analyzes the 
phenomena of madness as it relates to a variety of topics such as power, 
religion, and women. Porter gives specific examples to illustrate his point that in 
addition to viewing madness as a disease it is equally possible to think in terms 
of the manufacture of madness, that is, the idea that labeling insanity is primarily 
a social act, a cultural construct.   
 
The designation of madness as a medical problem – hence a ‘mental illness’ is 
primarily a product of the modern period. It remains the dominant paradigm 
through which madness is interpreted. Foucault in Madness and Civilization 
(1988) illustrates that one can show that the medicalization of madness is a 
phenomenological interpretation connected with a whole series of social and 
economic processes at a given time, and also with institutions and practices of 
power. Foucault argues that there is a marked shift in our intellectual horizon as 
we move from premodern to modern history. The fear of death is not the horizon 
that frames purposeful meaning; it is now the fear of insanity enveloping society 
in a grand apocalyptic universal event. Foucault argues that the fearful figure of 
the madman emerges as leprosy disappears and the age of reason is born. The 
colonies that formally held lepers begin to house the mad.  Because rationality in 
the modern period became so highly vaunted, the insane are to be confined as 
they are a contagion, disrupting the normal, reasonable civil order.  
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Foucault’s influence in the area of describing the dynamics associated with 
modern medical practices in general and mental health in particular has been 
substantial. Jones joined Porter (1994) in editing a series of essays analyzing 
medical practice following Foucault’s phenomenological approach. It is entitled, 
Reassessing Foucault: Power, Medicine and the Body. While some are critical of 
Foucault’s idealism with respect to medicine, most agree that mental illness 
needs to be set apart from other biological illnesses. For example, Freundlieb 
(1994) in Foucault’s Theory of Discourse and Human Agency is critical of 
Foucault’s Idealism with respect to his theory of medical discourse but 
nonetheless concedes that madness is complex and deserves to be placed in a 
separate category from other natural medical illnesses.  
 
What we see in contemporary scholarship related to the history and interpretation 
of mental health is a desire to return to individual experience and adopt a more 
critical posture with respect to the development of diagnosis to label that 
experience.   
 
Recent clinical research is also cautioning against an overly dogmatic approach 
to classifying mental illness as a disease. How diagnostic categories should be 
understood is an important question that Kendell and Jablensky (2003) address 
in Distinguishing Between the Validity and Utility of Psychiatric Diagnoses.  
According to Kendell and Jablensky (2003:7), the assumption among a number 
of researchers today is that most currently recognized psychiatric disorders are 
not diseases. They conclude, therefore, that it is important to distinguish between 
the validity and the utility of all diagnostic concepts and of their formal definitions. 
At present there is little evidence that, strictly speaking, most contemporary 
psychiatric diagnoses are valid, because they are still defined by syndromes that 
have not been demonstrated to have natural boundaries.  
 
With the increasing emphasis on technology in psychiatry, professionals in 
mental health are concerned with the reductionistic tendencies associated with it. 
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Andreasen’s (2001) editorial in the American Journal of Psychiatry ‘Diversity in 
Psychiatry: Or, Why Did We Become Psychiatrists?’ places the issue in context.  
 
 Many of us are being pressured to see ourselves as 
psychopharmocologists who prescribe medications to treat ‘brain 
diseases,’ at the expense of forgetting that the mind and the person 
may need treatment with psychotherapy as well.  Many of us feel 
overwhelmed by the pace at which the neuroscientific basis of 
psychiatry is growing, and threatened by the possibility that we 
cannot keep up or learn enough to practice well.  The technicalities 
of dopamine receptors, lod scores, in situ hybridization, thalamic 
nuclei, and signal transduction seem both irrelevant to the 
individual person whom we treat and also beyond our purview or 
intellectual grasp (2001:673).  
 
Tasman (2002) in his article Lost in the DSM-IV checklist: Empathy, meaning and 
the doctor-patient relationship fears that we are training a generation of 
psychiatrists who lack the basic skills and framework for understanding mental 
health from a humanistic perspective. With the emphasis on neuro-science and 
pharmacology, new psychiatrists are not acquiring empathetic listening skills and 
may lack the appreciation of the role of the symbolic in interpreting symptoms. 
 
In the postmodern frame of reference, mental health is profoundly concerned 
with individuality, subjectivity and ultimately issues related to the meaning of 
human experience. Since human experience involves a relationship with the 
transcendent, psychiatry and spirituality are rapidly converging.  
 
1.4.4  MENTAL HEALTH AND SPIRITUALITY 
Some of the pioneers of psychoanalysis of the modern period such as Freud  (d. 
1939) have had at best an ambivalent attitude towards the religious impulse of 
the human person. Others such as Jung (d.1961) and Jaspers (d.1969) were 
congenial to spirituality.    
 
Ever since the time of  Freud and his book, The Future of an Illusion (1927), 
where he psychoanalyzed the religious impulse as being rooted partly in 
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narcissistic needs, attachments and wish fulfillments, certain segments of 
psychiatry have had, at best, an ambivalent attitude towards the religious impulse 
of the human person. Even during Freud’s time however, there was considerable 
disagreement concerning the role of spirituality. A close disciple of Freud was 
Jung who eventually parted company with Freud over Freud’s excessive sexual 
theory. In contrast to Freud’s sexualized theories, Jung embraced spirituality.  
 
Jung remains an influential founder of many contemporary forms of psycho-
spirituality. According to Jung the psyche creates the experience of the divine. In 
Psychology and Religion (1969), one of his later works, Jung equates the 
experience of the divinity with the experience of numinosum.  The numiosum for 
Jung is an internal aspect of transcendence that is not outside of the human 
person.  Dourley (2001:3) in explaining this Jungian concept notes that for Jung, 
the numinous is not the ‘wholly other God’. Instead archetypical energy and 
imagery, created by the religious experience itself within the psyche, works in the 
interests of the personal integration of the individual in whom it occurs. Contained 
within the natural psyche, is its intra-psychic ‘creator’ seeking redemption in its 
creature. Jung, therefore, contains the dialogue between the human and the 
divine to the immediate dialogue of consciousness.  
 
The development of a coherent approach to mental health as well as spirituality 
has been undertaken by Jaspers, who in 1946 produced a very comprehensive 
and rich tome entitled General Psychopathology. Jaspers began early on in his 
career to ask important questions concerning mental health and spirituality. 
Jaspers observes that the greatest successes in mental health have not 
belonged to psychiatrists but to shamans, priests, leaders of sects, wonder-
workers, confessors and spiritual guides of earlier times (Jaspers 
[1946]/1963:806). Jaspers’ methodology in General Psychopathology is 
compelling, particularly in its ability to meet the exigencies of our postmodern 
era. It is also consistent with the trajectory of contemporary trends both in 
spirituality and mental health with their emphasis on holistic approaches. Jaspers 
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observes that the individual is truly unique; consequently, the therapist needs to 
approach each individual with religious reverence. Supporting a holistic 
anthropology, Jaspers writes: 
 
At some decisive point every individual is as it were, in theological 
language ‘created’ from a source of his own and not merely a 
processing of a modified hereditary substance…Far from being the 
sum of his hereditary factors (which would be quite correct for his 
material preconditions and determinants) the individual is directly 
created of God (Jaspers [1946]/1963:753). 
 
Jaspers’ approach differs from Jung. For Jung the spiritual process consists in 
discovering the core spiritual self through various psychodynamic processes and 
testing which uncover broad archetypes that are expressed in particular people.  
Thus the spiritual self corresponds to an archetypical pattern. The aim of 
psychoanalysis is to discover these archetypes. For Jaspers since each 
individual is, as it were, a singular category, there is no internal archetype to 
discover. The self is not discovered in advance. Instead, the spiritual journey 
consists in becoming one’s own self through concrete existential responses to 
life. The focus of analysis therefore is on the moral choices that we make in 
response to the question of life. As a consequence of these moral choices, we 
discover or rather create our self. 
 
One of the best known proponents of facilitating an existential approach to 
questions of spiritual meaning is found in the work Frankl. Frankl spent time in a 
Nazi concentration camp and while there developed what he termed logotherapy. 
Frankl outlines logotherapy in his well known book Man’s Search for Meaning: an 
Introduction to Logotherapy (1959). Logos is a principle originating in classical 
Greek thought which refers to a universal divine reason, immanent in nature, yet 
transcending all oppositions and imperfections in the cosmos and humanity. In 
most of its usages, logos is marked by two main distinctions - the first dealing 
with human reason (the rationality in the human mind which seeks to attain 
universal understanding and harmony), the second with universal intelligence 
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(the universal ruling force governing and revealing through the cosmos to 
humankind, i.e., the Divine) (Counterbalance Foundation 1995). In the context of 
logotherapy logos refers to the former; namely to the ability of the human person 
to craft meaning from challenging, difficult and chaotic life contexts. Logotherapy 
emerged from an awareness of the spiritual dynamic at work in the unconscious, 
based on Frankl’s personal perspective and his experience and observation. 
Logotherapy is a form of existential analysis.   
 
According to the International Society for Existential Analysis and Logotherapy 
(GLE International 2006:1), logotherapy can be defined as a phenomenological 
and person-oriented psychotherapy, with the aim of leading the person to dare 
(mentally and emotionally) free experiences, to induce authentic decisions and to 
bring about a truly responsible way of responding to life and the world. 
Logotherapy is not about imposing meaning from a knowledgeable therapist who 
can decode the individual’s experience. Nor is it about discovering archetypical 
patterns. The locus of control remains with the individuals themselves, as they 
come to perceptual awareness of the meaning and purpose of their lives. 
Logotherapy does not see a person as the mere result of inner-psychic 
processes or of the influences of his or her environment, but as someone who 
can shape himself or herself in those things that count in life. Therefore notions 
like being (existence), relation (values), freedom of decision, responsibility 
(conscience) form the fundamental concepts of the existential analytical way of 
thinking and they all lead to the idea of meaning (logos).  
 
While the term spirituality in the context of mental health is generally used to 
denote movements of the will towards meaning and purpose, there is another 
more precise existential experience of the spiritual life that has historically been 
referred to as mysticism. Considerable research is being done in this area. 
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1.4.5  MENTAL HEALTH AND MYSTICISM 
Prince (1979) in his article Religious Experience and Psychosis concludes that it 
is becoming clear that mystical experiences are widely distributed throughout the 
population. He argues that mystical experience can be distinguished from 
psychosis. The phenomenon of mystical experience represents successful 
transformation on the part of individuals experiencing life stress. Prince 
researches the frequency and distribution of mystical experience by surveying 
several different studies on the subject. From the three surveys he notes that 
each study agrees that twenty to forty per cent of the population at large report 
mystical experiences The Chicago based NORC survey team (1973) and the 
Religious Experience Unit from Oxford (1976) found that frequent mystical 
experiences are linked with higher social classes while the Gallup Poll (1962) 
found the reverse. Interestingly, both the NORC and Oxford studies also support 
Douglas-Smith’s (1971) suggestion in his research entitled ‘An Empirical Study of 
Religious Mysticism’ published in the British Journal of Psychiatry that those who 
report mystical experience are in good mental health (Prince 1977:171).  
 
Similarly, Hood and Morris (1981) in Knowledge and Experience Criteria in the 
Reporting of Mystical Experience note that current studies of mysticism are 
remarkably consistent in finding approximately one-third of persons sampled 
report having had a mystical experience. The unexpected high frequencies of 
reported mystical experience may be related to the fact that as criteria for 
mysticism become more publicly discussed, more persons can identify previously 
unlabeled experiences (or perhaps differently labeled) as mystical (Hood and 
Morris 1981:76). Their research reveals that people can apply objective criteria to 
their experience to determine whether they had a mystical experience. To test 
this hypothesis, Hood and Morris place 91 items in five major factor groups. The 
five factor groups were: 1. Religious; 2. Unity; 3. Affect; 4. Time and Space; and 
5. Noetic. Examples of items placed in the five major factor groups were a sense 
of reverence (religious item); an experience of unity with an outside world (unity 
item); joy (affective item); an experience that is both timeless and spaceless 
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(temporal/spatial item); and a great increase in understanding and knowledge 
(noetic item). In their study they found that persons reporting mystical experience 
have intense experiences knowledgably recognized as mystical, while persons 
who report not having such experiences differ more in the absence of such 
experiences than in the recognition of the criteria for mysticism. Hood and Morris 
conclude that, based on their research, it appears to be the case that persons 
affirming mystical experience report a greater intensity of experience overall 
based on component factors of mystical criteria. They interpret the foregoing to 
mean that such persons knowingly apply criteria to affirm a mystical experience 
that they report having experienced. On the other hand, persons not affirming 
mystical experiences tend to indicate experience ratings lower overall based on 
component factors of mystical criteria. They interpret this to mean that such 
persons knowingly recognize appropriate criteria for mysticism that they simply 
have no experience of at least at the intensity of persons affirming the experience 
(Hood and Morris 1981:82). Hood and Morris’ research demonstrates that 
mysticism is a distinctive human experience and that people can knowingly 
assess whether they have experienced it or not. 
 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that not all self-reports of ecstatic divine 
union indicates a profound religious experience. The difference between 
psychosis and mysticism is one that requires a careful evaluation. Siglag’s (1986) 
dissertation Schizophrenia and Mystical Experience: Similarities and Differences 
is an example of just such an evaluation. Siglag (1986:iii) writes that the overall 
results of his research consistently supports the view that the pattern of 
experiences reported by individuals with schizophrenia differ in identifiable ways 
from what the literature describes as classical mystical experience. Siglag 
(1986:37-38) outlines the basic symptoms of schizophrenia as: 1) Disturbance of 
association; chains of thinking are organized according to non-logical rules of 
condensation, and symbolism, such as words being connected by similarity in 
sound rather than meaning. 2) Affect, rather than logic, has a dominant role in 
thought formation; 3) Obstructions of thought occur in which the mental stream 
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suddenly ceases. Thought may continue from seconds to days later, but often 
with what appears to be completely new thought; 4) A feeling of ‘thought 
pressure’ exists in which the patient feels as if a force outside of his conscious 
volition directly puts thoughts in his mind; 5) Affective disturbances may take the 
form of apparent lack of emotional responsiveness associated with extreme 
withdrawal, or extreme overactivity associated with negativity and irritability. 6) A 
‘schizophrenic ambivalence’ exists in which ‘contrasts that otherwise are mutually 
exclusive exist side by side in the psyche’. 
   
After a review of the literature, Siglag (1986:64-65) summarizes the 
characteristics described by most authors as occurring in mystical states: 1) 
Difficulty putting the experience into words, a nonverbal quality; 2) Alteration in 
sense of time and space; 3) Loss or diminution of ego boundaries which may be 
related to the experience of loss of control, and the sense of being influenced or 
in contact with a powerful external force; 4) Alterations in rational thought 
processes and logic, allowing such experiences as the acceptance of seemingly 
paradoxical thoughts; 5) Perceptual/sensory alterations sometimes as dramatic 
as hallucinations and out of the body experiences; 6)  An experience of unity or 
oneness with the universe; 7) Sense of sacredness; 8) Noetic quality; 9) A strong 
sense of self, or a strong ego prior to having a mystical experience; 10) The 
mystical experience is of short duration; 11) Positive changes in attitudes, 
behaviours, and interpersonal relationships of those who experience mystical 
state.  
 
Concerning the relative similarity of the schizophrenic and mystical experience, 
Siglag notes that individuals reported intense positive affective experiences, and 
experience of timelessness/spacelessness. This supports the view that there are 
similar psychological processes operating in terms of schizophrenia and 
mysticism which might superficially lead some to identify mysticism with 
schizophrenia. Other conclusions from his research, however, reveal 
psychological processes of individuals undergoing a psychotic experience which 
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differ in significant ways from individuals undergoing a mystical experience. For 
example, the lack of any distinct unifying factor which is present in the mystical 
experience suggests that this factor is not a primary aspect of the psychological 
processes of schizophrenia (Siglag 1986:132). People experiencing 
schizophrenia do experience the common mystical experience of loss of 
orientation and thoughts from one’s mind. However, what is noticeably absent is 
the ability to experience a sense of unity or order in one’s world. By way of 
contrast the mystical experience leads to a profound sense of integration.3   
 
This integration which is facilitated by the mystical process has been described 
by psychiatrists D’Aquili and Newberg (1999:14) as absolute unitary being. 
D’Aquili and Newberg’s research has contributed greatly to our understanding of 
the mystical experience from a neurological point of view. As a result of their 
research on mysticism and the mechanics of the brain they have developed what 
they term neuro-theology. Their neuro-theological research is outlined in The 
Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious Experience (1999) D’Aquili and 
Newberg argue that a neuro-psychiatric approach to mysticism establishes that 
there are certain core elements that appear to be universal and that can be 
separated from particular cultural matrices. From a strictly neuro-psychiatric 
perspective the brain gives us our sense of reality – including our understanding 
of the reality of God. In a compelling retort to the charge of reductionism D’Aquili 
and Newberg state that to maintain that the reality of peoples’ objective 
experience of God is due to neuro-chemical flux, and nothing more, is equivalent 
to maintaining that their experience of the ‘objective’ reality of the sun, the earth, 
and the air they breathe is reducible to neuro-chemical flux (D’Aquili and 
Newberg 1999:120). As an anecdote, they cite a Zen koan in which two monks 
argue about a flag waving in the wind. One argues that the wind moves, the other 
                                                 
3 The integration that the mystical state facilitates may take some time to be observed and integrated within 
the personality. A spiritual facilitator familiar with the mystical process is useful in assisting in this process. 
As reported in Acts 9, Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus is instructive. Paul’s eyes were opened 
but he could see nothing (v. 8). For three days he neither ate nor drank.  He was eventually assisted by 
Ananias, one of the disciples in Damascus. This event led to a complete change in religious and cultural 
vision. As a result Paul became one of the most important leaders in the early Christian community. 
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that the flag moves. Finally, the master says that it is neither the flag nor the wind 
that moves; it is the mind that moves. In similar fashion we can say that it is the 
mind that moves, regardless of whether it is experiencing baseline reality, or 
whether it is experiencing God (D’Aquili and Newberg 1999:120). Such an 
approach no more negates the objective reality of God than it negates the 
objective reality of the sun, the earth, and the air we breathe. D’Aquili and 
Newberg’s research is compelling for our understanding why mysticism has had 
such a positive impact on so many people, from diverse cultural and religious 
traditions throughout human history.  
 
The significance of work such as Siglag’s and D’Aquili and Newberg is that it is 
now possible to differentiate psychosis from the mystical process both 
psychoanalytically and neuro-psychiatrically. Consequently, therapy can be 
directed at integration of the knowledge acquired through emerging 
interdisciplinary dialogue between spirituality and mental health, thus utilizing the 
growth potential of the mystical experience. Much work remains to be done in the 
development of this area. However, it is evident from the research that the 
foundation is being laid for such efforts to come to fruition. 
 
Authentic mystical experience has historically been able to unify the deep 
structures of exteriority and interiority, otherness and sameness, the Divine and 
the human. For this reason it is beneficial to open up the received wisdom of the 
mystical tradition of the great religious traditions in order that it be more widely 
diffused within the world, and particularly within the area of mental health. 
   
 Lancaster (2001:47) notes in his study on Eckhart, Kabbalah and the Limits of 
Psychological Inquiry that there is an urgent need for a mature understanding of 
the relationship between knowledge based on psychological research and 
insights from mystics. The mystical dimensions of religious practices, whether 
Christian as in the case of Eckhart (d.1328) or Jewish as in the case of Abulafia 
(d.1291) arise when the mystic actively engages with processes that are labeled 
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in psychoanalytic language as preconscious or unconscious. Eckhart and 
Abulifafia were not simply communicating a mystical experience but were also 
trying to communicate the knowledge acquired through their experience. This 
they accomplished through the categories of thought in which they were 
immersed. The question Lancaster asks is to what extent might the introduction 
of psychological terms – perhaps replacing their more philosophical ones – meet 
the challenge of understanding that human-divine relationship which lies at the 
focus of all their endeavours? Lancaster argues that the mystics can sharpen our 
psychological models.   
 
May (2004) in The Dark Night of the Soul – A Psychiatrist Explores the 
Relationship Between Darkness and Spiritual Growth relates the traditional 
notion of the dark night of the soul as articulated by the mystic John of the Cross 
(d.1591) to contemporary issues of depression and addiction. The dark night (a 
mystical experience in which one feels bereft of the presence of God (or the 
subsequent gifts of joy and hope) is a natural existential experience that occurs 
even to people who are good.  In other words the dark night is not necessarily a 
punishment from God but can be a blessing. As a consequence of the dark night 
we become liberated from our attachments and cravings. In his work May sounds 
an oft repeated note that resonates with many professionals in mental health; 
namely that mental health practice involves ways to ease the pain of the moment 
and not so much to find meaning in it. Returning to a core existential theme, May 
notes that easing suffering is not as important as helping others to find meaning 
in it. Based on the received wisdom of the mystics John of the Cross and Teresa 
of Avila (d.1582) May argues that the dark night can be liberating. It can be seen 
as a blessing and a precursor to an enhanced mystical consciousness.  
 
1.5 SUMMARY 
The literature suggests that a path is now open for a fruitful and mutually 
enriching dialogue between spirituality and mental health. The present research 
explores not only what is meant by mental health but how spirituality is 
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understood within mental health. The speciality of spirituality is the proper 
discipline, not only for clarifying spirituality, but also for clarifying the nature of 
mysticism in a critical and rigorous way. All persons inasmuch as they are human 
seek to understand their experience of the Divine, the transcendent, in ways 
readily apparent to them. Spirituality has the benefit of accessing and mining the 
vast history and tradition of spirituality and mysticism as it has been expressed 
and interpreted historically and entering into meaningful dialogue with mental 
health. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 SPIRITUALITY IN A CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT  
 
To be alive is power, 
Existence in Itself, 
Without a further function, 
Omnipotence enough.  
 
Dickinson [1894]/1993:178 
 
2.0  INTRODUCTION 
Increasing secularization, particularly in the West, has challenged all religions as 
they begin to adapt and respond to the modern world. Scientific developments, 
new interpretive methods for history, the advent of sociology, psychology and the 
social sciences have each had their effect on religions’ self-understanding. One 
of the effects of increasing secularization is that there has been a fracture 
between religion and spirituality. One hears frequently from people that they 
consider themselves spiritual but not religious. Today spirituality and religion 
have become dichotomized in the minds of many. Spirituality often represents 
something personal, positive, and liberating while religion something 
bureaucratic, negative and oppressive (Schneiders 1999:1).1   
 
Given both the interest in spirituality and the ambiguity attached to the term it is 
clear that spirituality, as an acknowledged human phenomenon, needs to 
develop its own contemporary methodologies and contribute to the body of 
knowledge in a scientific or academic milieu. This challenge is recognized within 
the emerging speciality of spirituality in theology. Cousins (2000:xiii) writes that in 
the context of modern scholarship spirituality has not been extricated from the 
history of religions, the philosophy of religion and theology. Its central focus, its 
categories and concepts, and its distinct methodology have not been established 
to the point of being commonly accepted as conventions. Added to this the term 
                                                 
1 One sees this trend in Canada.  Stats Canada reports that at the time of 1961, less than 1% of Canadians 
claimed to have no religion.  By 1991 this proportion had increased to almost 13% (Clark 1998:6). Yet, 
Reginald Bibby’s Project Canada Survey indicated that 81% of Canadians still believe in God implying that 
although church attendance has declined most people retain their belief in God (Bibby 1995:130).    
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‘spirituality’ is also used for life orientations which are non-religious or even anti-
religious.  As Schneiders (1986:255) notes:   
 
One hears talk of feminist spirituality, Black spirituality, Marxist 
spirituality.  Again, we are witnessing an expansion of the term from 
a strictly Roman Catholic usage in which most of the terminology 
was fairly standardized, to an ecumenical but still Christian usage in 
which some terms are unfamiliar or are used in unfamiliar ways, to 
a usage which includes non-Christian religious experience which 
must be grasped by analogy through serious and open dialogue, 
and even to a non-religious usage whose meaning is anything but 
clear. 
    
This chapter will explore how contemporary Christian spirituality is often 
conceived in a phenomenological or existential context.  Phenomenology, as a 
research method, lends itself to subjectivity and it is this kind of existential, 
subjective, and person-centered understanding of spirituality that is operative 
throughout the present research. Since historical description is an aspect of the 
phenomenological method, the role of tradition in interpreting spirituality will be 
explored. Additionally, because the Church has been the place in which 
spirituality has historically been expressed in the Christian tradition, the 
relationship and understanding of ‘church’ in supporting a contemporary 
understanding of spirituality will be described.   
 
The work of the Modernist theologian George Tyrrell will serve as a locus for this 
enquiry. Born in 1861, Tyrrell died in 1909. He was among the leading thinkers at 
the time of the English Modernist Movement. Most discussions of Tyrrell's 
theology occur within the historical context of the Modernist Crisis in the Catholic 
Church. However, that is not the basis for his inclusion here. The reason for 
selecting Tyrrell is that he is sufficiently contemporary, yet an adequate time has 
lapsed to allow for his ideas to have been tested by history.   
 
Tyrrell lived at a time, not unlike our own, when religion seemed fated to be 
submerged by the vast torrent of secular knowledge that was sweeping over the 
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intellectual world (Lewis 1932:9). Tyrrell gave voice to the presence of the Other 
operative in the modern period that was calling the Church to deconstruct the 
very intellectual vessels of medievalism that were no longer capable of meeting 
the exigencies of that time. Additionally, much of his theological thinking seems 
to anticipate contemporary postmodernity.  
 
By way of articulation of a contemporary understanding of spirituality, attention 
will be paid inter alia to the currents of Catholic Modernism in the early twentieth 
century and its antecedents in the currents of nineteenth century existentialism 
as articulated by Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. This will culminate in the 
contemporary currents of postmodern phenomenology such as those articulated 
by the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. It may strike the reader as odd to 
include both a Jewish and agnostic philosopher such as Nietzsche in Christian 
research. The reason for this is twofold.  First, the Christian tradition has 
historically been open, albeit in a critical manner, to intellectual and cultural 
currents outside of those which it has inherited or developed through the course 
of its own historical evolution. Second, a contemporary understanding of 
spirituality is inherently dialogical. This has been the constant tradition of the 
Christian enterprise since the beginning. Through vital engagement in diverse 
cultures the primitive Church discovered that there were a variety of contexts in 
which the gospel could be articulated. As Tyrrell (1906:131) notes: 
 
Into every time honored phrase and expression a new wealth of 
meaning was crowded. ‘Go borrow the vessels abroad of all thy 
neighbors even empty vessels; borrow not a few’ (2 Kings 4:3).  In 
obedience to some such prophetic impulse the Christian Church 
wandered far among the gentiles borrowing their vessels even their 
empty vessels, right and left, to hold the treasures for which she 
found no receptacle in the house of her birth.   
 
Tyrrell wrote that since doctrine depends on religion more than religion on 
doctrine, it is the effort of religion to find utterance and embodiment.  ‘For as the 
strong creative thought of genius selects spontaneously the aptest (sic) language 
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at its disposal, so a deeply religious spirit will not fail to respond to that doctrine 
or system which is more consonant with its needs and exigencies’ (Tyrrell 
1907:5). The research suggests that the most apt language and method 
available in interpreting a contemporary understanding of spirituality is 
phenomenology. This means placing spirituality in the context of existential lived 
reality and grounding it in an observable phenomenon. By so doing, we sever it 
from any sense of being an esoteric, abstract idea or theory. As Schneiders 
(1986:267-268) notes, the discipline of spirituality within theology will be 
descriptive and analytic rather than prescriptive and evaluative. Consequently, 
whether the researcher is studying mysticism, the relation of prayer to social 
justice involvement, discernment of spirits, ritual, feminist religious experience, 
God images or any of the hundreds of other topics which are attracting the 
attention of students of spirituality today, the first task will be to try to understand 
the phenomenon on its own terms, that is, as it is or was actually experienced. 
 
2.1 HOW IS SPIRITUALITY EXPERIENCED? 
While it is true that all knowledge is mediated through a complex series of 
cultural matrixes, spirituality from an existential perspective is simultaneously 
concerned with the individual. In examining spirituality, it is to be affirmed that it 
has a corporate dimension expressed through cultural bodies. Secondly, it is also 
to be affirmed that spirituality is also concerned with the person’s subjective 
experience of transcendental meaning. These two dimensions have a dialectical 
relationship each nurturing the other. Frankl (2000:72) writes that there are 
certain given cultural moulds into which personal religiousness is poured. These 
moulds are not transmitted in a biological way, but are passed on through the 
world of traditional symbols indigenous to a given culture. This world of symbols 
is not inborn, but we are born into it. The religious forms wait to be assimilated by 
the person. That which serves this purpose is not any inner psychological 
archetypes but the prayers of our fathers, the rites of our churches and 
synagogues, the revelations of our prophets and the examples set by saints and 
zaddiks.   
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Religious symbols and signs are symbiotically connected with the existential 
effect these symbols have on people. Regarding the corporate importance of 
religious symbols and the importance of ensuring their existential relevance, Weil 
(1951:186) writes, 
 
 Religious things are pure by right, theoretically, hypothetically, by 
convention.  Therefore their purity is unconditioned.  No stain can 
sully it.  That is why it is perfect.  It is not, however, perfect in the 
same way as Roland’s mare, which, while it had all possible virtues, 
had also the drawback of not existing.  Human conventions are 
useless if they are not connected with the motives that impel people 
to observe them (italics mine).  
 
Historically, religion has provided the categories and language for people to 
understand and integrate spirituality in their lives. As religious practice has 
waned new symbols have not emerged to root people within their cultural history.  
As a result there exists a free-floating anxiety in contemporary culture. The 
present crisis of meaning in our Western culture has manifested itself in both 
mental health and religion. Later chapters will critically explore how mental health 
has responded to this crisis of meaning. The task of spirituality is first to 
understand our context and articulate the experience of spirituality according to 
the ethos of our age so that it is comprehensible and relevant. In so doing it is 
important that we stay connected to our own traditions. 
 
2.2 THE ROLE OF TRADITION 
We are all part of a history or a tradition. As Schillebeecx (1968:27) notes, it 
belongs to the very essence of humanity to be within a tradition while reactivating 
it. This is what is known as a living tradition. There is a living tradition only if, in 
the light of the present that is oriented towards the future, that which has already 
found expression is reinterpreted towards the future. The perpetual death and 
rebirth of differing forms of articulating the mystery of the Christian faith is part of 
the living traditio of the Church. Traditio can be distinguished from traditum in that 
traditio is the transmission itself while traditum is the content of that transmission. 
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Traditio is phenomenological. It is the spirit as it is disclosed in our critical 
examination of various traditas. There is a vital osmosis between traditum and 
traditio. We cannot completely cast off our traditum as it is that which clothes 
tradition. Consequently, while it is important to locate spirituality in the present 
moment in order to respond to contemporary realities, we ought not dislodge 
spirituality from life-giving streams of tradition 
 
As an example of tradition being used to interpret contemporary issues in light of 
a faith tradition, Levinas (1990:xx) delivered some essays to a group of rabbis. 
Included in these were questions that the French speaking Jewish community felt  
it urgent to address, such as attitudes to take toward the Germans, the land of 
Israel, and the place of Judaism in the world at large. In order to ensure that the 
interpretation is authentic, Levinas writes that it is necessary to free the text from 
a potential arbitrary interpretation by recourse to oral law. The oral law is laid out 
specifically in the Talmud and in various rabbinic principles. The interpreter must 
by aware of the order of the text accepted by tradition in the Talmud. The reason 
for this is because the one who is interpreting the text is not a closed ‘interiority’, 
distinct from history and the influence of others, but is in fact part of a living 
tradition. This awareness helps to make the relation of the interpreter to the text 
something other than mere whim, for it forces the interpreter out of his or her 
private universe and into the life shared with others both past and present 
(Levinas 1990:xx). Such an approach trains and moulds one’s own subjectivity in 
a wholesome manner:    
 
What allows one to establish a difference between a personal 
originality brought to the Book and the pure play of amateurs’ (or 
charlatans’) illusions is a necessary reference of the subjective to 
the historical continuity of interpretation, is the tradition of 
commentaries that cannot be ignored under the pretext that 
inspiration comes to you directly from the text.  A ‘renewal’ worthy 
of the name cannot circumvent these references, just as it cannot 
circumvent the reference to what is called the Oral Law (Levinas 
1990:xxii). 
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Similarly, to distinguish the charlatan from the prophet Tyrrell, supporting the 
value of tradition, writes,  
 
None of us may build wildly according to his private freak and fancy 
but solely in the best attainable light as to what has already been 
done and what has yet to be done by the historical church in unity 
of spirit, idea and plan – to apprehend this idea ever more 
adequately through the study of the past in light of the present and 
of the immediate future (Tyrrell 1907:xi).   
 
This relationship, that is the traditio/traditum relationship, is often left 
unappreciated. Casey points out that traditio is assailed from both the left and the 
right: 
 
The left attacks it because the past is identified with the forces of 
conservatism; it is understood, to use Margaret Mead’s term, as 
coercive rather than instrumental. It imposes its own way of viewing 
situations and responding to them so that development is blocked.  
On the other hand, memory is rejected by the right because it is 
subversive to the status quo; memory knows another time. It 
relativizes the present and so can offer an alternative to current 
ideology – which may be why J.B. Mertz speaks about the 
dangerous memory of Jesus Christ (Casey 1996: 71-72). 
   
The particular manner in which Christianity historically has both valued tradition, 
while at the same time being open to contemporary cultural currents, is 
instructive as we attempt to articulate a contemporary understanding of 
spirituality. As Christianity spread during the Patristic period there was heated 
debate around both the manner and extent to which the philosophy of the Greeks 
should be used to understand the revelation of Christ through one Jesus of 
Nazareth. The early Patristic teachers were deeply divided over the extent to 
which Greek philosophy should enter a Christian universe. Some, such as 
Tertullian (ca 160-225 CE), and Tatian (ca 120-173 CE) were passionately 
opposed to Greek philosophy and culture in the fear that their influence would 
adulterate the gospel. Others, however, such as Justin Martyr (ca.112–165 CE) 
and Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–212 CE), endeavoured to articulate the 
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message of the gospel using Greek philosophical concepts (Williams 1997:32).  
Notwithstanding Tertullian’s protestation, ‘What has Athens to do with 
Jerusalem?’ the baptism of Greek philosophy into Christianity occurred.  
Henceforth philosophy, even that which originated from the pagan philosophy of 
Aristotle and Plato would become the ancillae theologiae.  Such openness to that 
which was considered ‘other’ would find expression once again in the medieval 
Scholastic period of St. Thomas Aquinas who synthesized Aristotle’s ethics, 
cosmology, and metaphysics with the Christian message. This was so in spite of 
the fact that the Dominican Constitution from the years 1221-1231 stated: ‘Our 
brothers may not study the books of pagan writers (referring above all to 
Aristotle) and philosophers (what is meant is Arabic philosophy, the great 
modernism in the Middle Ages); far less may they study the secular sciences’ 
(Schillebeeckx 2002:1). Bold use of notions borrowed from traditions outside of 
one’s own, while not without controversy, has always been a living part of the 
Christian traditio. This is again being felt today as spirituality critically engages 
with postmodern culture.    
 
The Church has been an important place wherein people are able to express 
their deepest desires and be nourished by important traditions. It has also served 
as the place where dialogue concerning these issues can occur. It is important, 
therefore to distinguish carefully between religious institutions and spirituality in 
order to understand the value of each.   
 
2.3  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPIRITUALITY AND THE ‘ECCLESIA’ 
Religion is intimately tied with spirituality and can help in understanding 
spirituality in a coherent fashion. Schneiders (2003:164) addresses this very 
issue when she suggests that the contradictory relationship between spirituality 
and religion results from a faulty understanding of both and that, properly 
understood, religious traditions are normal and healthy contexts for genuine 
spiritualities. Religion is the sociological expression of spirituality: 
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Religion, as those who specialize in its study tell us, is a notoriously 
difficult term to define…What seems to mark religions is that they 
are cultural systems for dealing with ultimate reality, whether or not 
that ultimate reality is God, and they are institutionalized in patterns 
of creed, code and cult.  In some way, religion is about the human 
relationship to the sacred, the ultimate, the transcendent, the 
divine. These are not strictly equivalent terms but religion is 
basically a system for dealing with that which transcends the 
individual or even the social entity (Schneiders 1999: 4-5). 
 
As mentioned previously, there are certain given cultural moulds into which 
personal spirituality is poured. These moulds are not transmitted in a biological 
way, but are passed on through the world of traditional symbols indigenous to a 
given culture.  
 
In Christianity the specific sociological entity that emerged from the spirituality of 
Jesus and his followers has a particular biblical name - the ecclesia. Exploring all 
the various understandings of the ecclesia has become a specialty in and of itself 
in theology, named appropriately enough, ‘ecclesiology’. Differing interpretations 
of scriptural texts, differing historical, political and philosophical movements, and 
various charismatic or reform-minded leaders have all contributed to the 
divergent manner in which Christians understand the ecclesia as an organizing 
principle for the faith. 
 
Spirituality is not a categorical object imposed on a group but is rather disclosed 
through the particularities of the group’s self-understanding derived from its own 
historical culture, tradition and rites (e.g. Eastern Orthodoxy, monasticism, 
Protestantism, etc.). There is, argues Berdyaev, a plurality of expressions 
corresponding to the plurality of cultures and people within the one Church of 
Christ. This plurality is not problematic: 
 
The selfsame and eternal Truth of the Christian Revelation is 
individualized in different races, nations, personalities. The 
absoluteness of Christian Truth is in no way contrary to an 
individuation of this kind. There are no excluding oppositions 
between the universal and the individual. The universal and the 
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individual have herein a concrete sameness. The absolute Truth of 
Christianity has a human recipient. The human element is not 
passive but rather active, and it reacts with a creativity different to 
that which is revealed from above. It creates a multiplicity of forms. 
And in this should be seen nothing bad. There are many mansions 
in my Father's house [John 14:2]. Thoroughly justified is the 
existence of an Eastern and of a Western Christianity, just as there 
is of a Romanic Christianity and of a Germanic Christianity 
(Berdyaev 1925:1). 
 
The Church today is understood as a lived experience in the world as opposed to 
an ahistorical superstructure separate from the living culture in which it is 
embodied.  Masson (1984:340) writes: 
 
Rahner himself argued that we are witnessing the beginning of a 
new epoch: the transition from a church of the Hellenistic and 
European culture and its colonies to a world - church embodied in 
many different cultures. This ‘coming-to-be of the world-church,’ he 
insisted, does not mean merely a quantitative augmentation of the 
earlier church, it contains a theological caesura in church history 
which … can be compared perhaps only with the transition from 
Judeo-Christianity to Gentile Christianity. 
 
Debates relating to ecclesiology, while necessary and legitimate, are foreign to a 
rigorous examination of spirituality within the scope and history of Christianity as 
it has existed for the last 2000 years. In surveying the literature associated with 
Christian spirituality one very rarely comes across any apologies for the various 
ecclesiologies that are extant within Christianity today. From an existential 
perspective a Pauline ecclesiology is to be preferred. The notion of the Church 
as a universal community of spirit filled people renewed in mind (cf. Romans 
12:2) transcending national, ethnic and gender categorization had its genesis in 
Paul.    
 
Paul’s vision for the ecclesia is a universal, christologically conceived human 
solidarity, in which there is no longer any opposition between male and female, 
Jew and Greek, slave and free (cf. Gal. 3:28). Paul felt liberated to read very 
different exigencies into familiar Torah Scriptures as a consequence of his 
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conversion and self-understanding of Christ’s mission. As Pauw (1993:50) notes, 
Paul evoked Scripture in surprising and even subversive ways to argue for a new 
vision of the Church. The grafting of the Gentiles into the rich root of Israel 
required Paul to execute bold and unorthodox re-reading of familiar texts. For 
example, Paul subverts the story of Hagar and Sarah and their sons in Galatians 
4:21-31, by interpreting it to mean that the uncircumcised are children of promise.  
Such an inclusion was not without controversy. Indeed one of the earliest ethical 
dilemmas recorded in the New Testament concerned the thorny issue of 
circumcision. The Jerusalem Council (as reported in the Book of Acts (15:1-29) 
and in Galatians (2:1-10) eventually exempted Gentile Christians from 
circumcision and full Torah observance. This was new wine requiring new 
wineskins. The articulation of this message has been part of the Catholic 
enterprise ever since. ‘It is the mission of the Catholic Church to foster and 
supernaturalize that progressive evolution and brotherhood of man in Christ, the 
liberty of the sons of God – the vindication of inalienable rights founded on this 
equality’ (Tyrrell 1904:333). This notion was given fuller expression in the Second 
Vatican Council’s document Gaudium Et Spes in 1965.   
 
Most theologians desire to operate in medio ecclesia. However, with the 
expansion of what it means to be Church the sense of center is no longer clear. 
In the context of Catholic Modernism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, Tyrrell exposed unconscious discourses of power that wrongly identified 
the medieval juridical institution with the experience of faith and the 
understanding of Church. Such a posture was no longer possible in the Modern 
age: 
  
To apply to this juridical and hierarchic power of the later Church 
texts that refer only to the spiritual influence of the primitive and 
pre-hierarchic Church was possible and even excusable in an age 
devoid of the slightest historical and critical sense, yet the 
misapplication has been and is still the main support of the 
medieval Church-theory.  Surely it is time we had done with this 
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superficial exegesis that has ceased to be excusable (Tyrrell 
1909:69).  
 
 
The relationship of Christians internally as participants in the mystical body of 
Christ, with the external manifestation of that body, is determined today less 
clearly along juridically conceived organizational boundaries. Holland (1998:50) 
argues that there are three styles of organization corresponding to premodern, 
modern, and postmodern society. He writes that premodern classical society was 
not oriented to professionalism but to authoritarianism. Pyramidal order was its 
form of organization, cyclical tradition its extension through time, and absolute 
rule its governance.  Religious consecration was its legitimation.   
 
Modern society, and to a degree modern religious organization, is oriented 
towards professionalism. Bureaucratic rationalization is its form of organization, 
linear progress its extension through time, and manipulative management its 
governance.  
 
Postmodern organization, however, will be different still, oriented to the principle 
of creativity. The holistic web of community is becoming its form of organization, 
a rhythmic spiral its extension through time, and artistic imagination its norm of 
governance. As a result its legitimation will come primarily from charism, which is 
at once social and spiritual. Consecration and competence will not disappear but 
will be placed at the service of the creativity of charism (Griffin 1998:50). This 
postmodern form of ecclesial organization was Tyrrell’s preferred model. The 
Russian existentialist philosopher Berdyaev suggests that Tyrrell’s model of 
Church is strikingly similar to the Russian notion of sobernost. Berdyaev (1927:2) 
writes that Tyrrell does not set Protestant individualism against the Catholic 
authoritative doctrine of the Church, but sets forth rather a peculiar spiritual 
collectivism, what Russian Orthodox call sobornost. Berdyaev explains the notion 
of sobornost as follows: 
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In what sense is the Church a reality?  The church as an objective 
reality which stands at a higher level than man (sic.) is a social 
institution, and in that sense is the objectification of religious life; it 
is an adaptation of spirit to social conditions. But in its depth the 
Church is the life of the spirit, it is spiritual life. It is miraculous life 
which is not subject to social laws; it is community, a brotherhood of 
men (sic) in Christ. It is the mysterious life of Christ within a human 
communion with Christ. In this sense the church is freedom and 
love, and there is no external authority in it, there is no necessity 
and no coercive force. What is in it is freedom enlightened by 
grace.  And this is what Khomyakov calls sobernost. Sobornost is 
not a collective reality which stands higher than man (sic) and 
issues its orders to him. It is the highest spiritual qualitative power 
in men (sic); it is entering into the communion of the living and the 
dead. This sobornost can have no rational juridical expression.  
Each must take upon himself (sic) responsibility for all. No one may 
separate himself from the world whole, although at the same time 
he ought not regard himself as part of a whole….I repeat, the 
question of the supreme value of personality, of the supremacy of 
what is personal and individual over the common, and the 
controversy about universals, are not open to intellectual and 
rational solutions; a solution is to be found only through the moral 
will which establishes values, only through volitional choice. The 
secret of personality, the existential mystery, is revealed only in the 
creative life of the spirit as a whole. It is a spiritual conflict. False 
objectified universals, false collective realities must be overthrown 
in the combat which with the spirit wages (Berdyaev 1957:131-
132).   
 
However, Tyrrell radically expands the notion of Church in the sense of the place 
wherein the Divine is experienced to include the world. This too was a prophetic 
insight. Today religion is only one of the many places where personal and 
communal spirituality is lived out.      
 
2.4  MODERN EXISTENTIAL INFLUENCES IMPACTING CONTEMPORARY SPIRITUALITY 
The most potent and powerful thinkers influencing contemporary spirituality are 
Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1900) and Søren Kierkegaard (d. 1855) Both understood 
that a period of Christendom was quickly coming to an end leaving in its wake an 
inevitable challenge with respect to morality and ethical living. While they differed 
in terms of their understanding of the relationship of the subject with God, each of 
these philosophers of the Modern period challenged the excessive rationality of 
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the Enlightenment. They did so by asserting the primacy of the will and the 
individuated personality against the forces of a society (civil and religious) that 
stood in opposition to that realization.  Some of their insights will be explored as 
a means of locating where we are today by way of a contemporary 
understanding of spirituality. 
 
2.4.1  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE  (D. 1900) 
For Nietzsche, as Porter (1987:140) points out, reason, interpreted as the 
Cartesian cogito, ceases to be the ultimate touchstone of the sane. True sanity 
lies in whatever confers the bloom of life – power, vitality, health – whatever 
nourishes the self and the soul’s greatness.  Mere reason’s infatuation with Being 
is superseded by life’s pursuit of becoming. The challenge against the spirit -
suffocating rationality of the Enlightenment was launched prophetically by 
Nietzsche. In terms of his prophetic spiritual character Foucault notes, ‘After Port-
Royal, men would have to wait two centuries - until Dostoievsky and Nietzsche - 
for Christ to regain the glory of madness, for scandal to recover its power as 
revelation, for unreason to cease being merely the public shame of reason’ 
(Foucault 1988:79). In relation to Foucault’s observation that madness and 
scandal are often an inherent aspect of revelation, Nietzsche utilizes as typology 
an ‘insane’ person to herald the prophetic truth that ‘God’ is dead: 
 
The insane man jumped into their midst and transfixed them with 
his glances. ‘Where is God gone?’ he called out. ‘I mean to tell you! 
We have killed him, you and I! We are all his murderers! But how 
have we done it? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave 
us the sponge to wipe away the whole horizon?  What did we do 
when we loosened the earth from its sun?… At last he threw his 
lantern on the ground, so that it broke in pieces and was 
extinguished. ‘I come too early,’ he then said. ‘I am not yet at the 
right time. This prodigious event is still on its way, and is traveling - 
it has not yet reached men's ears. Lightning and thunder need time, 
the light of the stars needs time, deeds need time, even after they 
are done, to be seen and heard. This deed is as yet further from 
them than the furthest star - and yet they have done it!’ It is further 
stated that the madman made his way into different churches on 
the same day, and there intoned his Requiem aeternam deo. When 
led out and called to account, he always gave the reply: ‘What are 
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these churches now, if they are not the tombs and monuments of 
God?’ (Nietzsche [1886]/1964:168-169). 
 
The intent here is not to enter into the debate concerning death of God theology2 
but to describe the radical movement towards individualism so characteristic of 
postmodernity. The rationalism of Nietzsche’s time had the effect of removing 
one from subjective responsibility and destiny. As an antidote to that, Nietzsche 
introduced the übermensch (super-man). Tyrrell acknowledged that Nietzsche’s 
übermensch constituted a new kind of doctrine that required critical theological 
engagement.   
 
Tyrrell recognized in Nietzsche’s work an understandable desire, which Tyrrell 
shared, for a better conception of personhood than that which had been 
prevailing since the Enlightenment. According to Tyrrell, the übermensch 
represented a revolt, albeit an excessive and indiscriminate revolt, against false 
mysticism and false sentiment. The übermensch is heralded in Nietzshe’s poem 
‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’ where there is the metamorphosis of the human 
personality culminating ultimately in the übermensch. Brock (1935:128) writes 
that in Nietzsche’s poem ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’, he formulated his own 
philosophical task using a variety of symbols. The symbol of the übermensch 
relates directly to the issue of spirituality in terms of what it means to live a full 
human life given the dissolution of Christendom. The three stages that lead to the 
übermensch parallel Nietzsche’s own personal development. The first stage in 
the metamorphosis is the appropriation of values stage. This stage is where we 
begin to learn the values that are propagated by social institutions. The second is 
the living out of those values. The final stage is the transcending of each of the 
former by going beyond ethical categories and living out of one’s own 
                                                 
2 There is considerable disagreement in interpretation concerning the status of Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’ 
pronouncement. The fable of the ‘Madman’ has been taken as an attack on ‘the adherents of secularized 
versions of the old Christian moral ideal’ (Salaquarda 1996:102).  Even Heidegger’s monumental Nietzsche 
([1961]/1999) equivocates over Nietzsche’s meaning, suggesting that Nietzsche is not attacking the 
Christian God of biblical revelation but only a misrepresentation of God in metaphysical ontotheology (Peters 
2000:26).   
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individuated personality and will. These three stages of life correspond also to 
the three main stages of history; namely premodern, modern and postmodern.  
 
According to Nietzsche, the first metamorphosis of the human spirit in history is 
the acquisition of ethical codes of conduct and duty. This phase could be 
understood as the development of all the great religions of the world; the 
development of their sacred texts. This aspect of history is rendered symbolically 
by the use of the camel:  
All these heaviest things the load bearing spirit taketh upon itself: 
and like the camel, which, when laden, hasteneth into the 
wilderness, so hasteneth the spirit into its wilderness (Nietzsche 
[1891]/1999:13)   
The wilderness is a strong biblical allusion signifying a region of openness and 
trust. Once moving to this desert the human spirit becomes more singular. It 
becomes freer to critically examine these suppositions, thereby changing into the 
lion. This transformation could be understood as the transformation from pre-
modern mythologizing to Modern criticism and the development of rationalism 
and empiricism as a way to free oneself from mythical external forces: 
But in the loneliest wilderness happeneth the second 
metamorphosis: here, the spirit becometh a lion; freedom will it 
capture, and lordship in its own wilderness (Nietzsche 
[1891]/1999:13)    
The lion, like Jacob wrestling with angel of God, must wrestle with the dragon 
upon whose scales are all the codes of categorical ethical behaviour:  ‘All values 
have already been created, and all created values – do I represent.  Verily, there 
shall be no ‘I will’ anymore. Thus speaketh the dragon’ (Nietzsche 
[1891]/1999:14)  
In the interest of absolute liberty this final dragon must be annihilated. Only a lion 
who has become sufficiently critical and sufficiently free can achieve this task. 
‘To create itself freedom, and give a holy Nay even unto duty: for that, my 
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brethren, there is need of the lion’ (Nietzsche [1891]/1999:14). Finally once this 
dragon is annihilated a new birth emerges.  The lion turns into a child and original 
innocence is regained. This is what Nietzsche refers to as the eternal return. It is, 
as mentioned above, the fullest expression of the acceptance of earthly reality as 
a whole. This transformation could be understood as postmodern. All categories 
and norms are transcended. The human person is utterly free to will its own: 
Innocence is the child and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a game, 
a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy Yea. Aye, for the game 
of creating, my brethren, there is needed a holy Yea unto life: its 
own will, willeth now the spirit; his own world winneth the world’s 
outcast (Nietzsche [1891]/1999:14). 
The spirit that now wills its own is the übermensch.  It is striking how similar this 
is to authentic Christian mysticism. In this regard Nietzsche’s analysis is 
important as it represents:  
…the revolt against an exaggerated pessimism which excludes all 
possibility of God’s Will being done on earth as it is in heaven; the 
revolt against a transcendental mysticism that finds the theatre of 
man’s (sic.) highest life only in the clouds; against a sentimental, 
enervating pity that views pain and sorrow as the sovereign 
unmitigated evils, and fosters a blind self-defeating ‘indiscriminate 
charity’; against the confusion of gentleness with softness of 
meekness with weakness; against an over restraining of the 
‘organic’ idea of Society and against kindred theories of 
government and authority, socialistic or absolutist, which are fatal to 
the growth of personality and the truly Christian principle of 
individual dignity. We should sympathize with the scorn of 
contented mediocrity, of the average and paltry; with the feeling 
that in some sense a man should ‘be himself’ and not the creature 
of servile imitation and conformity; with the aspiration after the 
‘strong man,’ the hero, the More-than-man, whose production is the 
goal of all moral endeavour. For all his monstrosity, the Superman 
is largely built up of, and lives by certain too neglected elements of 
Christian ideal and sentiment (Tyrrell 1906:67). 
Tyrrell was similar to Nietzsche in his understanding that the herd mind cannot 
elevate itself. The crowd mind, writes Tyrrell (1907a:263), will always be 
something with us, not as something to acquiesce or defer to, but to combat, 
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purify, elevate. Like Nietzsche, Tyrrell believed that the Christian must go beyond 
the noisier and aggressive representatives of the Church and live out of their own 
subjective, sacred yes. Still, there remains disquieting elements in the 
übermensch that make embracing a fully Nietzschean spirituality ill advised. 
2.4.2 CRITIQUE OF  NIETZSCHE’S ANTHROPOLOGY 
In Nietzsche’s final anthropology, the übermensch must rebel against natural 
human compassion. For Nietzsche, compassion and pity were antithetical to the 
development of the human personality. He criticized Christianity precisely on 
these grounds:  
Christianity is called the religion of pity - Pity stands in opposition to 
all the tonic passions that augment the energy of the feeling of 
aliveness: it is a depressant. A man (sic.) loses power when he 
pities. Through pity, that drain upon strength which suffering works, 
is multiplied a thousandfold. Suffering is made contagious by pity; 
under certain circumstances it may lead to a total sacrifice of life 
and living energy - a loss out of all proportion to the magnitude of 
the cause (the case of the death of the Nazarene). This is the first 
view of it; there is, however, a still more important one. If one 
measures the effects of pity by the gravity of the reactions it sets 
up, its character as a menace to life appears in a much clearer 
light. Pity thwarts the whole law of evolution, which is the law of 
natural selection. It preserves whatever is ripe for destruction; it 
fights on the side of those disinherited and condemned by life; by 
maintaining life in so many of the botched of all kinds, it gives life 
itself a gloomy and dubious aspect (Nietzsche [1895]/1999:24).   
Tyrrell’s critique of the übermensch proved to be prophetic. While acknowledging 
that authenticity is not tested by adherence to the prevailing categorical 
discourse of institutions (‘Of unconditional obedience to an avowedly conditioned 
authority the Catholic religion knows nothing’ (Tyrrell 1907a:ix), it is not entirely 
arbitrary either. Authenticity is gauged by the sense in which one’s will is 
conformed to the example of Jesus and his understanding. In the Christian 
tradition, there is a law inscribed on the human heart (cf: Romans 2:14). It 
becomes known existentially to us through ethical response which is foundational 
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in human experience. The hungry, thirsty, the naked, the sick, the sinful, these 
are our judges and law givers (Tyrrell 1907a:380).   
On the one hand the ideal of the übermensch is easily criticized. Self-giving and 
self-seeking instincts are essential to the survival of the species. Brutal 
unmitigated egotism is a principle of decadence and deterioration (Tyrrell 
1906:66). This dynamic was played out in Nazi Germany in the 1940’s. National 
Socialism identified the übermensch with the Aryan nation, embodied in the Nazi 
ideal, as it rejected all sense of universality with respect to transcendent human 
values. In place of that the Nazis presented their own version by violence and 
through scapegoating an entire culture and race that refused to assimilate – the 
Semitic.   
While Tyrrell (1902:3) acknowledged the Modern dilemma between a freedom of 
God which annihilates the human person and a freedom of the human person 
which annihilates God, he was in no way a nihilist. Simply because an 
understanding of God needs new wineskins this does not mean that we should 
not actually attempt to find those wineskins. In natural science, scientific structure 
has to be continually broken up and reconstituted so as to correspond to new 
tracts of experience - so too with theology. Tyrrell was of the opinion that the 
subject’s self-presence before God was necessary in order to ensure that 
humanity is preserved. ‘Whatever the truth about idealism, man (sic.) is by nature 
a Realist and similarly by nature a theist until he (sic.) has studiously learnt to 
align himself in a non-natural pose’ (Tyrrell 1902:273).  Revelation itself is 
inscribed in nature. The kind of nihilism that closes off human experience from 
the possibility of the divine inscribed in nature does not contribute to a ‘super-
man’. While sharing many of the same characteristics, the Church’s saints and 
doctors are nevertheless different than Nietzsche’s super-man who is more of a 
super-brute (Tyrell 1906:68). A proper existential understanding must appreciate 
that existence is received. The spiritual movement toward truth is a passive 
quality.  Truth is given or revealed through our response to the external world. 
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Revelation, although occurring in our consciousness, is not self-created but is in 
a mysterious sense received.   
Revelation is a transforming and heightening not of the active but the receptive 
intellect. This means that with revelation we listen, we do not speak, we receive, 
we do not give (Tyrrell 1907a:283). Tyrrell understood revelation as dialogue that 
is first revealed from that which is Other to the subject. Upon receiving revelation 
we then frame that revelation in such a way as to give intelligible voice to that 
experience. It is a relational but nonetheless subjective process. To understand 
subjectivity as it is understood in contemporary spirituality it is helpful to turn to 
the most eloquent proponent of Christian subjectivity and the father of Christian 
existentialism - Søren Kierkegaard.  
 
2.4.3 SØREN KIERKEGAARD (D. 1855) 
Like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard found that the existing ecclesial and social order 
was inadequate to produce an authentic human, let alone Christian, existence.  
Neuhaus (2004:29) writes,  
 
The cultural Protestantism that German theologians call 
Kulturprotestantismus and Kierkegaard calls Christendom is as 
hostile to Christ as was the religious establishment of first-century 
Judaism. Indeed the hostility is stronger since the Pharisees did 
expect a radically new thing in the coming of the true Messiah, 
whereas Christendom thinks it has smoothly subsumed what it 
formally acknowledges as the true Messiah into the all-inclusive 
synthesis that is The System. Christendom is the enemy of 
Christianity—it is, Kierkegaard says repeatedly, the ‘blasphemy’—
that stands in the way of encountering Christ as our contemporary. 
Christendom assumes that Christ is far in the past, having laid the 
foundation for the wonderful thing that has historically resulted, 
Christendom. Of course we are all good Christians because we are 
all good Danes. It is a package deal and Christ and Christianity are 
part of the package. If we are good Danes (or good Americans), if 
we work hard and abide by the rules, the church, which is an 
integral part of the social order, will guarantee the delivery to 
heaven of the package that is our lives. 
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Kierkegaard, the forerunner of the existential movement in Christianity, 
dramatically launched the reaction against the spirit-suffocating rationalism of the 
Enlightenment as systemized by Hegel and accepted by the Church. Gilson 
(1952:143) notes that Kierkegaard was haunted by the conviction that, if religion, 
which is life, is in constant danger of degenerating into abstract speculation, the 
reason for it is that one of the standing aims of philosophy is to eliminate 
existence from thought, replacing it with abstract ideas. The very origin of 
contemporary existentialism is in Kierkegaard, and one might even wonder if 
pure existentialism did not cease immediately after the death of Kierkegaard. 
While Tyrrell did not explicitly use the term his spirituality can accurately be 
referred to as existentialist. Tyrrell acknowledged that since Modernism is 
connected with concrete historical existential experience it is not definable, unlike 
the abstractions of medieval scholasticism. The reason for this is because the 
former is living and thus in flux and the latter is dead. ‘In the abstract, 
Medievalism is definable because it is dead; Modernism is not so because it is 
living’ (Tyrrell 1909:141). In a similar fashion, Kierkegaard pointed out in his 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript an existential system is impossible: 
 
An existential system cannot be formulated.  Does this mean that 
no such system exists?  By no means; nor is this implied in our 
assertion.  Existence itself is a system – for God; but it cannot be a 
system for any existing spirit.  System and finality correspond to 
one another, but existence is precisely the opposite of finality.  It 
may be seen, from a purely abstract point of view, that system and 
existence are incapable of being thought together; because in order 
to think existence at all, systematic thought must think it as 
abrogated, and hence as not existing.  Existence separates and 
holds the various moments of existence discretely apart; systematic 
thought consists of the finality which brings them together 
(Kierkegaard [1847]/1989:201). 
 
 
For Kierkegaard, Tyrrell and in addition the postmodern ‘school’ the most 
important question is not the truth of Christianity as an objective system, but 
rather the mode of the subjects’ appropriation of revelation and the existential 
effect this then has. Kierkegaard ([1847]/1941:116) writes, ‘the subjective 
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acceptance is precisely the decisive factor; and an objective acceptance of 
Christianity is paganism or thoughtlessness’ Similarly for Tyrrell (1906:68), ‘As 
before, we leave aside the metaphysical problem of the relation of the divine 
Being to our own, of sameness and otherness, and speak simply of those 
manifestations of the spirit of which man’s soul is the theatre, though God is also 
their author in some mysterious way’. The Socratic maxim to know thyself implies 
that knowing oneself is really knowing the truth. Christianity’s task, argued 
Kierkegaard, was not philosophical but concerned itself with subjectivity:   
 
It is subjectivity that Christianity is concerned with, and it is only in 
subjectivity that truth exists, if it exists at all; objectively Christianity 
has no absolute existence.  If its truth happens to be in only one 
single subject, it exists in him alone; and there is greater Christian 
joy in heaven over this one individual than over universal history 
and the System, which as objective entities are incommensurable 
with that which is Christian (Kierkegaard [1847]/1941:116). 
 
By way of natural anthropology, Kierkegaard maintains that each individual 
human being is cast into the world unfinished and finite, yet, nevertheless, must 
take responsibility for his or her choices. The human person is not a self-
sufficient spiritual atom but, as a subject, is only authentically him or herself in a 
personal relationship to the God of revelation. According to Kierkegaard, 
'existence' is absolutely original and radically personal and unique (Robbins 
2001:3). Tyrrell similarly maintains that Christianity needs to be enfleshed in the 
singular subject in order to be manifested in the infinite variety of people in all 
places and times. This requires a constant becoming on the part of Christians to 
share the spirit of Christ as opposed to developing ever more totalizing thought 
systems that would be able to be replicated by individuals if only they follow the 
formula laid out in the text.  Tyrrell (1906:52) writes, 
 
 We see then at once the truth and the fallacy of ‘New Testament 
Christianity’ and how falsely and thin a conception of Christ he 
would have who, without distinguishing the spirit from its 
embodiment, should take the religion of the synoptics or even of St. 
John or St. Paul as the sole and only legitimate expression of 
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Christianity to be slavishly imitated by all future ages, to be a fetter 
on all progress and lawful variation.   
 
In this way Tyrrell resembles the existentialism of Kierkegaard but also 
Heidegger who in his later thought did not rule out a ‘nonmetaphysical 
relationship to God’ (Caputo 1993:279,285). 
 
For both Tyrrell and Kierkegaard the solution lay in understanding that the human 
person is spirit. Spirituality, understood as response to that which is totally Other 
(God), is the constitutive element of the human person. Kierkegaard dramatically 
stated its subjective character as follows:  
 
Every human existence not conscious of itself as spirit, or not 
personally conscious of itself before God as spirit, every human 
existence which is not grounded transparently in God, but opaquely 
rests or merges in some abstract universal (state, nation, etc.), or in 
the dark about itself, simply takes its capacities to be natural 
powers, unconscious in a deeper sense of where it has them from, 
takes its’ self to be an unaccountable something; if there were any 
question of accounting for its inner being, every such existence, 
however astounding in its accomplishment, however much it can 
account for even the whole of existence, however intense its 
aesthetic enjoyment: every such life is nonetheless despair 
(Kierkegaard [1849]/1989:76). 
 
 
2.5 MODERN TRAJECTORIES IN THE CHURCH IMPACTING UPON A CONTEMPORARY 
UNDERSTANDING OF SPIRITUALITY 
The purpose of spirituality is not to eschew mystery but to ensure that it is 
articulated in forms that are comprehensible. Subjectivity, personalism and 
plurality are strong cultural paradigms in our world today. Consequently, it is 
important to articulate a contemporary understanding of spirituality along these 
lines. Indeed, following Holland’s (1998:52) observation that legitimation of 
contemporary forms of ecclesial organization will come primarily from charism, it 
is today, as has most often been the case in Christian tradition, the saints and 
mystics who are the reguli fidei. Indeed, Callahan (1989:268) notes that our lived 
spiritual experience is a valid authority for what we come to believe as true of 
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God’s revelation. Julian of Norwich (d.1416 CE), for example, chose to trust her 
lived personal experience of God’s tender mercy rather than to hold the church’s 
current doctrine about the wrath of God while Teresa of Avila (d.1582 CE) was 
convinced from her lived spiritual experience that we never get beyond the 
humanity of Christ, even in exalted stages of prayer. To support this notion 
Tyrrell observes that historically the development of spirituality has emerged 
more from individuals and schools of theology rather than from representatives of 
the institutional dimension of the Church: 
 
History shows us that all the substantial advance has been the 
work not of officials, but of individuals, almost in opposition to 
officials; not of the system, but of those who have to some extent 
corrected and modified the system. The great teachers of the 
Church have been the Fathers who, though often Bishops, were not 
as a class members of the Ecclesia Docens.  Except St. Augustine, 
no teacher has taught the Western Church more than St. Thomas 
Aquinas -not a member of its official teaching staff. To-day the 
beliefs of the faithful are de facto determined far more by unofficial 
individuals and by schools of theology than by the episcopate 
(Tyrrell 1907: 180). 3 
 
In the early twentieth century, Tyrrell anticipated the impact that the style of 
modernity that was flowering in the Church at the time would later have on 
contemporary spirituality. During the early twentieth century the Magisterium of 
the Roman Church was increasingly worried by initiatives in the Church to open it 
to the worlds of science, philosophy and democracy, as well as the historical-
critical method in regard to the Scriptures. Kourie (1985:43) notes that scholarly 
                                                 
3 This is not to suggest that the role of women in shaping spirituality ought to be minimized or 
forgotten. Indeed, there has been significant research and reconstruction on the role of women in 
shaping the spirituality of the early Church. Swan’s (2001) work The Forgotten Desert Mothers: 
Sayings, Lives, and Stories of Early Christian Women is a very useful compilation of significant 
women ascetics and their doctrine from the Patristic period. Miller’s (2005) Women In Early 
Christianity: Translations From Greek Texts is an excellent reconstruction on the history of actual 
women in Christianity. In the later middle ages, women mystics from diverse cultural backgrounds 
such as Hildegard of Bingen (d. 1179 CE), Mechtild of Magdeburg (d. 1264 CE), Catherine of 
Sienna (d. 1380 CE), Julian of Norwich (d. 1416 CE) and Theresa of Avila (d. 1582 CE) to name 
just a few, exerted a powerful influence on the development of mysticism and spirituality. Their 
work continues to be a source of research in spirituality and mysticism to this day. 
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activity in Roman Catholic biblical scholarship was influenced more by the 
negative rather than the positive aspects of Magisterial documents such as 
Providentissimus Deus (1893). This reaction was due largely to the Modernist 
Crisis in the Church. In the context of Roman Catholic biblical scholarship, 
modernism utilized the rationalistic and critical approach to scripture. The 
negative attitude of the church to modern forms of exegesis prevailed well until 
1940 and is evidenced in the encyclical Spiritus Paraclitus (1915) which was 
strongly defensive on the historicity of the bible, and critical and modern scientific 
advances largely due to the fear that such methods would be destructive to 
doctrine (Kourie 1985:44). Such a posture changed under the pontificate of Pius 
XII and the publication in 1943 of the papal encyclical Divino Afflante Spiritu. Pius 
XII’s encyclical is regarded as a watershed moment in terms of biblical 
scholarship in the Catholic community. Coupled with the establishment in 1941 of 
the Pontifical Biblical Commission, Catholic scholarship was able to keep apace 
of important developments in scientific research.  
 
Traumas at the hands of the modern world, stretching back to the Reformation 
and the French Revolution, still weighed heavily upon the church (Arraya 1998: 
2). The Church in Tyrrell’s time was hesitant to embrace anything that 
approximated existentialism or subjectivity. With the publication under Pius X, of 
Lamentabili (1907) as well as the anti-modernist encyclical Pascendi (1907), the 
Roman Catholic Church self-consciously and with full intention withdrew from any 
and all currents outside of the post-reformational medievalism it had inherited. 
There were very few tools available and acceptable by the Magisterium of the 
day that could assist in articulating spirituality in a modern context. Consequently, 
Tyrrell set about to analyze the faith experience using methods derived from his 
contemporary context outside of the Church’s dominant scholastic paradigm. 
Tyrrell’s appreciation of the subjective dimension of theology leading to 
wholesome contemporary spirituality was a prophetic insight.  
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For any serious dialogue between the Church and contemporary postmodern 
culture to bear fruit, it should be acknowledged that our Western philosophical 
tools, such as classic Thomism are ill equipped to serve as an ancilla theologiae 
for contemporary spirituality, which stresses personal experience over static 
formulations. Tyrrell argued, ‘The Patristic and traditional notion of the Deposit as 
the form of sound words must be abandoned in favour of the notion that it is a 
spirit or Idea perpetuated in experience to be expressed by each generation in its 
own way but having no classical form of expression’ (Tyrell 1907a:106). This 
remains the basic orientation of contemporary spirituality. 
 
Two closely allied postmodern trajectories are critical in offering some context to 
the current tensions and issues extant in spirituality today and thus deserve 
exploration.  The first is a recognition that a period of medieval Christendom has 
come to a close, leaving in its wake the kind of material secularity that is part of 
the fabric of contemporary culture. The other is the controversy concerning 
anthropology that has occurred as a consequence of this historic shift. 
Concerning the former, it is now widely acknowledged, among even the most 
conservative of theologians that a period of Christendom has come to an end. 
Weigel, an American Catholic theologian, eloquently describes our contemporary 
Christian context: 
During the past two hundred years or so of Western history, a form 
of ‘Christendom’ has come to an end. History has determined that 
the Church, for the foreseeable future, will not be able to claim a 
privileged (still less, determinative) role in the formulation of public 
policy; nor, in most cases, will the Church have state power 
buttressing its truth claims. The union of altar and throne is over. 
The last king has not been strangled with the guts of the last priest, 
as Voltaire wished. But ‘the priests’ no longer constitute an ‘estate,’ 
and the Church is no longer a partisan political actor …. For some 
Christians, this has seemed a loss; some even consider it a 
catastrophe. I do not presume to know the future that has been 
created by the end of this type of Christendom. But I do think I can 
see a profound paradox emerging in these early days of ‘post-
Christendom.’ And that paradox is a challenge to rethink the 
question of winners and losers at the end of modernity …. I believe 
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it is very good for the Church that a form of Christendom implying a 
deep entanglement of the auctoritas of the Church with the 
potestas of the state is over and done with. The end of this style of 
Christendom frees the Church for its essential tasks of 
evangelization, worship, and service. And the end of Christendom 
gets the Church out of the coercion business, a great stain on its 
record that Pope John Paul II has called Christians to repent of 
publicly in preparation for the turn of the millennium (Weigel 
1996:62).  
With respect to the second trajectory, namely the issue of anthropology, this 
issue remains current. The very foundation of humanism is being questioned in 
certain strains of postmodern thinking. One of the questions that the specific 
discipline of spirituality addresses is what is the most appropriate response to 
contemporary reality? Schillebeecx (1968:72) writes that if speaking of God really 
means that we are at the same time saying something meaningful about 
humanity, then talking about God in categories that belong to an earlier stage of 
humanity’s experience simply cannot involve anything that is meaningful either 
about – or to – modern people. This research suggests that a turn to subjectivity 
using existentially derived notions such as phenomenology is appropriate.  
 
2.6  PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF SPIRITUALITY  
The affirmation of the external, created world as the theatre for the operation of 
the divine as opposed to a more theoretical and ontological approach to 
spirituality is a strong aspect of phenomenological spirituality. The incarnational 
perspective of the Divine disclosing itself in creation and in secular experience is 
a powerful current in contemporary spirituality. Through reflection on our 
experience in the world, the world itself discloses the Divine.  Tyrrell (1909:135) 
writes, 
 
If he (sic) believes in the Church as a Catholic, as a man (sic) he 
believes in humanity; he believes in the world. To regard the world 
outside the Church as God-forsaken; to deny that God works and 
reveals himself in human history, that he is in mankind in all its 
struggles against evil and ignorance and degradation, that he is the 
primary author of all intellectual, aesthetic, moral, social, and 
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political progress, seems to the Modernist the most subtle and 
dangerous form of atheism (Tyrrell 1909:135). 
  
Merton, writing several decades later, made a similar observation. The profound 
notion of the incarnation needs to be explored by spirituality in ever richer and 
creative ways. This has been lacking in much of theology as Merton 
([1968]/1989) notes. 
 
Robinson is right, I think, when he says that Christianity has tended 
more and more to preach the ‘disincarnate word,’ to reduce Christ 
to formal abstract concepts which ordinary people are no longer 
able to cope with….What we need is a deeper understanding of 
Christ and of His presence in the world, in man (sic).  From this we 
will gain a much truer, less arrogant, more humble and more 
merciful awareness of the true meaning of the Church and of her 
mission to man (sic). 
 
The identification of revelation as derived from experience as opposed to 
abstract formal definitions derived from intellectual deduction is a strong 
phenomenological theme in contemporary spirituality. Tyrrell certainly typifies this 
theme when he writes,  
When any statement or formulation of experience is accepted as 
exhaustive it soon comes to usurp the place of experience, to be X 
or Y that does duty for it in its absence.  Mistaking the symbol for 
the reality, the formula for the thing, we cease to be pressed by the 
inadequacy of the formula, as we are pressed by it when the two 
together are present to our consciousness (Tyrell 1909:141). 
Still, the experience requires a coherent methodological approach in order for 
spirituality to be articulated. As Tyrrell (1906:139) notes: 
 
A faith that really springs out of our rational or spiritual nature, or 
commends itself to it, cannot be fundamentally irrational or 
incapable of being explained and defended; and a reason which is 
unable to find an intelligible meaning in some of the deepest 
experiences of human souls must be one sided and imperfectly 
developed.  In other words there must be reflection on religious 
experience as on all other experience if it is not to be squandered.   
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A phenomenological approach to spirituality is reasonable although not rational in 
the Cartesian sense of the word. Kourie (1992:89) writes that reason has both a 
discursive and non-discursive form. This can be seen in the classical distinction 
between the episteme and the nous in which the former is characterized by 
discursiveness and the latter by a more intuitive grasp of the whole. Non-
discursive rationality does not manifest the Cartesian clarity of the rationalist 
epistemological ideal. Its understanding of knowledge extends beyond the 
conceptual and empirical (Kourie 1992:89). Postmodern phenomenological 
theology is based on the primary experience of the nous. As Levinas 
understands it, phenomenology is a reading, the understanding of meaning an 
exegesis, a hermeneutics, and not an intuition (Peperazk et al. 1996:38).   
 
2.7  A CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING OF SPIRITUALITY – EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND THE 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE OTHER 
 
In 1951 Weil noted: 
 We are living in times that have no precedent, and in our present 
situation universality, which could formerly be implicit, has to be 
fully explicit. It has to permeate our language and the whole of our 
way of life.  Today it is not nearly enough to be a saint, but we must 
have the saintliness demanded by the present moment, a new 
saintliness, itself also without precedent’ (Weil 1951:99).   
 
Weil recognized, however, that a certain liberality of language and expression is 
required and that the Church as an institution ought not to impose a specific 
language or systems that might frustrate the kind of broad catholicity she 
envisioned. While acknowledging the Church’s role as preserving the deposit of 
faith she wrote, ‘But she is guilty of an abuse of power when she claims to force 
love and intelligence to model their language upon her own. This abuse of power 
is not of God.  It comes from the natural tendency of every form of collectivism, 
without exception, to abuse power’ (Weil 1951:80).  
 
Subjectivity is a dominant aspect of contemporary culture. Levinas’s 
metaphysical approach which defends subjectivity can, therefore, serve as a 
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useful foundation for articulating contemporary spirituality. The mistrust of 
totalizing systems with an emphasis on the subjectivity is a strong theme in 
Levinas. 
 
To remedy a certain disorder which proceeds from the Order of 
universal Reason, it is necessary to defend subjectivity.  As I see it, 
subjective protest is not received favorably on the pretext that its 
egoism is sacred but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret 
tears’ of the Other, which are caused by the functioning – albeit 
reasonable – of the hierarchy….I am for the I, as existence in the   
first person, to the extent that its ego-ity signifies and infinite 
responsibility for an Other.  Which amounts to saying that it is as if 
the substance of the I is made of saintliness.  It is perhaps in this 
sense that Montesquieu rested democracy upon virtue (Peperzak 
et al. 1996:23).    
 
There is a strong movement within contemporary spirituality away from 
ontological assertions of God derived from theoretical deduction. The movement 
is instead towards active engagement in the drama of life itself (i.e. the drama of 
being-in-the-world).  Levinas writes,  
 
The essential contribution to the new ontology can be seen in its 
opposition to classical intellectualism ….To comprehend our 
situation in reality is not to define it but to find ourselves in affective 
disposition. To comprehend being is to exist. All this indicates, it 
would seem a rupture with the theoretical structure of Western 
thought. To think is no longer to contemplate but to commit oneself; 
to be engulfed by that which one thinks, to be involved.  This is the 
dramatic event of ‘being-in-the-world’ (Peperzak et al.: 1996:4). 
 
The quest for meaning and purposefulness as fundamental to our understanding 
of spirituality lies at the heart of human experience. Its lack constitutes angst and 
despair. This quest is characterized in contemporary spirituality as self-
transcendence or in postmodern philosophers such as Levinas as metaphysical 
desire. The good life has classically been understood as the state of being 
(dasein) in which one lives joyfully in the fullness of one’s humanity. We do not 
always experience ourselves as living, in an existential way, the good life. Still we 
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have some kind of primordial notion as to what this means as a consequence of 
being in the world. ‘The true life,’ writes Levinas, ‘is absent. But we are in the 
world.’ (Levinas 1969:33). ‘Yearning for happiness’ Levinas terms ‘metaphysical 
desire’. Metaphysical desire is a constitutive aspect of the human person that 
propels us into the world. Metaphysical desire is positive and personal; part of 
subjective, human experience founded on the idea of infinity. ‘[Totality and 
Infinity]4 does present itself as a defence of subjectivity, but it will apprehend the 
subjectivity not at the level of its purely egoist protestation against totality, nor in 
its anguish before death, but as founded on the idea of infinity’ (Levinas 
1969:26).  The idea of infinity is neither an abstract intellectual construct nor an 
impersonal ideal springing from an apprehension of need.. The notion of infinity is 
analogous to the notion of self transcendence. It is experienced as metaphysical 
desire. Metaphysical desire, which springs from the idea of infinity, is not a desire 
to return to a prior ontological state. Such an understanding of desire would be 
nostalgia for the same (i.e. one’s own horizon) As Levinas writes,’ The 
metaphysical desire does not long to return, for it is a desire for a land not of our 
birth, for a land foreign to every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to 
which we shall never betake ourselves. The metaphysical desire does not rest 
upon any prior kinship’ (Levinas 1969:34). Metaphysical desire is a transcendent 
human desire for meaning, rooted in the existential experience of human 
relationships, that seeks the Other (that Levinas sometimes renders using the 
biblical imagery of Stranger) in the face of the other.  ‘To begin with the face as a 
source from which all meaning appears, the face in its absolute nudity ... is to 
affirm that being is enacted in the relation between men (sic), that Desire rather 
than need commands acts. Desire, an aspiration that does not proceed from a 
lack - metaphysics - is the desire of a person’ (Levinas 1969:299). Our being-in-
the-world does not frustrate metaphysical desire.  It is its starting point.   
 
                                                 
4 Totality and Infinity (1969) was one of the first texts where Levinas began to explore the 
subjective founding of metaphysics on the ethical response. 
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Affirmation of the created world (‘exteriority’ or ‘worldliness’ as it is described in 
contemporary spirituality) is the starting point for all experiences even the 
experience of faith. Levinas casts worldliness as the chez-soi.  That is we are ‘at 
home’ with things and are happy for the fulfillment of those needs. According to 
Levinas, need cannot be interpreted as simple lack, despite the psychology of 
need given by Plato, nor as pure passivity, despite Kantian ethics. The human 
being thrives on need; he (sic) is happy for his (sic) needs (Levinas 1969:114). 
Tyrrell agrees, ‘To imagine then that we can love God more by loving creatures 
less, is an error akin to that which supposes that we can know him better the less 
we know of those creatures which reveal him; and that He is found by shutting 
our eyes and not opening them’ (Tyrrell 1907:241).   
 
Contemporary spirituality (i.e. metaphysical desire) is not an interior construct 
applied to the world but is an unparalleled openness to the world, to others, to 
the ‘marvel of exteriority’. Spirituality is disclosed through our own ethical 
response in human relationships. A contemporary understanding of spirituality is 
a ‘delightful lapse of the ontological order’. For Levinas ontology means theory as 
distinct from actual existents.  Levinas writes, ‘Being, which is without the density 
of existents, is the light in which existents become intelligible. To theory, as 
comprehension of beings, the general title ‘ontology’ is appropriate’ (Levinas 
1969:42). Consequently, ontology creates a self-contained system (‘the same’) 
that resists any intrusion that would call forth from us an existential response. 
‘Here (ontology) theory enters upon a course that renounces metaphysical 
Desire, renounces the marvel of exteriority from which the Desire lives’ (Levinas 
1969:42). Ontology inasmuch as it concerns itself with grasping the universal 
truth of things (being) apart from the plurality and density of actual existents 
prevents us from maintaining the other’s alterity. Maintaining the alterity of the 
other is fundamental. Alterity refers to the state of non-identification with the 
other. It means allowing difference to be. For Levinas, alterity is necessary in 
order for the face to face encounter to be the foundation for our ethical response. 
‘The nakedness of the face is not what is presented to me because I disclose it 
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… The face has turned to me - and this is its very nudity. It is by itself and not by 
reference to a system.’ (Levinas 1969:75).  This turning of the face is the moment 
whereby I am changed. It is a revelation (an ‘eschatological moment’).   
 
For Levinas, eschatology does not consist in introducing a teleological system 
into the totality of history or in teaching an orientation of history. The first ‘vision’ 
of eschatology reveals the very possibility of eschatology, that is, the breach of 
the totality, the possibility of a signification without a context. This signification 
without a context is revelation. There is a certain metaphysical atheism that 
mirrors closely the apophaticism of many mystics. Levinas (1969:78) articulates it 
as follows: 
 
Revelation is discourse; in order to welcome revelation a being apt 
for this role of interlocutor, a separated being, is required. Atheism 
conditions a veritable relationship with a true God ... A relation with 
the Transcendent free from all captivation by the Transcendent is a 
social relation. It is here that the Transcendent, infinitely other, 
solicits and appeals to us ... His very epiphany consists in soliciting 
us by his destitution in the face of the Stranger, the widow, the 
orphan.  The atheism of the metaphysician means, positively, that 
our relation with the Metaphysical is an ethical behavior ... God 
rises to his supreme and ultimate presence as correlative to the 
justice rendered unto (others).    
 
Allowing the Other to disrupt the ‘at homeness’ (chez-soi) of our own horizon is 
ethics. It is not simply a medium by which we abstract from existents the truth of 
their being and grasp them in their primordial sublimity separate from their 
density, but is an existential response accomplished through ethics. No category, 
no system can ever capture or maintain the person, as each one is unique and 
free in themselves. Those that try to create a separate intellectual system 
(ontology) from the density of real live persons (existents) inevitably breed 
violence. For Levinas the purpose of his work Totality and Infinity was ‘the 
establishment of this primacy of the ethical, that is, of the relationship of man to 
man - signification, teaching, and justice - a primacy of an irreducible structure 
upon which all the other structures rest (and in particular all those which seem to 
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put us primordially in contact with an impersonal sublimity, aesthetic or 
ontological) (Levinas 1969:79).    
 
Levinas rejects any kind of natural onto-theology, placing instead the ethical 
response in the face-to-face existential encounter as the location where the 
Other discloses itself.  
 
Ethics is the spiritual optics ... The work of justice - the uprightness 
of the face to face - is necessary in order that the breach that leads 
to God be produced - and ‘vision’ here coincides with this work of 
justice.  Hence metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is 
enacted - in our relations with men.  There can be no ‘knowledge’ 
of God separated from the relationship with men. The Other is the 
very locus of metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my 
relation with God (Levinas 1969:79).   
 
Persons need freedom and liberty in order to fully actualize themselves in 
their context. For Levinas it is precisely in the free ethical response to the 
Other who is revealed, not in a shock negating the I, but as the primordial 
phenomenon of gentleness that our selfhood emerges. The Other does not 
at all limit our freedom. On the contrary it calls it to responsibility, founds it 
and justifies it. Unlike the Hegelian dialectic, the other is not like an allergy 
that needs to be assimilated into a systematic synthesis. The relationship is 
instead positive. It evokes an ethical response. ‘The relation with the other as 
face heals allergy .... But the relation is maintained without violence, in peace 
with this absolute alterity. The ‘resistance’ of the other does not do violence 
to me, does not act negatively; it has a positive structure: ethical ... I do not 
struggle with a faceless god, but I respond to his expression, to his 
revelation’ (Levinas 1969:197). The response to life is one that no interiority 
can avoid. Indeed the response precedes the reflection. Universality is thus 
founded upon the ethical response which takes the form of dialogue. 
 
 Thus I cannot evade by silence the discourse which the epiphany 
of the face opens ... The face opens the primordial discourse 
whose first word is obligation, which no interiority permits avoiding. 
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It is that discourse that obliges entering into discourse, the 
commencement of discourse rationalism prays for, a ‘force’ that 
convinces even ‘the people who do not wish to listen’ and thus 
founds the true universality of reason (Levinas 1969:201).   
 
In the Christian tradition, there is precedent for viewing spirituality in such a 
manner. Meister Eckhart states that the one ‘who understands my teaching about 
justice and the just person understands everything I say’ (Schurmann 2001:92). 
As mentioned above, the coming revelation of God, (eschatology), is neither the 
introduction of a teleological system nor the orientation of history. It is a response 
formed without image and without mediation.  Meister Eckhart in his sermon on 
Wisdom 5:16: ‘The Just live in Eternity’ says:  
 
The just person seeks nothing in their works. Those that seek 
something in their works or those who work because of a ‘why’ are 
(serfs and mercenaries).  And so if you want to be transformed by 
and transformed into justice, have no [specific] intention in your 
works and form no ‘why’ in yourself, either in time or eternity, either 
reward or happiness, either this or that. Such works are in fact, 
dead. Even if you form God within yourself, whatever works you 
perform for a [specific] purpose are all dead, and you ruin good 
works…It is a characteristic of creatures that they make something 
out of something, while it is characteristic of God that he makes 
something out of nothing. Therefore if God is to make anything in 
you or with you, you must first have become nothing. Hence go into 
your own ground and work there, and the works you work there will 
all be living. This is why he says, ‘the just lives’.  Because he is just 
he works, and his works live (McGinn 1986:296) 
 
As Schurmann (2001:93) comments that the just no longer look for support 
elsewhere; nor do they let their acts be determined by external precepts. If they 
strove for conformity with exterior laws, their acting would simply be legal. The 
just one who acts out of intimate assimilation with justice ‘is’ just in the same way 
that the reflection of a beautiful face is beautiful; totally by another and yet totally 
in itself.  
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2.8  CONCLUSION  
Our time is unique and requires a creative theological imagination in order to 
read the ‘signs of the times’.  For postmodern thinkers ambiguity is not something 
to fear but embrace.  Any attempt to build an overarching meta-system separate 
from the density of actual existing human persons is viewed with suspicion.  
 
Spirituality has now evolved towards a holistic orientation. The holistic approach 
makes the study of spirituality infinitely more complex than its dichotomous 
nineteenth-century forebear.  It is no longer possible for us to fragment the 
human person into parts and faculties, into inner and outer, into personal and 
social. We are all of these things at once and much of the spiritual task consists 
precisely in bringing this rich multi-facetedness into unity. The value of spirituality 
is qualitative. It is actualized in the secrecy of the person’s own subjective 
consciousness, but lived in concrete action.  
  
As mentioned at the outset the phenomenological method of investigation is the 
preferred one for a contemporary understanding of spirituality. Postmodernity 
possesses an apolitical character tending towards a humanism grounded in 
caring justice. Principled theories or systems distance us from the concrete and 
personal qualities of other human beings. Engster (2002:2) writes, ‘Rather than 
meeting them (other human beings) on their own terms we subsume them under 
objectifying categories. The other’s reality becomes data, stuff to be analyzed, 
studied, interpreted’. Spirituality concerns itself with what is most human and 
what is most human transcends categorization. It is disclosed. Heidegger 
([1926]/1962:73) notes that a person is never to be thought of as a thing or a 
substance. Instead the person is a unity of a spiritual ‘living through’.  
 
All of the historical factors with respect to religion and culture are brought to bear 
in the study of spirituality but not in such a way as to try to create some kind of 
meta-spiritual ‘over-system’. Freedom and subjectivity lie at the heart of 
contemporary spirituality and are inseparable from authentic religious expression. 
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The fact that so many of these existentially derived notions evolved from 
traditions outside traditional Christianity sensitizes us to listen ever more intently 
and carefully to the experience of spirituality outside of our own religious 
categories. It means not seeing the other as ‘heretic’ but as one sharing an 
experience. This requires dialogue and respect. In a contemporary 
understanding of spirituality, the density of particular religions and peoples as 
they live within their culture and history are respected as given. The process of 
inter-religious dialogue and co-operation as Gross (1999:367) correctly notes is 
not the same as syncretism, a futile attempt to create a new religion by selecting 
the ‘best’ features of the existing religions. Mutual transformation does not result 
in new religions or in one universal syncretistic religion, but in the enrichment of 
the various traditions that results when their members are open to the inspiration 
provided by resources of others. How much more satisfying is this both 
intellectually and ethically than mere tolerance or religious ethnocentrism and 
chauvinism! 
 
Traditionally, ascetic or mystical theology covered much of what is intended by 
the term spirituality. Given, the emphasis on community, culture, anthropology, 
and language, spirituality must broaden its scope to account for the presence of 
the afore-mentioned. A contemporary understanding of spirituality can in fact 
achieve this by simply allowing these disciplines to ‘just be’ thereby allowing a 
space whereby the animating and transcendent principle present within these 
disciplines to ‘come to presence’ in our consciousness. Heidegger uses the 
German term anwessen lassen meaning a ‘coming-to-presence’ to articulate this 
point (Schurmann 2001:206)5. He emphasizes that to let all things be means to 
experience their presence in a contemplative or spiritual manner. It is this ‘spirit’ 
that quickens and gives life. Whether we understand the spirit in the context of 
the Hebrew ruah or the Greek pneuma, the breath of life permeating and 
                                                 
5 By way of philosophical conception, Heidegger additionally notes that the German language 
does not say ‘there is’ being but rather ‘it gives’ being (es gibt Sein) (Schurmann 2001:207).  
While sein is rendered as being, it can also more accurately perhaps be rendered as ‘spirit’.   
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animating all of life is what is meant. It is not more real than that which discloses 
it.  As Levinas (1978:39) writes,  
 
The world is what is given to us. The expression is admirably 
precise! The given does not to be sure come from us, but we do 
receive it …. The world offers the bountifulness of the terrestrial 
nourishment to our intentions – including those of Rabelais; the 
world where youth is happy and restless with desire is the world 
itself.  It takes form not in an additional quality inhering in objects, 
but in a destination inscribed in its revelation, in revelation itself, in 
the light. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF MADNESS 
 
Much madness is divinest sense 
To a discerning eye; 
Much sense the starkest madness. 
‘Tis the majority 
In this, as all, prevails. 
Assent and you are sane; 
Demur, - you’re straightway dangerous, 
And handled with a chain.  
 
Dickinson [1894]/1993:30 
3.0 INTRODUCTION  
In General Psychopathology, Jaspers ([1946]/1963:778) writes that psychosis is 
a puzzle. They (the various manifestations of psychosis) are the unsolved 
problems of human life. The fact that they exist is the concern of everyone. This 
concern is one of the mainsprings of our desire for greater understanding of 
mental health. In the previous chapter, the notion of spirituality as having two 
dimensions was explored. First, spirituality has a corporate dimension expressed 
through cultural bodies. Secondly, it is a person’s subjective experience of 
transcendental meaning. These two dimensions have a dialectical relationship, 
each nurturing the other. A similar dynamic can be observed with respect to 
madness. As Porter (1987:3) notes, when we juxtapose the mind of the insane 
with that of reason, society and culture, we see two facets, two expressions, two 
faces, and each puts a question to the other. If normality condemns madness as 
irrational, subhuman and perverse, madness typically replies in kind, having its 
own tu quoque.   
 
The understanding of what constitutes normalcy is largely determined by the 
cultural mores of any given society in history. As Jaspers ([1946]/1963:780)   
notes, the meaning of ‘sick’ in general terms depends less on a doctor’s 
judgment than on the judgment of the patient and the prevailing conceptions of 
contemporary culture. With the great majority of physical disorders, this is not so 
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noticeable, but with mental health disorders, it is very evident. The same 
psychological state that will bring one individual to the psychiatrist as a sick 
person, will take another to the confessional as one suffering from sin and guilt.   
  
There is in mental health, as in every medical science, a complex matrix of 
historical and social interpretation that influences the epistemological 
categorizations of mental illness that is then applied to specific individuals. 
Critically examining the history of these interpretations is necessary to clearly 
grasp the illusive character of madness. This chapter addresses the social 
history and social constructs of a particular age inasmuch as these constructions 
have, for good or ill, impacted both on our conceptualization of mental illness and 
conditioned our response to it. After all, as Jaspers ([1946]/1963:792) points out, 
all therapy and attitudes towards patients depend upon the state, religions, social 
conditions, the dominant cultural tendencies of the age and finally, but never 
solely, on accepted scientific views. 
     
 The broad term ‘madness’ used in this chapter is not meant to be pejorative. The 
reason for this is because historically the term ‘madness’ generally refers to 
mental illness in medical terms. Indeed, the designation of madness as mental 
illness is itself a product of the modern period. Foucault (d. 1984) is an important 
historian in this regard. His work on madness is central to this chapter. As 
Osborne (1994:42) comments:  
 
The critique forwarded by Foucault of medical expertise – its 
monologic character, its organic fixation – can serve as justification 
for the promotion of subjectivity. What is at stake here is, again, not 
the antinomy of the medical model so much as a deepening of the 
probity of clinical rationality. It is not the absence of expertise, the 
eclipse of the directive presence of the doctor which is at issue but 
the expertise of subjectivity; an expertise that is all the more 
irreversible for being tied to our desire for freedom. 
 
In order to interpret the phenomenon of madness, it is helpful to describe its 
social history by examining the social policy and cultural attitudes towards the 
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phenomenon of madness in the premodern, modern and finally postmodern 
period.  
  
3.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Mental health is not simply an objective science examining the range and 
boundaries of reason, standardizing this range and classifying various 
dysfunctional phenomena so as to treat people who then happen to fall within 
these categories. It is also profoundly concerned with individuality, subjectivity 
and ultimately issues related to human anthropology. Individual experience often 
challenges the standardized classifications that have developed in the course of 
the modern period. As Porter (1987:3) states, the writings of the ‘mad’ challenge 
the discourse of the normal and its right to be the objective mouthpiece of the 
times. The assumption that there exists a definitive and unitary standard of truth 
and falsehood, reality and delusion is put to the test.  
 
In mental health, the subjective approach towards madness corresponds to the 
overall trajectory of the present research and is also fully in keeping with 
orthodox scientific clinical practice. As discussed in the first chapter, the 
phenomenological method of investigation brings us ever closer to the thing 
itself. The thing itself, in the context of this chaper, is madness. By way of 
approaching madness, Foucault’s method is to return to subjectivity and rest 
medical structures upon the individual’s experience. Osborne, commenting on 
Foucault’s thesis in The Birth of the Clinic (1975), writes:  
 
Far from being a form of thought which subverts individuality, 
clinical thought is precisely the science of individuality. Hence, calls 
for an ever more profound turn to the individual may only be 
expressions of the clinical ethos itself….Indeed the possibility of a 
subjectification of the medical field (another anti-medical theme) 
also seems to be internal to this – clinical – logic in two main ways.  
First, because there is a curious space of possibility for a 
phenomenological emphasis within clinical thought. A 
phenomenological emphasis is there, waiting to be unleashed. The 
disappearance of the disease as entity entails the consequence 
that the doctor confronts the modulations of the volumes of the 
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body, as it were, directly. And this is a mutation which leads, as 
Foucault argues, to the vaunting of ‘the signifying powers of the 
perceived and its correlation with language in the original forms of 
experience’. Hence, the injunction to get as close as possible – 
preferably without forms of mediation (pace Reiser) – to the 
authenticity of the object of knowledge: to let the object, as it were, 
‘speak for itself’, that is, as if it were a subject (Osborne 1994:40). 
 
In the context of mental illness, it is important to appreciate that what is 
constitutive in madness is the social and political action that divides madness 
from reason, and not the science which is elaborated once this division is made 
(Foucault 1988:ix). It is this action - namely the conceptual understandings 
propagated by particular institutions (i.e., the discourses) - that have shaped our 
perceptions. Rose (1994:58) writes:   
 
To differentiate is also to classify, to segregate, to locate persons 
and groups under one system of authority and to divide them from 
those placed under another. Placing persons and populations 
under a medical mandate – in the asylum, in the clinic, in an urban 
space guided by medical norms – exposes them to scrutiny, to 
documentation and to descriptions in medical terms. It is here that 
one can discover the conditions for the emergence of ‘positive’ 
knowledge of the human individual …. Truth, at least in the human 
sciences, arises out of the institutional and organizational 
conditions which gather humans together and seek to act upon 
them in order to produce certain ends. The history of truth, the 
constant schism, oppositions, transformation and successions of 
rationalities, is to be understood as a ‘practical matter’ – that is to 
say, as always a matter of practices. We can best grasp the relation 
of truth to our experience of its effects through a study of what one 
might term truth machines: the machinery of forces, spaces and 
subjects which bring into existence and configure the space which 
truths inhabit, and for which truths themselves provide the fuel.  
 
As Porter (1987:3) notes, most people and practically all psychiatrists would 
affirm what seems like a common sense proposition, the reality of mental illness.  
But it is equally possible to think in terms of the manufacture of madness, that is, 
the idea that labeling insanity is primarily a social act, a cultural construct.  
Foucault illustrates that one can show that the medicalization of madness, in 
other words, the organization of medical knowledge around individuals 
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designated as mad, is connected with a whole series of social and economic 
processes at a given time, and also with institutions and practices of power.  
 
Schrenk (1973:17) agrees with Foucault’s view that the end of leprosy in the 
fifteenth century left an empty space in European society. In the subsequent 
search for new rituals of purgation, madness took the place of leprosy, with leper 
houses being transformed into workhouses and asylums in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  
 
Expecting to find insanity rooted in neurological or biochemical disorders, a 
branch of medicine that may anachronistically be termed ‘psychiatry’ – emerged 
from the late eighteenth century, anchored in the asylum movement (Porter 
1987:18). It emerged, however, as a consequence and not a cause of the social 
policy towards those labeled insane. It would be a mistake to regard the drive 
over the last three centuries toward institutionalizing insanity fundamentally as 
the brainchild of psychiatry. In the first instance, the sequestration of the mentally 
ill was primarily an expression of civil policy, more an initiative from magistrates, 
philanthropists and families than the achievement of doctors (Porter 1987:17). 
Consequently, confinement and juridical authority is integrally linked with mental 
health in the modern period. However, this has not historically always been the 
case.   
 
 In order to come ever closer to the truth of the thing itself – in this instance 
madness - deconstructive methodologies are applied. Deconstruction has 
become jargon in postmodern discourse. Almost anyone dissatisfied with a 
dominant mode of theorizing has called for deconstruction. Indeed, one is likely 
to get away with calling any kind of critical analysis a deconstruction. Thus, 
deconstruction needs to be carefully understood if it is to be properly used.  Rose 
(1994:71) writes: 
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Deconstruction is not aimed at deligitimizing that which we take to 
be pure by revealing its impure origins. Rather, in delineating the 
complex contingencies that have made up the territory of our 
experience, in showing us that things could have been different, 
such analyses encourages us to weigh up the costs as well as the 
benefits of the present we inhabit . 
 
 
Since critical historical analysis is an important aspect of understanding madness 
in the following section attention will be paid to early Greek and early Christian 
understanding of madness. With respect to early Greek understanding, Simon 
(1978:40) argues that Athenian thinking developed the model for later thinking 
concerning madness.   
 
3.2  PREMODERN GREEK INTERPRETATION OF MADNESS 
In his book Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece, Simon (1978:42) argues that 
the ancient Greek models with respect to the mind and madness can be divided 
into three types. They are the poetic (mainly Homeric), the philosophical (mainly 
Platonic), and the medical (mainly Hippocratic).These models are useful insofar 
as analysis of them reveal important issues that continue to this day in mental 
health. The present discussion will limit itself to the Platonic (philosophical) and 
Hippocratic (medical) models that developed in ancient Greece, since these are 
most directly relevant to contemporary issues in mental health. Platonic 
philosophy concerns itself with the good – a dimension of which is social order. In 
Plato’s Republic, for example, it is the philosopher king who rules. Thus, with 
Plato, the emergence of reason, reflection and knowledge becomes a strong 
aspect of social leadership. Porter (1987:11) writes that Greek philosophers 
energetically set about subjecting nature, society and consciousness to reason. 
They wished to tame anarchy, establish order and impose self-discipline. 
Rationality became definitive of the noblest faculty in humanity. Mental health 
drew heavily on Plato’s notions; displacing the philosopher king for the 
psychoanalyst. Altschule (1965:195) writes: 
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Plato held that society consisted of uneducable masses who had to 
be governed by an élite – philosophers, of course. Freud’s 
uneducable masses are to be governed by another élite – the 
(analysts), of course. In general, the belief expressed by some 
Freudians that only the (analysts) can understand psychology and 
psychiatry resembles that of those ancient Greeks who held that 
only the virtuous can know anything . 
 
Among the pre-Socratic Greeks, it became the domain of philosophers to 
examine how the forces of reason and un-reason (or madness) were related and 
understood. Prior to this pre-Socratic philosophical development, literary 
mythologies by novelists such as Homer were created to explain human 
psychology. Often these mythologies featured people completely at the mercy of 
the external forces of the gods. Porter (1987:10-11) notes that the ancient 
Homeric epic gives its characters no sensitive, reflective inner self; no mind of 
their own grappling with ‘the choice of life’. Homer’s heroes are like puppets, 
players at the mercy of forces essentially from Beyond and beyond their control: 
gods, demons, the fates, the furies. The inner life, with its dilemmas of reason 
and conscience and the torments of mental strife, is not yet the center of 
attention. Eventually the pre-Socratics shifted the center of these forces. The pre-
Socratics demythologized the fates and furies and located their activity within the 
human mind. The pre-Socratic origin of the term ‘mind’ (sometimes translated as 
soul) refers to a fragment from Anaxagoras (ca. 500-428 BCE) who wrote ‘All 
other things have a portion of everything, but mind alone is without boundary and 
self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is all alone by itself’ (Kirk and Raven 
1962:372-73). The human psyche, which is the carrier of thoughts in the mind, 
became the landscape for the exploration of the range of human experience. In 
demythologizing the fates and furies, the basic architecture for the later 
understanding of the human person as self -transcendent was born. Clearly the 
human person is mortal; however, the mind carries with it a transcendental 
quality that was gradually perceived as mysterious, immortal, and in some 
respects, divine.   
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In reviewing the philosophical model of Greek antiquity Simon (1978:60) notes 
that the term psyche remained in use from Homer (poetic model) to all later 
Greek philosophical thought with respect to the mind. For the pre-Socratics, 
within the psyche there were two dimensions or hierarchies. There was a 
transcendent aspect which was incorporeal and immortal and another aspect 
identified with the body. In defining two modes of thinking, a superior and an 
inferior, the pre-Socratics thus laid the groundwork for some of the central issues 
in Platonic thought. One of these issues is how to understand the human person 
as a creature capable of both abstract, sophisticated, logical thinking as well as 
impulse-ridden, fantasy-dominated thinking 
 
In Phaedurus, Plato has Socrates discuss the role of madness in the human 
person. Madness, for the Greeks, was understood according to the above-
mentioned concept of impulse-ridden, fantasy-dominated thinking. Interestingly, 
in Phaedurus, this is not viewed as an evil that must be exorcised. Rather there 
is something divine lying at the heart of the experience of the passions or 
madness. 
 
False is the tale that when a lover is at hand favor ought rather to 
be accorded to one who does not love, on the ground that the 
former is mad, and the latter sound of mind. That would be right if it 
were an invariable truth that madness is an evil, but in reality, the 
greatest blessing come by way of madness, indeed of madness 
that is heaven sent (Hamilton and Huntington 1961:491). 
 
Strict rationality is not the only expression of a full life. The embrace of the 
irrational (or as it is referred to in this dialogue, madness) is connected with art 
and truth. Indeed, Plato has Socrates connecting madness with art and 
prophecy. ‘Yet, it is in place to appeal to the fact that madness was accounted no 
shame or disgrace by the men of old who gave things their names; otherwise 
they would not have connected that greatest of arts, whereby the future is 
discerned, with this very word ‘madness,’ and named it accordingly’ (Hamilton 
and Huntington 1961:491). Very early on then, the connection between creativity 
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and madness was intuited. However, we can glean from these early writings an 
understanding of the destructive nature of madness as well.   
 
It is clear that in addition to the transcendent, mystical and prophetic aspect of 
madness, it was also viewed as having a destructive force. The key to healing 
the destructive elements lay in embracing the ‘irrationality’ of mystery and 
purging the destructive elements through participation in religious rites. It is 
interesting that the early Greeks, like the Hebrews in the Old Testament which 
we will examine later, saw destructive madness as punishment for some ancient 
sin against the gods: 
 
And in the second place, when grievous maladies and afflictions 
have beset certain families by reason of some ancient sin, 
madness has appeared among them, and breaking out into 
prophecy has secured relief by finding the means thereto, namely 
by recourse to prayer and worship, and in consequence thereof 
rites and means of purification were established, and the sufferer 
was brought out of danger, alike for the present and for the future.  
Thus did madness secure, for him that was maddened aright and 
possessed, deliverance from troubles (Hamilton and Huntington 
1961:492).  
  
Uniting this dialectic, or at the very least taming the negative aspect, became a 
task of religion and mysticism but increasingly included the craft of medicine as 
well.  
 
3.3 THE MEDICAL MODEL IN ANTIQUITY 
Simon (1978:226) writes that the ideas and attitudes that we associate with the 
medical model become much more explicit with the rise of Hippocratic medicine 
in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. If Socrates was the man who, according to 
Cicero, brought philosophy down from the heavens to the marketplace, 
Hippocrates (ca.350 BCE) was the one who brought philosophy down from the 
level of theoretical discourse to the practice of caring for and curing the body.   
One of the most extensive documents dealing with mental disturbances, all of 
which were grouped under the category of epilepsy, is found in Hippocrates’ 
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work, On the Sacred Disease. Hippocrates takes the position that this disease is 
like any other.  Positing an imaginary divine cause only frustrates its treatment.   
 
It is thus with regard to the disease called Sacred: it appears to me 
to be nowise more divine nor more sacred than other diseases, but 
has a natural cause from the originates like other affections. Men 
(sic) regard its nature and cause as divine from ignorance and 
wonder, because it is not at all like to other diseases. And this 
notion of its divinity is kept up by their inability to comprehend it, 
and the simplicity of the mode by which it is cured, for men are 
freed from it by purifications and incantations …. The quotidian, 
tertian, and quartan fevers, seem to me no less sacred and divine 
in their origin than this disease, although they are not reckoned so 
wonderful. (Hippocrates 1994:2) 
 
The significance of the foregoing is the shift that began to occur in medical 
science with the emergence of the Hippocratic model. Like the philosophical 
model, impersonal forces of gods have been replaced with personal ones, except 
this time, the physiological emphasis is substituted for the mythological (Simon 
1978:222). While there were many other psychodynamic theories extant at the 
time, this particular insight of Hippocrates has particular resonance today in 
terms of the ascendancy of neuro - or bio-psychiatry. However, epilepsy, for 
example, has a definite physical manifestation of seizures. Psychological 
disturbances that create psychic stress and mania leading to strange behaviours 
were not differentiated and placed entirely under the purview of medical 
knowledge. The irrational still belonged to the realm of the philosophical and 
religious dimensions of society. What is clear is that among the ancients, not 
unlike in our own time, restoration from mental agitation to a sense of equilibrium 
was connected to both the art of medicine and/or the practice of religion.  
Alongside these essentially Greek ideas, Judaism and Christianity embraced 
similar views.  
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3.4 MADNESS IN THE BIBLE 
Analysis of how madness is interpreted in the Bible presents researchers with a 
hermeneutical problem. The cosmology of the Bible is very different than the 
cosmology of the contemporary era:   
 
The cosmology of the New Testament is essentially mythical in 
character.  The world is viewed as a three storied structure, with the 
earth in the centre, the heavens above, and the underworld 
beneath. Heaven is the abode of God and of the celestial beings – 
the angels. The underworld is hell, the place of torment. Even the 
earth is more than the scene of natural, everyday events, of the 
trivial round and common task. It is the scene of the supernatural 
activity of God and his angels on the one hand, and of Satan and 
his daemons on the other. These supernatural forces intervene in 
the course of nature and in all that men (sic.) think and will and do.  
Miracles are by no means rare. Man (sic.) is not in control of his 
own life.  Evil spirits may take possession of him; Satan may inspire 
him with evil thoughts. Alternatively, God may inspire his thoughts 
and guide his purposes (Bultmann 1953:1). 
 
Consequently, the issue of biblical interpretation is an important one. Bultmann 
states that in order to arrive at a correct interpretation, we have to first identify 
our interest. Our interest is in the relevance of the Bible for today. Bultmann 
writes:   
 
Now we have found the adequate way to put the question when we 
interpret the Bible. This question is, how is man’s (sic) existence 
understood in the Bible? I approach the Biblical texts with this 
question for the same reason which supplies the deepest motive for 
all historical research and for all interpretation of historical 
documents. It is that by understanding history I can gain an 
understanding of the possibilities of human life and thereby of the 
possibilities of my own life. The ultimate reason for studying history 
is to become conscious of the possibilities of human existence 
(Johnson 1987:310) 
 
In order to achieve this goal, Bultmann suggests abandoning premodern 
mythological conceptions in order to apprehend the deeper meaning of the text. 
The method of interpretation which tries to recover the deeper meaning behind 
the Biblical images such as demonology, Bultmann calls demythologizing. Its aim 
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is not to eliminate the mythological statements but to re-interpret them. This is 
Bultmann’s hermeneutical method (Johnson 1987:293).   
 
For example, Ratzinger (1970:238) suggests that the three cosmic levels 
mentioned above – the earth with heaven above and hell below ought to be seen 
not as a description of the physical structure of the cosmos but as symbols of the 
dimensions of human experience. Hell, then, is not a name for some unearthly 
place, but a dimension of human nature, the abyss into which it reaches down to 
its lower end. 
 
Applying this method to how madness is rendered in the Bible, we can re-
interpret the evil spirits of the Bible as projections of unconscious contents of the 
human mind (White [1952]/1967:191). Indeed White ([1952]/1967:192) cites 
Rivkah Schärf (1948), who favours a subjective and psychological approach to 
interpreting evil spirits. Schärf identifies Satan, not with a distinct spiritual being, 
but instead with the ‘yetzer ha ra’ – that is the ‘evil inclination’ or imagination 
inherent in man of which we read first in Genesis – and then frequently in the Old 
Testament.  
 
3.4.1 MADNESS IN THE OLD TESTAMENT 
In the Bible, much of the sickness afflicting humanity was attributed to demons.  
In the earlier Old Testament period, demons might have been called by God for a 
specific purpose. Tweltfree (1985:25) cites, as an example of the foregoing, the 
author of the story in 1 Samuel 16 who believed that even the evil spirit which 
afflicted Saul was ‘from the Lord (vv.14,16,23; Num. 21:6). This interpretation 
slowly shifted. For example Pseudo-Philo (ca.70 CE) and Josephus (ca.100 CE), 
Jewish writers in the New Testament era no longer held this view and when 
interpreting the story, dropped all reference to the evil spirit coming ‘from the 
Lord’. We begin to see a slight movement towards juxtaposing good and evil in a 
more dualistic framework. Distinct evil spirits whose origins lie with a separate 
being, Satan or the devil, lie at the heart of conflicts. It is possible to 
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demythologize the demonology of the Bible in order to ascertain what might have 
been meant by the use of such imagery.   
 
May (1969:123) defines the demonic1 as any natural function which has the 
power to take over the whole person. Examples are sex and eros, anger and 
rage, and the craving for power. The demonic can be either creative or 
destructive and is normally both. When the power goes awry and one element 
usurps control over the total personality, we have ‘demon possession’, the 
traditional name throughout history for psychosis. May (1969:123) adds that the 
Greek concept of ‘demon’ – the origin of our modern concept – included the 
creativity of the poet and artist as well as that of the ethical and religious leader, 
and is also the contagious power which the lover has. 
 
The cosmology of Hebrew culture with respect to madness resembled the early 
Greeks insofar as madness had a divine source linked with prophecy. Its 
expression, however, could be evil or good. The Hebrew word for prophet is 
nemi; it is also the term for ‘madman’. The phenomenon the term nemi describes 
is a matter of discernment for both the community and the individual. For 
example, in I Samuel 10:10, a band of prophets meet Saul and he falls into a 
prophetic frenzy among them. When the people view this frenzy they ask, ‘What 
has come over the son of Kish? Is Saul among the prophets?’(v.12). What this 
exchange demonstrates is the cultural experience of the people to the 
manifestation of frenetic activity, which could be described as mania. It is the 
genesis of a popular colloquialism concerning those who appear eccentric or 
even somewhat mad – ‘Is Saul among the prophets?’ In this instance, the 
proverb ‘is Saul among the prophets?’ has a positive connotation showing that 
the Lord’s spirit empowers Saul to prophesy and rule (Coogan 2001:414).   
 
                                                 
1 May notes that the word can be spelled ‘demonic’ (the popularized form), or ‘daemonic’ (the medieval form 
often now used by the poets – by Yeats, for example), or ‘daimonic’ (the derivative from the ancient Greek 
word ‘daimon’).  He uses the spelling ‘daimonic’ – I have chosen the more popular ‘demonic’. 
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While he had been privately anointed earlier, there is a public proclamation and 
vote where Saul is eventually chosen to be king. The good spirit of God comes 
upon Saul as he proves himself worthy to lead. Later, however, we read that the 
good spirit of the Lord departs from Saul and an evil spirit from the Lord torments 
him (1 Samuel 16:14). Interestingly each spirit - the good and evil – is seen as 
having its source in God, although they are both centered in the person of Saul.  
The evil spirit is disquieting and a remedy is sought through the agency of music.  
There is a crude sense at this time that certain natural aesthetic remedies can 
help in normal states of melancholy. The servants decide that having someone 
play music will help restore Saul. David is enlisted for this cause. This does not 
have its desired effect as the demons of envy and rage overtake Saul. 
 
Saul’s ecstatic behaviour is once again evidenced in 1 Samuel 18:10 when an 
evil spirit from God rushes upon Saul, compelling him to take David’s life. David 
is successful in eluding Saul. Later in the narrative, Saul falls into a prophetic 
frenzy, strips off his clothes and lies before Samuel (19:23-24). The people ask 
again if Saul is among the prophets because God is using this mad, but prophetic 
spirit, to prevent harm from coming to David (Coogan 2001:431). Saul is a 
tortured person and the narrative leaves few clues as to the reason for his 
torture.   
 
Elaborating any further on the specific form of madness as we understand it 
today is difficult as the purpose of the story is to tell the beginning of the Israeli 
monarchy and not to the explore the madness of King Saul. What is instructive is 
the particular manner in which the people receive Saul’s madness. The 
boundaries of reason that are breached in such a jarring way may be connected 
in some way with a truth that cannot be disclosed to others. On the other hand, it 
could be destructive. Either way, it is understood as a gift from God. As we move 
closer to the New Testament period, the evil spirits tend to be attributed to a 
distinct demonic force.   
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3.4.2 MADNESS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT 
In the New Testament period, demonology takes on a much more discrete form. 
White ([1952]/1967:193) writes that since Schweitzer (d.1965) and Otto (d.1958), 
it has become difficult to read the Gospels at all other than as an account of the 
struggle between the de jure reign of God and the de facto reign of Satan – the 
actual ‘prince’ or ‘god’ of this world over human hearts, minds and affairs. The 
coming of Christ evokes the spirit of the anti-Christ (White [1952]/196]:193) Tillich 
articulates it as follows: 
 
Christianity asserts that Jesus is the Christ.  The term ‘the Christ’ 
points by marked contrast to man’s existential situation.  For Christ, 
the Messiah is he who is supposed to bring the ‘new eon’, the 
universal regeneration, the new reality. New reality presupposes an 
old reality; and the old reality, according to prophetic and 
apocalyptic descriptions is the state of the estrangement of man 
and his world from God.  This estranged world is ruled by structures 
of evil, symbolized as demonic powers (Tillich [1957]/1969:27). 
 
Tillich ([1957]/1969:27) suggests that our existential predicament is alienation 
from God and one another, combined with the desire for deeper reconciliation. In 
that sense, existentialism, argues Tillich, is a natural ally of Christianity. The texts 
of the New Testament can be read as symbolic of our existential predicament.  
Thus the theme of redemption in the Gospels can be interpreted symbolically as 
saying something about the need for restoration of health, including mental 
health, to the human person as well as a deeper renewal of being. The force of 
evil is named by Jesus in the New Testament. The naming of the demonic, 
argues May (1969:167), illustrates the positive curative side of the role of 
knowledge in relation to the demonic. May continues, ‘Traditionally, the way man 
(sic) has overcome the demonic is by naming it. In this way, the human being 
forms personal meaning out of what was previously merely threatening 
impersonal chaos’ (May 1969:167). Manifestations of madness (impersonal 
chaos) as well as manifestations of healing (personal meaning) are each 
symbolized in the gospel stories.   
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One of the most interesting stories of demonic possession that those in mental 
health care might recognize as an extremely disassociative, psychotic personality 
disordered behaviour, is the story of the Geresene Demoniac  (Mark 5:5). The 
land of the Gerasenes is outside of Jewish territory. While connected with Jesus’ 
Galilean ministry, the evangelist notes that it is opposite Galilee (Mark 5:25) 
(Brown 1968:130). There is a strange otherness to this man, not only culturally, 
but behaviorally as well. He wears no clothes and lives in the tombs. He is clearly 
marginalized and outside of both Jewish and Gentile society. He is restrained 
with shackles and chains. We are told that many demons haunted this man. 
Jesus orders the unclean spirit out of the man. In this instance the healing of the 
demoniac is brought about by Jesus demanding the name of the demon (Mark 
5:9). In the next vignette, the people witness the man sitting by Jesus, healed, 
clothed and in his right mind. Thus a transformation is wrought in this man that is 
clearly evident to the Gentile population. Not only that, but as a Gentile, Jesus 
suggests that he return to the Gentiles declaring how much God has done for 
him. Otherness, both psychologically and culturally, is transcended and healed 
through the action of Jesus.   
 
It is interesting to note that when commissioning the twelve, the ability to cast out 
demons (disease of the mind) and cure diseases (somatic disease) is part of the 
same singular mission, although a distinction is clearly drawn between the types 
of diseases. The demons, while perceived as distinct beings, are understood to 
haunt the recesses of human consciousness. There is, however, as much 
ambiguity with respect to madness or possession among biblical authors as there 
was among the early Greeks and Hebrews. 
 
For example, the accusation of being either mad or possessed was leveled 
several times against Jesus. In one instance, his family is concerned that he 
appears out of his mind (Mark 3:20-35). The charge is later leveled against Jesus 
that he has Beelzebul and it is by the ruler of demons that he casts out demons.  
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Jesus counters this charge by saying that the ‘unclean’ spirits are gone and it 
makes no sense that an evil spirit would exorcise an evil spirit.   
   
When Paul is discussing the experience of faith to King Agrippa, King Agrippa 
says to Paul that he is out of his mind and that too much learning is driving him 
insane (Acts 26:24). Paul replies that he is not out of his mind but speaks the 
sober truth. That sober truth is a spiritual one. Paul follows the intimation of the 
New Testament in characterizing the new dispensation as one of the spirit. 
However, Paul seems to be describing a new kind of inner experience. Watts and 
Williams (1988:94) argue that there is a theological point being made about a 
psychological development towards greater inwardness and subjectivity in Paul. 
We see evidence for this in the concept of consciousness (‘syneidesis’), a 
Hellenistic concept imported by Paul, to which he gives a deeper religious 
significance (Watts and Williams 1988:94). Paul draws a contrast between the 
spiritual person (pneumatikos anthropos) and the natural person (psychikos 
anthropos) (1 Cor. 2:14-15). The spiritual person is one alive with the spirit of 
God, a new creation. Thus there is a sense in which the spirit of Christ expands 
consciousness, making the person quite literally a new creation. This process of 
renewal involves embracing madness. In a striking passage, Paul states that the 
cross itself is madness. ‘For Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom, but 
we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to the Jews and foolishness to the 
Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jew and Greeks, Christ the power of 
God, and the wisdom of God. For God’s foolishness is wiser than human 
wisdom, and God’s weakness is stronger than human strength’(1 Cor. 1:22-25). 
 
3.5 MADNESS IN THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD 
While the Bible is not a medical history it influenced the cosmology of the 
medieval period, particularly with respect to madness. In addition, the Greek 
tradition of medical art began to flourish again with Artesius and Galen in the first 
century CE. They made contributions to the history of medicine, reviving Greek 
thinking through experimenting and developing theories around mania and 
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melancholia (Mathews 2004:4). These Greek and Christian streams converged in 
the medieval period, producing a particular approach to madness.  Porter 
outlines the dynamic: 
 
The culture of medieval Latin Christendom absorbed and made use 
of both of the Greek alternatives (madness as moral trauma, 
madness as disease). But it also fitted them within a cosmic 
Christian scheme – madness as divine Providence – which could 
impart a higher significance to either.  Medieval and Renaissance 
minds could regard madness as religious, as moral or as medical, 
as divine or diabolical, as good or bad (Porter 1987:13). 
 
Adopting a Biblical cosmology influenced by the New Testament, the devil was 
eventually accepted as the culprit for all manner of deviant behaviour, including 
madness. May (1969:168) notes that in the Middle Ages, the priests who were 
successful at casting out devils were those who could divine the name of the 
demon, the pronouncing of which was sufficient to conjure the evil spirit away. 
Indeed, during the middle ages, demonology eventually became the ‘psychiatry’ 
of the day (Mathews 2004:3). White ([1952]/1967:192) notes that with the rise of 
scholasticism beginning with St. Anslem around 1050 CE did questions 
concerning demonology become acute. May notes that angelology and 
demonology are in fact primordial psychological themes that emerge in the 
consciousness of the medieval period.  May (1969:138) writes: 
 
Satan, Lucifer, and the other demonic figures who were all at one 
time archangels, are psychologically necessary. They had to be 
invented, had to be created, in order to make human action and 
freedom possible. Otherwise, there would be no consciousness.  
For every thought destroys as it creates: to think this thing, I have 
to cut out something else; to say ‘yes’ to this is to say ‘no’ to that 
and to have a ‘no’ in the very ambivalence of the ‘yes’ . … For 
consciousness works by way of either/or: it is destructive as well as 
constructive. 
 
White argues that while ‘devils’ and ‘complexes’ are not altogether synonymous 
terms, in point of fact theological and psychological accounts can be put side by 
side and are not mutually exclusive.  
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When the theologian says that somebody is afflicted by the devil, 
he is describing his situation in relationship to God. When the 
psychologist says he is suffering from an unassimilated 
autonomous complex, he is describing an inherent functional 
disorder. Each speaks a different language; each describes an 
observed occurrence from a different view point, or, as he 
scholastics would say, in a different ratio formalis qua. Our 
contention is that the meanings of the two sets of terms (the 
theological and the psychopathological) are, however, not mutually 
exclusive; and we would offer for expert consideration the 
suggestion that, while the meanings are different, each terms may 
be, and commonly is referable to the selfsame phenomenon or 
occurrence  (White [1952]/1967:203). 
 
 
Haitzmann (d. 1700 CE) is a case in point. Haitzmann believed that he had made 
a pact with the Devil. In order to free himself from this pact, he submitted himself 
to the priests and was subsequently successfully exorcised by the Holy Fathers.  
So successful was his exorcism that he entered the monastery and became 
known as Brother Chrysostom until his death in 1700. Porter notes that Freud 
analyzed Haitzmann’s case. Freud added that the ancient demonological 
interpretations such as that in Haitzman’s case shared much in common with 
psychoanalytical accounts. Psychoanalytic language simply needed to supplant 
and convert the theological language:  
 
For both demonology and psychoanalysis stressed the priority of 
turmoil in the consciousness, rather than resting content with lazy 
suppositions of mere organic disease. The ‘superstitious’ theory of 
he ‘dark ages’ had presupposed maleficium, forces possessing 
from without, from above; modern psychiatry saw disturbances as 
triggered by forces within, welling up from below. For that reason, 
the religious neuroses of several centuries back were – just like the 
neuroses of children – easier to ‘crack’ than the complex 
organically disguised neuroses of latter days …. Freud thus 
believed that Christian demonology had stumbled upon, yet 
ultimately mystified, the true nature and cause of the disturbance.  
But he could lay that mystification bare, by showing how the 
theological language was a sort of code, recording all the 
hieroglyphic clues in strange tongue which would succumb to the 
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right translation device. Freud had no hesitation in labeling 
Haitzmann a case of ‘neurosis’ (Porter 1987:85-86). 
 
The problem with Freud’s approach is that madness, even religious madness, 
was presumed to be manifestations of pathology. As the age of reason begins to 
characterize the modern period, madness has no positive feature. As Foucault 
observes, the original shock of the cross, its power of paradox and otherness 
was inverted and changed: 
 
The great theme of the madness of the Cross, which belonged so 
intimately to the Christian experience of the Renaissance, began to 
disappear in the seventeenth century, despite Jansenism and 
Pascal. Or rather, it subsisted, but changed and somehow inverted 
its meaning.  It was no longer a matter of requiring human reason 
to abandon its pride and its certainties in order to lose itself in the 
great unreason of sacrifice. When classical Christianity speaks of 
the madness of the Cross, it is merely to humiliate false reason and 
add luster to the eternal light of truth; the madness of God-in-man’s 
image is simply a wisdom not recognized by the men of unreason 
who live in this world …. After Port-Royal, men (sic) would have to 
wait two centuries - until Dostoievsky and Nietzsche - for Christ to 
regain the glory of madness, for scandal to recover its power as 
revelation, for unreason to cease being merely the public shame of 
reason (Foucault 1988:79). 
 
3.6 MADNESS IN THE MODERN PERIOD: CULTURAL SHIFTS 
Both in the popular imagination and in literature, the theme of madness is 
substituted for the theme of death. The fear of death is not the horizon that 
frames purposeful meaning; it is now the fear of insanity enveloping society in a 
grand apocalyptic universal event. Foucault (1988:17) describes this rupture:  ‘It 
is no longer the end of time and of the world which will show retrospectively that 
men (sic) were mad not to have been prepared for them; it is the tide of 
madness, its secret invasion that shows that the world is near its final 
catastrophe; it is man’s (sic) insanity that invokes and makes necessary the 
world’s end’. 
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As Porter (1987:15) writes, the growing importance of science and technology, 
the development of bureaucracy, the formalization of the law, the flourishing of 
the market economy, the spread of literacy and education all made their 
contribution to this amorphous but inexorable process of prizing rationality, as 
understood by those ‘right-thinking’ members of society who had the power to 
impose social norms. In terms of the cultural impact, from around the mid-
seventeenth century, a similar process of redefinition was afoot within Europe, 
tending to deny the validity of traditional forms of religious madness. The 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation had made a great play of the reality of 
religious madness: some of it good, derived directly from God and manifested in 
ecstasies or in prophetic powers; much of it evil, originating from the Devil and all 
too obvious in witches, demoniacs and heretics (Porter 1987:15). In the modern 
period, any notion that the individual may have a unique relationship with an 
external, or even internal, transcendent source was viewed as imaginary. As 
Porter (1987:85) notes, Hobbes (d.1679) is an out-and-out skeptic of such 
notions and suggests that claims of immediate personal contact with God or the 
Devil were, by definition, frauds, fictions or crazy delusions, marks of diseases of 
the head. They lacked scientific plausibility; they had no authentication.  
 
Madness was thus torn from that freedom which allowed it to flourish on the 
Renaissance horizon. In less than a half century, it was sequestered, and in the 
fortress of confinement, bound to Reason, to the rules of morality and to their 
monotonous rights (Foucault 1988:64). 
 
Since the end of the eighteenth century, the life of unreason no 
longer manifests itself except in the lightning-flash works such as 
those of Holderlin, of Nerval, or Nietzsche, or of Artaud – forever 
irreducible to those alienations that can be cured, resisting by their 
own strength that gigantic moral imprisonment..(Foucault 
1988:278). 
 
The figure of the ‘mad’ as an exclusionary and fearful creature begins as leprosy 
disappears at the end of the Middle Ages: 
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In the margins of the community, at the gates of cities, there 
stretched wastelands which sickness had ceased to haunt but had 
left sterile and long uninhabitable. For centuries, these reaches 
would belong to the non-human. From the fourteenth to the 
seventeenth century, they would wait, soliciting with strange 
incantations a new incarnation of disease, another grimace of 
terror, renewed rites of purification and exclusion (Foucault 1988:3).  
  
 
While leprosy disappeared and the leper vanished, the structure of exclusion and 
the theme of reintegration remained. Poor vagabonds, criminals, and ‘deranged 
minds’ assumed the part previously played by the leper. With an altogether new 
meaning and in a very different culture, the forms would remain – essentially that 
major form of a rigorous division which is social exclusion but spiritual 
reintegration (Foucault 1988:7). The new priests of this spiritual reintegration 
became psychiatrists. Additionally, the landscape for this exclusion became both 
a physical space (the asylum) and a psychic interior space (emergent psychiatric 
theories).  
 
3.6.1 MEDICAL SHIFTS  
The Modern period saw a fundamental change in how medicine was understood 
and practiced. As a consequence of modern medical evolution (which preceded 
the emergence of psychiatry but is nonetheless related), we should not be 
surprised, as Rose (1994:68) points out, that health has replaced salvation in our 
ethical system; that the doctor has supplanted the priest; that the discourse of 
medicine has become saturated with questions concerning the meaning of life.   
 
Modern medicine is governed by an object-centered cosmology rather than a 
person-centered one (Armstrong 1994:51). Eighteenth-century medicine based 
on patient dominance, which accordingly recognized the primacy of a patient-
defined agenda, is usurped by a medicine which treats patients as objects and 
ignores their words in search of a presumed underlying pathological basis of 
illness. Hospital medicine with the new technologies of physical examination, 
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autopsy and statistics swept across Europe in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century (Armstrong 1994:18). The hospital provides a locus for a new 
medical mythology. Foucault writes how this happened in France: 
 
The years preceding and immediately following the Revolution saw 
the birth of two great myths with opposing themes and polarities: 
the myth of a nationalized medical profession, organized like the 
clergy, and invested, at the level of man's bodily health, with 
powers similar to those exercised by the clergy over men's souls; 
and the myth of a total disappearance of disease in an untroubled, / 
dispassionate society restored to its original state of health 
(Foucault 1975:31-32).   
 
The resulting objectification of medicine has led to a distancing from the doctor-
patient relationship as the doctor views the patient through an exclusive bio-
medical gaze. In consequence, the autonomous identity of the patient is 
alienated by new mechanistic forms of clinical practice (Armstrong 1994:20). 
Foucault outlines the consequence of the bio-medical model with respect to the 
‘mad’:  
 
In the serene world of mental illness, modern man (sic) no longer 
communicates with the madman; on the one hand the man of 
reason delegates the physician to madness; thereby authorizing a 
relation only through the abstract universality of disease; on the 
other the man of madness communicates with society only by the 
intermediary of an equally abstract reason which is order, physical 
and moral constraints, the anonymous pressures of the group, the 
requirement of conformity (Foucault 1988:x). 
 
Transferred to mental health, hospital medicine had the effect of reinforcing the 
power of the doctor who now not only possessed psychoanalytic knowledge, but 
also increasingly begins to amass coercive juridical power. 
 
3.6.2 THE BIRTH OF THE ASYLUM  
Historians studying the rise of psychiatry in the Western European world and our 
current attitudes towards the mentally ill, including the development of 
exclusionary social policy, see the emergence of psychiatry as corresponding to 
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the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment (Porter 
1987:10). Through the Middle Ages and well beyond, the mentally ill had rarely 
any special, formal provision made for them. Refuges specifically for lunatics 
were almost unknown (Porter 1987:13). All of this changed as we entered the 
Modern period. The particular form of exclusion varied - based on the political 
systems of the country. For example, Porter (1987:16) writes that the systematic 
confinement of lunatics instigated by the state developed in France from the mid-
seventeenth century as part of the great confinement of troublemakers launched 
by Louis IV’s absolutism. In Britain, the biggest growth sector for the confinement 
of lunatics before the nineteenth century lay within the market economy where a 
‘trade in lunacy’ grew up centered upon the private madhouse. Not until 1774 
were any legal safeguards enacted to protect patients held within them.   
 
A date, argues Foucault (1988:39), can serve as a landmark for the birth of the 
asylum, 1656, the decree that founded, in Paris, the Hôpital Général. From the 
very start, it is clear that the Hôpital Général is not a medical establishment. It is 
rather a sort of semi-judicial structure, an administrative entity which, along with 
the already constituted power, and outside of the courts, decides, judges and 
executes decisions. As mentioned above, this phenomenon occurred all across 
Europe. The constitution of an absolute monarchy and the intense Catholic 
renaissance during the Counter-Reformation produced in France a very 
particular character of simultaneous competition and complicity between the 
government and the Church. Elsewhere it assumed quite different forms but its 
localization was just as precise. In German-speaking countries, it was marked by 
the creation of houses of correction, the Zuchthäusern 2. In England, an act of 
1575 covering both ‘the punishment of vagabonds and the relief of the poor’ 
prescribed the construction of houses of correction, to number at least one per 
county (Foucault 1988:43).   
                                                 
2 Others were founded in the second half of the century: Basel (1667), Breslan (1668), Frankfort 
(1684), Spandau (1684), Königsberg (1691). They continued to multiply in the eighteenth century: 
Leipzig first in 1701, then Halle and Cassel in 1717 and 1720, later Brieg and Osnabrück (1756), 
and finally Torgau in 1771 (Foucault 1988:43). 
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These houses were not designed specifically to house the mad as this category 
had not been established yet. The category of people kept in them is not clearly 
differentiated according to strict behavioural parameters. To inhabit the reaches 
long since abandoned by the lepers, administrators chose a group that to our 
eyes is strangely mixed and confused. For example, in the Royal edict of April 
27, 1657, the Hôpital Général set itself the task of preventing ‘mendicancy and 
idleness as the source of all disorders’ (Foucault 1988:47). Before it had the 
medical meaning we have given it, confinement is required for something quite 
different from any concern for curing the sick. The Hospital does not have the 
appearance of a mere refuge for those whom age, infirmity or sicknesses keep 
from working, but it has an ethical status. The authorities of the Hospital are 
granted every juridical apparatus and means of repression. They have the power 
of authority, of direction, of administration, of commerce, of policing, of 
jurisdiction, of correction and punishment. Since policing and segregation lie at 
the heart of the original exclusion, the perception that the mad were alien and 
different began to pervade Western consciousness. 
 
That perception would take on greater clarity when eventually the mad became 
the exclusive inhabitants of the asylum. The nineteenth century would consent, 
would even insist, that to the mad, and to them alone, be transferred the lands on 
which, a hundred and fifty years before, authorities had sought to pen the poor, 
the vagabond, the unemployed (Foucault 1988:57). As the Age of reason begins 
to dominate, confinement is the practice that corresponds to madness 
experienced as unreason; that is, as the empty negativity of reason. Madness 
takes on a moral character where it is perceived on the social horizon as poverty, 
the incapacity for work, of inability to integrate with the group.  
 
The sequestering of the mad is primarily a political act out of which evolved 
modern medical psychiatric practice. While reforms were initiated at the bequest 
of physicians such as Tuke (d. 1822) and Pinel (d.1826), these reforms had the 
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effect of guaranteeing that the physician becomes the essential figure. As 
Foucault (1988:270) notes, the physician initially played no part in the life of 
confinement. However, as a consequence of reforms from the end of the 
eighteenth century, the medical certificate becomes an obligatory requirement for 
the confinement of the mad. This requirement remains to this day. The coupling 
of the person of science with the force of sequestering, reinforces, not the 
restorative aspect of the medical arts within the asylum, but grants to the doctor a 
moral juridical status. ‘Our own age,’ writes Jaspers ([1946]/1963:807) echoing 
the above, ‘is characterized by the fact that psychiatrists are now performing in 
secular fashion what earlier was performed on the grounds of faith. The basic 
medical knowledge of the doctor derives from the natural sciences and 
constantly colours the situation but, whether he (sic) wants to or not, he (sic) is 
always exercising some psychological and moral influence.’ Paradoxically, the 
doctor is used to continue exclusionary political policy and this perception 
hardens into practice. Foucault (1988:270) writes: 
 
However, and this is the essential point, the doctor’s intervention is 
not made by virtue of a medical skill or power that he possesses in 
himself and that would be justified by a body of objective 
knowledge.  It is not as a scientist that homo medicus has authority 
in the asylum, but as a wise man. If the medical profession is 
required, it is as a juridical and moral guarantee, not in the name of 
science … For the medical enterprise is only a part of an enormous 
moral task that must be accomplished at the asylum, and which 
alone can ensure the cure of the insane.  
 
Today, public policy with respect to mental health care is more and more 
envisaged in a community-based and recovery-oriented paradigm. Davidson 
(2005:3) defines recovery in the context of mental illness as ‘a process of 
restoring or developing a meaningful sense of belonging and positive sense of 
identity apart from one’s disability while rebuilding a life in the broader community 
despite or within the limitations imposed by that disability’. He notes that a 
recovery-oriented system of care offers supports that identify and build upon 
each person’s assets, strengths, and areas of health and competence to support 
 96
the person in managing his or her condition while regaining a meaningful, 
constructive sense of membership in the community. Recovery-oriented care 
assumes social inclusion and self-determination as fundamental civil rights of 
people with psychiatric disabilities, not as privileges to be earned through the 
reduction of symptoms, the acquisition of skills, or compliance with treatment 
(Davidson 2005:15). To examine this shift, it is helpful to analyze what changed 
between the modern period and the postmodern one. 
 
3.7 MADNESS IN THE  POSTMODERN PERIOD: CULTURAL SHIFTS 
Our ethos in the postmodern period has shifted dramatically. ‘Ethos’ is a Greek 
term and refers to a general mood or feeling that provides the foundation for a 
consciously constructed response. Ethos refers to the intellectual, spiritual or 
cultural feel of a culture. From ethos derives the term ‘ethic’ which refers to much 
more concrete action in response to life. Part of the reason for the shift towards a 
postmodern ethos was due to the world-shattering events of two world wars, the 
technological revolution, liberation movements of all kinds, an explosion of 
knowledge, and rapid developments in philosophy, the humanities, the 
personality and social sciences (Schneiders 1986:270). This change in ethos 
demanded that the ethic (policy and practice) shift as well. Spretnak (1998:39-40) 
suggests that questions posed with respect to social policy can be raised in a 
postmodern frame of reference. These referents she identifies as ecological 
wisdom, grassroots democracy, personal and social responsibility, nonviolence, 
decentralization, community-based economics, postpatriarchal values, respect 
for diversity, global responsibility and future focus. Falk (1998:83) writes that 
postmodern sensibility helps emancipate us from colonizing forms of knowledge 
associated with both evident and disguised structures of domination. This spirit 
does not repudiate the achievements of modernism, but seeks to displace its 
negative features. One of those negative features is alienation. Lyotard 
expresses the current anxiety well when he writes:  
 
We could say there exists a sort of destiny, or involuntary 
destination toward a condition that is increasingly complex. The 
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needs for security, identity, and happiness springing from our 
immediate condition as living beings, now seem irrelevant next to 
this sort of constraint to complexify, mediatize, quantify, synthesize, 
and modify the size of each and every object.  We are like Gullivers 
in the world of technoscience: sometimes too big, sometimes too 
small, but never the right size (Lyotard 1992[1997]:78).   
 
Lyotard [1992]/1997:79) identifies that technoscientific development 
characteristic of the modern period as being a cause of deepening our malaise 
rather than being an agent in allaying it. It is no longer possible to call 
development progress. It seems to proceed of its own accord, with a force, an 
autonomous motoricity that is independent of us. 
 
In mental health some researchers such as Bracken and Thomas (2001:725) 
note that psychiatry must move beyond its modernist framework. Faith in the 
ability of science and technology to resolve human problem is diminished.  
Bracken and Bridge refer to this dynamic as ‘post-psychiatry’. Post-psychiatry 
emphasizes social and cultural contexts such as community. It places ethics 
before technology and works to minimize coercive interventions.  
 
Two key postmodern themes in post-psychiatry as they relate to mental health 
deserve attention. They are empowerment of the individual and community-
based directions.   
 
3.7.1 PERSONAL EMPOWERMENT AND FREEDOM 
A recovery of personal autonomy is critical in facilitating the social spaces for 
people to be able to recover from the effect of mental illness in their lives. Illich 
(1976:267) writes: 
 
The recovery of personal autonomy will thus be the result of 
political actions reinforcing an ethical awakening.  People will want 
to limit transportation because they will want to move efficiently, 
freely, and with equity; they will limit schooling because they want 
to share equally the opportunity, time, and motivation to learn in 
rather than about the world; people will limit medical therapies 
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because they want to conserve their opportunity and power to heal.  
They will recognize that only the disciplined limitation of power can 
provide equitably shared satisfaction.  
 
The direction towards personal empowerment is recognized in both civil and 
religious institutions. Politically, we have moved from a conception of the state 
that holds that the state is a created good from which citizens derive their rights 
and dignity, to a conception of state which sees itself as being ordered to the 
inherent dignity of the human person in his or her political, religious and 
economic aspirations. One sees this reflected in two prominent institutions 
symbolizing the civil and religious spheres of the West - the United Nations (UN) 
and the Vatican. The UN, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
1948, clearly positioned the rights of the human person above whatever political 
system a governing body chooses to use in its geographic boundary. Article 2 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: 
 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction 
shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or 
international status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or 
under any other limitation of sovereignty (United Nations 1948:1). 
 
Such a position represents the consensus of the global community in terms of 
the values that we want to see extant in the civil arena as we move forward in 
history.   
 
With the publication of the Declaration on Religious Liberty (Dignitas Humanae) 
at Vatican II, the Catholic Church recognized that religious freedom and cultural 
plurality are values most consistent with the dignity of the human person. 
 
This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to 
religious freedom. Freedom of this kind means that all men (sic) 
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should be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social 
groups and every human power so that, within due limits, nobody is 
forced to act against his convictions in religious matters in private or 
in public, alone or in associations with others. The Council further 
declares that the right to religious freedom is based on the very 
dignity of the human person as known through the revealed word of 
God and reason itself. This right of the human person to religious 
freedom must be given such recognition in the constitutional order 
of society as will make it a civil right (Flannery 1975: 800). 
 
 
This historic document was a recognition that truth claims from religious bodies 
could no longer be linked with the potestas of the state. Murray (1966:15) argues 
that in light of this and other Catholic social teachings, there has been an 
inversion in Catholic social teachings such that now ‘the safekeeping and 
promotion of ... rights is government’s first duty to the common good’. 
 
The human person is self actualized within his or her natural social, political and 
religious environment (i.e. their community). Clarifying what is meant by 
community is important. 
 
3.7.2 COMMUNITY BASED APPROACHES 
In the nineteenth century, as complex regimes of medical practice spread across 
urban space, the town became a multifaceted apparatus for fighting disease and 
securing health. The organic community became subject to scrutiny from a 
clinical gaze. The domestic environment – the home and family and all the 
relations amongst person and activities within it – was constituted as a site 
subjected to scrutiny and administration in medical terms (Rose 1994:63).   This 
dynamic of the modern period has created what McKnight3 refers to as a service 
economy which frustrates the growth of organic community. McKnight believes 
that a service economy based on needs hides a very different landscape. That 
landscape is the organic community out of which emerges care and healing. ’He 
thinks that people are becoming aware in their bones that hospitals cannot 
                                                 
3 McKnight has worked with communities and neighbourhoods throughout Canada and the United 
States and directs a program in community studies at Northwestern University 
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simply produce health, nor schools education, nor police departments safety. 
Experience has taught them, he says, that communities can only regenerate from 
within’ (CBC 1994:13). 
  
McKnight (CBC 1994:14) defines a community as a group of persons who 
understand themselves as citizens responsible for and accountable to their 
neighbours. Community is not about technicians ‘fixing’ problems that disrupt the 
social order. We do not create community by inventing all kinds of services and 
products for consumer consumption. Community subsists in the concrete 
presence of persons who understand themselves as citizens first.  Berdyaev 
outlines well the understanding of community and how the human person is self-
actualized in that context: 
 
Community (communality) is always personalistic, it is always an 
encounter of person with person, the ‘I’ with the ‘thou’ in a ‘we’.  In 
authentic (community) there are no objects, for another person is 
never an object, but is always a ‘thou’. Society is an abstraction, it 
is an objectification, and in it the person vanishes. (Community) 
however is concrete and existential, it is outside of objectification. In 
society there is a conforming oneself into the state, and the person 
enters into the sphere of objectification, he becomes abstracted 
from himself, he undergoes as it were an alienation from his proper 
nature. About this there was many an interesting thought from the 
young Marx.  Marx discerns this alienation of human nature in the 
economics of the Capitalist order. But in essence this alienation of 
human nature occurs in every society and state. Both existentially 
and humanly, the only community is the ‘I’ with the ‘thou’ in the ‘we’ 
(Berdyaev 1936: 55). 
 
For McKnight (CBC 1994:16), a citizen is one who has a vested interest in the 
well-being of the community as it impacts on his or her immediate family and/or 
friends. It is the recovery of a sense of citizenship which is much more in line with 
the notion of personhood, as opposed to ‘clienthood’ that should be driving our 
social response.   
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Community is not just about economics.  We are saturated with advertising in our 
consumer-driven culture. Mass marketing has convinced us that citizenship 
derives from consumption. Historically, the market has been understood as the 
production and trade of goods. Now, with the human service industry expanding, 
people themselves are becoming these goods, and human services are 
becoming factories. People are viewed as products, commodities or ‘shares’ 
which drive the engines of the organization rather than fellow citizens with gifts 
who contribute to the richness of our local fabric. Viewing itself in this economic 
paradigm, unconsciously but with what McKnight calls ’the mask of love’, the 
organization or institution seeks to expand itself and seek out or more accurately 
create larger and larger markets. The cost (or side effect) of this, argues 
McKnight, is the loss of citizenship. Dressing this phenomenon with sentimental 
vocabulary will not change anything. 
 
We do not need to be creating sub-cultures and sub-communities that only serve 
to further marginalize people and force us to look at our neighbour as ‘consumer’.   
We are all members of the local community. The harm in colonizing and/or 
segregating the mentally ill is the fact that ‘people will become known by their 
deficiencies not their gifts’ and ‘active citizenship will retreat in the face of 
professional expertise; and services will aggregate to form total environments’ 
(CBC 1994:5). Despite the reduction and closure of mental institutions and 
asylums, mental health service has increased considerably. As Double 
(2002:902) points out, as more resources have been provided for mental health 
services, more resources are perceived to be needed. The traditional boundaries 
of psychiatric disorders have broadened. Everyday problems regarded as the 
province of other social spheres becomes ‘medicalised’ by mental health.  
McKnight comments: 
 
So we’re involved in, actually, a humorous but tragic kind of never 
ending search for new needs in people, because systems that grow 
have to find new needs and impute them to people, and the 
problem with that is it is always at the cost of diminished 
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citizenship.  So that as these systems of service colonize your life 
and my life, saying that we are bundles of needs and there are 
institutionalized services there to meet the needs to make us whole, 
to make us real, what we become is less and less powerful.  (CBC 
1994:3-4). 
 
3.7.3 POSTMODERN APPROACH TO MADNESS 
Values tending towards empowerment of the human person are foundational in a 
postmodern approach to madness. The ethical question today is how to act in 
congruence with the personalistic values of our postmodern ethos. Any system 
predicated upon abstractions of human experience risks losing the human 
element. In our day, part of that process involves critical analysis theory often 
using contemporary deconstructive methodologies derived from postmodern 
philosophers such as Foucault. The problem that Foucault (Rabinow and Rose 
1994:40) outlines, the problem of power, does not imply all power is evil. The 
problem with the issue of power lies not in denying that power is exercised but in 
knowing how to avoid the kind of domination where someone is subjected to the 
arbitrary and unnecessary authority of an authority figure. ’I believe’, says 
Foucault, ‘that this problem must be framed in terms of rules of law, rational 
techniques of government and ethos, practices of the self and of freedom’ 
(Rabinow and Rose 1994:40). The direction of postmodern ethics is to find ways 
to exercise as little domination as possible. A postmodern approach to madness 
is aimed at communal inclusion and dialogue. Freire (1995:48-49) writes:  
 
To achieve this (ethic), however, it is necessary to trust in the 
oppressed and their ability to reason. Whoever lacks this trust will 
fail to initiate (or will abandon) dialogue, reflection, and 
communication, and will fall into using slogans, communiqués, 
monologues and instructions. Superficial conversions to the cause 
of liberation carry this danger …. Those who work for liberation 
must not take advantage of the emotional dependence of the 
oppressed-dependence that is the fruit of the concrete situation of 
domination which surrounds them and which engendered their 
inauthentic view of the world …. Libertarian action must recognize 
this dependence as a weak point and must attempt through 
reflection and action to transform it into independence.  However, 
not even the best-intentioned leadership can bestow independence 
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as a gift. The liberation of the oppressed is a liberation of women 
and men, not things. Accordingly, while no one liberates himself by 
his own efforts alone, neither is he liberated by others. Liberation, a 
human phenomenon, cannot be achieved by semihumans. Any 
attempt to treat people as semihumans only dehumanizes them.  
When people are already dehumanized, due to the oppression they 
suffer, the process of their liberation must not employ the methods 
of dehumanization . 
 
A postmodern approach to madness means understanding individuals with a 
mental illness as fellow citizens, who share our same human hopes and 
aspirations and who have gifts to contribute as opposed to broken cogs in the 
machinery of society who require separate colonies such as asylums to inhabit or 
specialized services. 
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored how madness has been understood historically. The terms 
‘premodern’, ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ are conceptual terms used to delineate 
different horizons out of which our culture in the Western world conceives of 
science, politics, philosophy and religion. Relevant to this chapter, these 
developments had, and continue to have, far-reaching consequences by way of 
understanding mental illness from the point of view of those who experience it 
and those who treat it. While there have always been people who have been 
understood as mad, mental illness, as a distinct scientific, medical phenomenon 
with a new class of medical doctor, the psychiatrist, did not emerge until the 
Enlightenment. The modern period has significantly conditioned many of our 
attitudes towards madness and our classification of populations through the 
discourse of various psychoanalytic and psychiatric theories that dominate our 
understanding of the human person today. According to Hedges (2005:1), 
discourses are propagated by specific institutions and divide up the world in 
specific ways. Discourses promote specific kinds of power relations, usually 
favoring the ‘neutral’ person or professional using the discourse (the lawyer, 
psychiatrist, professor, doctor, etc.). This fact in no way impugns the scientific 
validity or the therapeutic effectiveness of mental health; it does not endorse 
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psychiatry, but neither does it invalidate it (Rabinow and Rose 1994:38). It does, 
however allow us to critically examine what is absent in modern approaches. 
 
Premodern interpretations reveal important intuitions that should inform our 
approach. Historically madness was perceived as one pole of spiritual 
experience. It contained both divine and destructive elements. Madness, 
prophecy and creative genius were linked to the same spirit.  Indeed, Plato (d. 
ca. 347 BC) has Socrates (d. ca. 399 BC) connecting madness with art and 
prophecy. The term used by the Greeks to describe the spirit of madness was 
daimon.   
 
As we moved into the later medieval period, Western culture adopting a biblical 
cosmology influenced both by the New Testament and Greek philosophical 
thought eventually accepted ‘demons’ as the culprit for all manner of deviant 
behaviour, including madness. Demonology became the psychiatry of the day. 
The medieval period understood some aspects of madness as religious; derived 
directly from God and manifested in ecstasies or in prophetic powers others as 
evil and destructive influenced by Satan and requiring the agency of exorcists. As 
we moved into the age of reason, that is the period of the Enlightenment, 
madness had no positive feature. It was torn from any transcendent source. 
  
In the modern period the patient-defined agenda became usurped by a medical 
approach which treated patients as objects. In the context of mental health, this 
meant that psychology ignored the patient’s words in search of a presumed 
underlying pathological basis of illness. Madness was torn from that freedom 
which allowed it to flourish in the pre-modern period. Madness, as Foucault notes 
was sequestered in the fortress of confinement, bound to reason, and to the rules 
of morality and their monotonous rights. The landscape for this exclusion became 
both a physical space (the asylum) and a psychic interior space (emergent 
psychiatric theories).  
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In contemporary mental health many researchers now agree that mental health 
must move beyond its modernist framework. Faith in the ability of psychology 
and psychiatry alone to resolve human problems is diminished. Researchers 
refer to this dynamic as postmodern psychiatry or more simply ‘post-psychiatry’. 
Post-psychiatry emphasizes social and cultural contexts. It places ethics before 
technology and works to minimize coercive interventions. Post-psychiatry 
demands that the ethic (policy and practice) shift as well. 
 
Postmodern mental health invites a vital and critical dialogue between various 
disciplines including spirituality. Spirituality places ethics before technology. Such 
an inversion conditions us to respond differently. Ethical critique of power 
relationships so that they support the individual is a strong theme in spirituality. 
Because each person is caught up in the web of knowledge and viewed as an 
active participant, contemporary spirituality is concerned with ethical social policy 
that facilitates individual freedom and autonomy. This new ethic is impacting 
social policy and treatment of the mentally ill in the form of positing recovery-
oriented directions for the mentally ill that stress community, citizenship, 
empowerment and choice with respect to treatment options.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONTEMPORARY EXPRRESSIONS OF SPIRITUALITY IN MENTAL HEALTH: 
TOWARDS A HOLISTIC UNDERSTANDING 
 
Surgeons must be very careful 
When they take the knife! 
Underneath their fine incisions 
Stirs the Culprit, - Life! 
 
 Dickinson [1894]/1993:14 
 
4:0 INTRODUCTION 
In the realm of mental health today there are two distinct tracks competing for 
emphasis. The first is the psychoanalytic track. It derives from, and is rooted in, 
traditional psychological theories based on the research of the founders of 
modern psychotherapy such as Freud, Jung and others. The other track is 
neurological. It is primarily connected with physiology and roots itself in the rapid 
discoveries that neuroscience has discovered with respect to how certain 
chemical imbalances in the brain can create psychotic or schizophrenic 
episodes. These differences in emphases correspond to the distinction made 
between the mind and the brain in the psyche. The mind refers to the cultural, 
religious, social, and historical contexts in and through which all of us act.  It is 
our mind that provides the form for our paradigms, speech and particular 
understanding of our world.   
 
The brain refers to the observable neurological and chemical changes that occur 
as a consequence of cognitive processes. Chemical variations can be observed 
among patients exhibiting psychotic or schizophrenic episodes. By comparing 
these results with typical imaging patterns, researchers have been able to locate 
particular neurological areas that exhibit increased or decreased levels of activity 
during certain psychotic episodes. This has led researchers to pinpoint specific 
neurological or chemical imbalances in the brain which have correlations in terms 
of affect in mood or in cognitive impairment. Replicating certain chemicals and/or 
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suppressing the transmission of chemicals such as serotonin has become part of 
the emerging technology of pharmacology.  
 
There is growing concern that the pharmacological and technological approach 
to mental health is dehumanizing. Mental health is increasingly turning to 
spirituality as a means to humanize its practice. This chapter critically examines 
how spirituality is being interpreted within mental health. The research of Frankl 
(1959;1967;2000), a well-known existential psychologist and father of  
logotherapy and Jaspers (1946) the influential existential psychiatrist and 
philosopher will be explored. These psychotherapists, along with others, support 
a holistic understanding of mental health that coheres well with contemporary 
spirituality. Given the semantic diffusion of the term ‘holistic’, a clarification of that 
term as it is used in mental health is offered. Finally, methods supporting such a 
direction will be outlined. The first issue that needs to be addressed, however, is 
what exactly is meant by the term ‘mental illness’.    
 
4.1 THE DISEASE MODEL IN MENTAL HEALTH 
The issue of precisely what illness is being treated in mental health is a 
compelling one. Psychiatric nosology is incredibly fluid and frustratingly inexact. 
Drawing on the research Albert et al. (1988), Kendell and Jablensky (2003:6) 
write that the types of conditions that may be said to constitute a disease range 
from nominalism and cultural relativistic theories (i.e. something becomes a 
disease when a profession or society labels it as such) and social idealism (i.e. 
failure to attain a social idea of perfect health) to culturally normative statistical 
concepts (i.e. deviations from statistical normality) and  finally the disease 
realism view (i.e. objectively demonstrable departure from adaptive biological 
functioning). While each of these has its place, they acknowledge that since the 
end of the nineteenth century the disease realism model in both its biological and 
psychodynamic version has dominated.  
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The trend in mental health towards the disease realism model is useful. Teaching 
is now based on an international reference system that provides a worldwide 
common language. This international reference system is The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Medical Disorders Fourth edition (DSM IV). The DSM IV is 
the clinical guidebook used by mental health for assigning illnesses to various 
psychiatric pathologies. It is publicly available and regularly updated as a 
consequence of emerging research. Public access to the diagnostic criteria used 
by mental health professionals has helped improve communication with users of 
services, caregivers, and society at large (Kendell and Jablensky 2003:4). There 
is, however, increasing disenchantment with the disease realism model. 
Psychiatric diagnoses are still based on culturally normative statistical concepts 
not biologically functioning. Accordingly to Kendell and Jablensky, one cannot 
validly claim that deviation from culturally normative statistical concepts means 
that one is suffering from a disease. The reason for this is because according to 
the disease realism model, a disease is called a disease when research has 
determined its validity. The term valid is derived from the Latin validus meaning 
strong and is defined by the Oxford dictionary as ‘well-founded and applicable; 
sound and to the point; against which no objection can fairly be brought’ (The 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1978). The problem with using the term valid 
in the context of mental illness, argue Kendell and Jablensky (2003), is that 
objections can be fairly brought against the categorization of mental illness as a 
specific disease entity.  
 
They suggest a more nuanced understanding offered by Jaspers. Mental illness, 
argues Jaspers, is not so much a concrete disease entity but an idea. The idea of 
the disease-entity, Jaspers explains, is in truth an idea in Kant’s sense of the 
word; that is the concept of an objective which one cannot research, but all the 
same it indicates the path for fruitful research and supplies a valid point of 
orientation for particular empirical investigations (Jaspers [1946]/1963:569). On 
the theme of mental illness as idea as opposed to disease, Kendell and 
Jablensky (2003:5) concur: 
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Thoughtful clinicians have long been aware that diagnostic 
categories are simply concepts, justified only by whether they 
provide a useful framework for organizing and explaining the 
complexity of clinical experience in order to derive inferences about 
outcome, and to guide decisions about treatment. Unfortunately, 
once a diagnostic concept such as schizophrenia or Gulf War 
syndrome has come into general use, it tends to become reified.   
 
Consequently, the assumption among the majority of  researchers today is that 
most currently recognized psychiatric disorders are not disease entities (Kendell 
and Jablensky 2003:7). Kendell cites Jaspers ([1946]/963:570) who adds that 
while the idea of disease entities has become a fruitful orientation for the 
investigations of psychiatry no actual disease entities exist. They conclude, 
therefore, that it is important to distinguish between the validity and the utility of 
all diagnostic concepts and of their formal definitions. Otherwise, the term ‘valid’ 
will continue to mislead. At present there is little evidence that, strictly speaking, 
most contemporary psychiatric diagnoses are valid, because they are still defined 
by syndromes that have not been demonstrated to have natural boundaries 
(Kendall and Jablensky 2003:7).    
 
This view represents the consensus of the scientific psychiatric community at 
present. The editors of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Medical 
Disorders  (DSM IV) state in the preface: 
 
The concept of mental disorder, like many other concepts in 
medicine and science, lacks a consistent operational definition that 
covers all situations….All medical conditions are defined on various 
levels of abstraction….Each is a useful indicator for a mental 
disorder, but none is equivalent to the concept, and different 
situations call for different definitions….In DSM IV, there is no 
assumption that each category of mental disorder is a completely 
discrete entity with absolute boundaries dividing it from other 
mental disorders or no mental disorder. There is also no 
assumption that all individuals described as having the same 
mental disorder are all alike in all important ways. The clinician 
using DSM IV should therefore consider that individuals sharing a 
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diagnosis are likely to be heterogeneous even in regard to the 
defining features of the diagnosis and that boundary cases will be 
difficult to diagnose in any but a probabilistic fashion. This outlook 
allows greater flexibility in the use of the system…and emphasizes 
the need to capture additional clinical information that goes beyond 
the diagnosis (American Psychiatric Association 1994:xxi-xxii). 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is a strong counter-movement which seeks 
to interpret mental illness according to the disease realism model. Gelenberg 
(2002) believes that the multiplicity of syndromes and the plethora of diagnoses 
(over 400 in the DSM IV) obscures the essential issue. That issue is that mental 
illness is primarily a biochemical disturbance – the particular manifestation of 
which (i.e. the diagnosis) varies but the cause of which is most evident in the 
chemical reactions occurring in the brain. Readjust these imbalances with the 
use of medication and irrespective of the particular diagnosis that the imbalance 
is named, the person will be in a better position to be able to adjust to their 
specific context.   
  
Gelenberg suggests that enhanced technology in brain imaging and genomics 
will abolish the current heterogeneity of diagnoses.  
 
I find myself growing restless and impatient. I manipulate today’s 
diagnostic categories and therapeutics. At the same time, I am 
convinced than in just a few years will look back on today’s 
understanding as primitive….Within the next two decades, brain 
imaging and genomics and proteomics technology should break 
apart today’s heterogeneous syndromes into more homogenous 
diagnoses. Then we will emulate our colleagues in other medical 
specialties by attacking the pathophysiology at its root causes.  
Ultimately, we can ‘reeducate’ aberrant nucleic acids and proteins, 
preventing brain disease (Gelenberg 2002:2). 
 
The particular way in which aberrant nucleic acids are reeducated is by way of 
pharmacological intervention. 
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4.2 THE ASCENDANCY OF PHARMOCOLOGY 
Drugs for depression are regarded as so safe and efficacious that they do not 
require a medical specialist such as a psychiatrist to prescribe them. They are 
often prescribed as the first line of treatment for depression whether that 
depression is episodic, situational or clinical. Since depression, anxiety and 
disturbance of mood is such a common experience today, the market for drugs 
that treat anxiety and mood disorders has exploded. Geleneberg outlines how 
this occurred from a pharmacological perspective: 
 
New antidepressants introduced into the US in the early 1980’s 
were largely disappointing. But the introduction of fluoxetine in 1988 
heralded a new generation of antidepressant agents. The selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI’s) are now mainstream and are 
usually first-line treatment for depression. Along with other new 
generation antidepressants, SSRI’s are better tolerated, diminishing 
the efficacy-effectiveness gap, and are much less hazardous in 
overdose than were earlier antidepressants (Gelenberg 2002:3).   
 
The prescription of anti-depressants and other psychotropic medication is rapidly 
becoming standardized. The proliferation of these drugs is not without ethical 
problems. Fervent debate surrounds this area with psychiatrists convening 
ethical panels to discuss this phenomenon. As the Zenit news agency reports: 
 
At a meeting on Bioethics and Psychiatry, organized by the Regina 
Apostolorum Pontifical Athenaeum last Thursday and Friday, Italian 
psychiatrist Dante De Santis said that the ‘indiscriminate use, even 
at school age’ of psycho-drugs or antidepressants ‘poses many 
questions from the ethical point of view.’ The practice also causes 
an ‘increase of expectations’ among people on the efficacy of these 
drugs, which in some countries, such as Italy, are prescribed by 
general practitioners, De Santis said. (Zenit 2003). 
 
 
In 2004, The Food and Drug Administration in the United States warned that 
antidepressants should come with the nation's strongest warning - in a black box 
on the label – stating that they can sometimes spur suicidal behavior in children 
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and teenagers. It is a rare risk, and therefore families need detailed information 
on how to balance that concern with the need to treat depression. ‘It will make 
prescribing more difficult. I anticipate there will be alarm from parents and the 
child,’ said Goodman.1 (Neergard 2004:1). 
 
4.3 REACTION TO TECHNOLOGICAL/PHARMOCOLOGICAL EMPAHSES IN MENTAL HEALTH 
Piombo, the moderator of the Bioethics and Psychiatry panel mentioned above, 
expressed a clear ‘no’ to the commerce of psychiatric treatments for chronic 
patients. He emphasizes that the patient's consent cannot be reduced to a 
bureaucratic ritual. When the basis for the relationship becomes discussions 
around the technological details of symptomology and dosages both clients and 
professionals begin to feel as if they are part of a dehumanizing technocratic 
system. There is a growing alarm among many psychiatrists concerning this 
dynamic within mental health. Andreasen (2001:673) writes: 
 
Many of us are being pressured to see ourselves as 
psychopharmocologists who prescribe medications to treat ‘brain 
diseases’ at the expense of forgetting that the mind and the person 
may need treatment with psychotherapy as well. Many of us feel 
overwhelmed by the pace at which the neuroscientific basis of 
psychiatry is growing, and threatened by the possibility that we 
cannot keep up or learn enough to practice well. The technicalities 
of dopamine receptors, lod scores, in situ hybridization, thalamic 
nuclei, and signal transduction seem both irrelevant to the 
individual person whom we treat and also beyond our purview or 
intellectual grasp. 
 
Interestingly, the dehumanizing effect of the excessive technological approach in 
mental health is referred to as ‘spirit breaking’. For example Deegan (1990), a 
psychologist who has experienced first hand serious mental illness and the effect 
of the current system in her own life writes:  
 
                                                 
1 Goodman is chair of psychiatry at the University of Florida. He backed the step on a 15-8 vote. 
"I think that's worth that complication, because it will raise the threshold to prescribing" these 
drugs to minors. (St. Petersburg Times 2004:1). 
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In many respects, people with disabilities who have lived the 
experience of dehumanization, trauma and depersonalization are 
the real experts. When those of us with psychiatric disabilities come 
together to talk among ourselves we don’t use clinical language.  
Instead, we talk about the experience of ‘spirit–breaking’ or we refer 
to times when ‘they almost broke my spirit’. We use our own 
language and discover our own words in order to reclaim our 
experiences and validate them…. That is why it is so important to 
listen to people and allow them to find their own words in order to 
name their own world (Deegan 1990:305). 
 
The concern over dehumanization in the field of mental health is being widely felt 
among professionals involved in the training of psychiatrists. Frank (2003:69), 
with refreshing candor, writes:  
 
Anyone who attends rounds…soon realizes that empathy is a 
concept primarily enshrined in commencement speeches, white-
coat ceremonies, and elegies for physicians. In clinical practice, 
commitment to empathy is honored more in the breach than in the 
observance. This apparent hypocrisy requires a rigorous 
examination of why empathy is essential to good care, why so 
many who practice this virtue must do so in secret, and why the 
social and intellectual organization of medicine so often 
discourages its development. 
 
One of the methods available to address the dehumanizing technological 
emphasis within mental health is the application of deconstructive 
methodologies. Deconstruction, in the present context, means critically exploring 
the technology surrounding mental health in order to make proper use of it. 
Jaspers ([1946]/1963:778) writes that to question the nature of something is not 
to question its potential use. It is not a matter of robbing science of something 
integral but of clarification within that science.  
 
4.4  DECONSTRUCTING MENTAL HEALTH’S TECHNE 
In our time we have seen the ascendancy of technology and the eclipsing of the 
classical understanding of science. Science is derived from the Latin scientia  
Scientia means knowledge. An aspect of knowledge is the wisdom (sapientia) 
required to make proper use of technology. Deconstruction, therefore, is not the 
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deconstruction of science, if by science we mean wisdom. Rather it is the 
deconstruction of an over-confident techne. In commenting on Goethe’s dictum, 
‘He who possesses art and science also has religion’, Frankl (2000:75) writes, 
‘But today we know only too well where (we) would wind up if we had science 
and nothing beyond it: soon the only thing that would be left at all of our science 
would be the atom bombs we possessed.’ Indeed as White ([1952]/1967:33) 
points out human hubris of the modern period has reversed the creation-story of 
Genesis not merely on paper but in fact. Humankinds’ own ingenuity has begun 
to reduce matter back to force, cosmos to chaos. The official code name for the 
explosion of the first atom bomb in the Mexican desert was ‘Operation Trinity’. 
White ([1952]/1967:33) continues, citing Cattel (1938) who wrote even before the 
Second World War: 
 
Psychologists and social scientists lose their militant attitude to 
religion when they realize that all their forces may well be needed 
to re-establish some order in the city they have so successfully 
besieged. The intellectual world is full of ‘post-war’ problems from 
this enormous cultural conflict, but perhaps the everyday world is 
even more distressingly aware of imminent emotional famines and 
pestilences arising from intellectual readjustment (Cattel 1938:50). 
 
This is certainly indicative of the crisis in postmodern culture. Too often, our first 
instinct in a crisis is to revert to simplistic formulas and solutions such as 
reductionism. Reductionism is the perennial temptation in mental health. 
 
Reductionism is basically the view that complex phenomena are reducible to 
simpler ‘building block’ elements from which they were constructed (Hersch 
2003:155). Reductive materialism that has been an aspect of biopsychiatric 
research until very recently. It has crowded out an important dimension of the 
human person. It neglects the basic human intuition that the human person is 
free, creative, and self-transcendent. For example Crick (1994:3) writes that,  
…you, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your 
ambition, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no 
more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their 
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associated molecules. As Lewis Carrol’s Alice might have phrased 
it ‘You’re nothing but a pack of neurons’.  
 
Reductive materialism (that is a scientific approach that dismisses a priori any 
transcendental or spiritual understanding of the human person) as a medical 
approach is based on the assumption that the preferred discourse (the 
neuropsychiatric discourse) renders the other discourse (spiritual approaches) 
redundant (Watts 2002:9-10). However, as Watts (2002:41) observes, many 
neuroscientists are abandoning reductive materialism. They seem to be heading 
towards a middle ground in which there would be room for both scientific and 
spiritual approaches. One way to achieve this middle ground is by way of 
developing a holistic approach in mental health.  
 
4.5  DESCRIPTION OF A HOLISITC APPROACH 
A holistic approach is an unending process of acquiring knowledge whereby we 
are illuminated through constant dialogue and engagement with diverse forms of 
understanding and interpretation. The liberation theologian Boff (1988:11) 
explains it as follows: 
 
Holism comes from the Greek holos which means ‘totality’ (and is a 
term widely diffused from its use by South African philosopher Jan 
Smuts). It means the tendency in nature to form wholes that are 
more than the sum of the parts. Here we have a synthesis that 
orders, synthesizes, regulates, and completes the parts in a whole, 
and relates each whole to another greater whole.      
 
A holistic understanding does not close the horizon of our knowledge as 
reductionism does. It demands openness to all of the elements of human life, 
including spiritual elements. It takes the data of a particular science or discipline 
and seeks ways to integrate that data with new knowledge and interpretations 
that come to the surface. This requires openness and creativity. Smuts 
(1927:140) writes that ‘creativeness’ is a key word relating to a great battle being 
fought between nineteenth and twentieth-century conceptions of the nature and 
trend of the universe, between mechanism as ordinarily understood and what is 
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called holism. If the concept of holism really wins through, notes Smuts, 
mechanism as a scientific and philosophical category will be reduced to a very 
modest proposition (Smuts 1927:140).  
 
Ethics also plays a large role in holism. Just as an ethical response is an inherent 
aspect of contemporary spirituality, so too is an ethical response an inherent 
aspect of a holistic approach.  
 
The ethical message of Holism to man is summed up in two words: 
Freedom and Purity.  And from what we have just seen it is clear 
that these two grand ethical ideals are at bottom identical. The 
function of the ideal of Freedom is to secure the inward self-
determination of the personality, its riddance of all alien obstructive 
elements, and thus its perfection as a pure, radiant, transparent, 
homogenous self-activity.  In other words, the function of Freedom 
is to attain Purity in the Personality. And similarly the function of the 
ideal of Purity is to afford the free play to the inward self-
determination and self-activity of the personality by removing all 
external impediments, all stains of impurities, all vice, cowardice, 
intemperance and injustice, all evil and ugliness; in short, all 
elements alien to the nature of the Personality, and thus to realize 
the Ideal of Freedom in the Personality (Smuts 1927:324). 
 
The foregoing clearly has implications for anthropological understandings of the 
human person and what constitutes human consciousness.   
 
4.6 A HOLISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
There are two paradigms (one materialistic, the other holistic) with respect to 
consciousness. The holistic paradigm is becoming more persuasive. Miller 
(2000:344) notes that research is discovering that consciousness is not a product 
of the brain but a primary principle of existence and reflective of the cosmic 
principle itself.   
 
Jaspers ([1946]/1963:753) agrees, writing:   
 
The individual possesses something in addition which is not found 
in the hereditary connections….At some decisive point every 
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individual is as it were, in theological language ‘created’ from a 
source of his own and not merely a processing of a modified 
hereditary substance….Far from being the sum of his hereditary 
factors (which would be quite correct for his material preconditions 
and determinants) the individual is directly created of God.  
 
Frankl (2000:61) adds further that one can only be a servant of one’s 
consciousness if it is understood as transcendent. ‘I can be the servant of my 
consciousness only when the dialogue with my consciousness is a genuine dia-
logos rather than mere mono-logos. This, however, can only be so when my 
consciousness transcends myself, when it is the mediator of something other 
than my self’. For Frankl and many existentialists the very term ‘person’, seen in 
the light of holistic understanding, takes on a new meaning. One may say, notes 
Frankl (2000:60) through the consciousness of the human person, a transhuman 
agent (a per-sonat) – ‘is sounding through’. If our anthropological paradigm is 
one that posits that the individual is free, possessing the wondrous capacity to 
transcend class, background, and a whole host of challenges in order to create 
meaning in their life and serve as inspirations for others, this has implications for 
the entire theory and practice of mental health.  
 
4.7 CHANGING PARADIGMS IN A HOLISTIC CONTEXT 
One of the critical questions within mental health is what place does the therapist 
occupy in the psycho-therapeutic relationship: that of awakener or that of 
moralist. Foucault suggests that the latter has been the one adopted by mental 
health. Scientific advancement in mental health has served then and continues to 
serve  discourses whose function is to repair that which was broken (technology) 
as opposed to awaken that which is latent (holistic). ‘Between a cure by the 
passions and cure by the prescriptions of the pharmocopia, there is no difference 
in nature; but only a diversity in the mode of access to those mechanisms which 
are common to body and soul’ (Foucault 1988:181). Foucault is drawing attention 
to the fact that irrespective of the particular tool that the therapist uses, the 
anthropological understanding is the same. The human person is a mechanism 
that with proper manipulation can be repaired in order to function properly within 
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society. It is the goal of the doctor with increasing technical skill to unlock the 
perplexing problem of mental illness and repair the person. Irrespective of the 
mode of treatment, the person is viewed mechanically. Additionally, from this 
point of view, the understanding of doctor shifts from that of an artisan to that of a 
technician which impacts upon ethics. Illich (1976:21-22) writes:  
 
With the transformation of the doctor from an artisan exercising a 
skill on personally known individuals into a technician applying 
scientific rules to classes of patients, malpractice acquired an 
anonymous, almost respectable status. What had formerly been 
considered an abuse of confidence and a moral fault can now be 
rationalized into the occasional breakdown of equipment and 
operators. In a complex technological hospital, negligence 
becomes ‘random human error’ or ‘system breakdown’ callousness 
become ‘scientific detachment’ and incompetence becomes ‘a lack 
of specialized equipment’. The depersonalization of diagnosis and 
therapy has changed malpractice from an ethical into a technical 
problem .  
 
Anthropological questions concerning the nature of the human person and 
subsequent moral issues are even more acute in mental health, particularly since 
the Enlightenment when mental health as a science was born. Andreasen 
(2001:158) writes, 
 
 During the 18th century, under the influence of the humanistic 
ideals of the Enlightenment, physicians identified themselves as 
specialists in caring for the mentally ill because they believed in the 
importance and dignity of the individual human beings. This group 
of specialists in mental illness eventually became known as 
psychiatrists, or ‘healers of the mind/spirit’.  
 
This image has perdured. Jaspers ([1946]/1963:807) notes that our own age is 
characterized by the fact that therapists are now performing in secular fashion 
what earlier was performed on the grounds of faith. The basic medical knowledge 
of the doctor derives from the natural sciences and constantly colours the 
situation but, whether the doctor wants to or not, he or she is always exercising 
some psychological and moral influence. It is precisely this context that begins to 
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provide the basis for the doctor-patient relationship that is increasingly being 
critiqued and questioned in light of the increasing technological posture of 
modern mental health.  
 
As outlined in the previous chapter the modern period of mental health practice 
has ensured that the psychiatrist is in the position of both physician and judge. 
The doctor for his or her part is granted powers from the State to confine the 
person and occasionally, although subject to certain checks and balance 
mechanisms, enforce treatment. As Jaspers ([1946]/1963:792) states, and which 
is still true today, whatever the therapy, an arbitrary element is present which 
derives in the last resort from the authority and demands of the state. Every 
consultation takes place within a situation in which the doctor has effective 
authority, heightened by the clinic and his own official position. While this position 
may be diminished, there is no question that for the near future the psychiatrist 
will remain a moral agent on behalf of the community. Consequently, ethical 
reflection regarding best practice will inevitably touch on philosophical and 
theological questions concerning mental health practice.   
 
In the context of mental health determinism (as opposed to holism) is defining the 
self by recourse to reductionism. Foucault describes well why this particular kind 
of thinking leads to epistemological oppressiveness that leaves no room for 
spirituality: 
 
What the classical thinkers retain of the ‘world,’ what they already 
anticipate in ‘nature,’ is an extremely abstract law, which 
nonetheless forms the most vivid and concrete opposition, that of 
day and night….A law which excludes all dialectic and all 
reconciliation; which establishes, consequently, both the flawless 
unity of knowledge and the uncompromising divisions of tragic 
existence; it rules over a world without twilight, which knows no 
effusion, nor the attenuated cares of lyricism; everything must be 
either waking or dream, truth or darkness, the light of being or the 
nothingness of shadow. Such a law prescribes an inevitable order, 
a serene division which makes truth possible and confirms it forever 
(Foucault 1988:109-110). 
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To address Foucault’s criticism above, mental health is adopting a holistic 
approach. 
 
4.8. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES IN HOLISTIC MENTAL HEALTH   
For mental health, Jaspers’ methodology is compelling, particularly in its ability to 
meet the exigencies of our time. It is also consistent with the trajectory of the 
present research with its emphasis on a holistic approach. Jaspers began early 
on in his career to ask important questions concerning the science of psychiatry. 
Jasper’s purpose in General Psychopathology ([1946]/1963) is not to build up in 
its entirety any integrated picture of the human person as a whole, but to ground 
research in the mystery of the individuated human person. ‘In the end no 
empirically recognizable basic form of human life emerges. Rather in the end the 
human being himself remains an open question and so too our knowledge of the 
human person’ (Jaspers [1946]/1963:749). Jaspers is not a nihilist but a scientist 
interested in methodological issues. He is interested in facilitating a context by 
which the science of psychiatry could be of service to the human person. While 
he does not mention it by name, that context is a holistic one.   
 
Jaspers states that integration of knowledge is indeed possible, but only in a 
methodological sense and not as an ontological theory of human life. No 
explanation of the human person ought to constitute for us a closed horizon in 
which we integrate our knowledge: 
 
Therefore we think it is a mistake in psychopathology to try to set 
up any principle of the whole or set one up scientifically as a point 
of orientation for research instead of taking up an attitude of faith 
and recognizing the infinite extent of what is knowable. When for 
example L. Binswanger wants to investigate individuals from a 
particular theoretical point of view, when he discards the 
‘conglomerate concept’ of man as body-psyche-mind unity which 
he says is a synthesis of several methods (scientific, psychological 
and cultural) and demands some ‘pre-arranged’ idea which for him 
is the ‘basic ontological idea of existentiality’ he makes a 
philosophical and scientific mistake. Such a formulation confuses in 
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the first place the method of philosophical illumination with that of 
knowledge and robs the former of its power to conjure the human 
mind and lend it wings; secondly it constitutes a basis for 
psychopathology which is utterly inadequate (Jaspers 
[1946]/1963:749). 
In contradistinction to material reductionism, the holistic approach is ready to 
adopt any method and asks only for those universal scientific criteria: general 
validity, convincing insights (which can be proved), clarity of method and the 
possibility for meaningful discussion (Jaspers [1946]/1963:788). Perspectives 
and approaches are limitless. Each has their value but none can be totalizing. If 
the particular whole under examination is taken as absolute, other truths are 
subsequently placed outside of our horizon. When a holistic approach is not 
undertaken the danger is that: 
The momentary whole tends to be taken for the ultimate whole: the 
psyche is consciousness and nothing else; the performance as a 
whole is the only objectivity, the only object for science; the body-
psyche unity is reality itself; milieu and culture are absolutes to 
partake in which is psychic reality; personality is the essence of the 
psyche, its meaningfulness is its Being; theories grasp the true 
reality; causal connections are the substance of things, the body is 
everything, the psyche only an epiphenomenon of cerebral 
processes; the individual is only a transit-station for hereditary 
connections; clinical reality only consists in disease entities, 
constitutions and the life-history as a unit; the individual is a 
function of society and history (Jaspers [1946]/1963:751). 
 
The reason for not taking any theory as absolute is that the individual can never 
be circumscribed within a single discourse. The therapist must therefore set him 
or herself against every attempt to create an absolute and to claim that particular 
methods of research are the only valid, single objectivities:   
 
All such conversions into absolutes are false. The mere number of 
them, when we set them out and look at them, shows us vividly that 
no complex unity of psychic life is ever the whole itself. To get to 
know the individual is comparable to a sea-voyage over limitless 
seas to discover a continent; every landing on a shore or island will 
teach certain facts but the possibility of further knowledge vanishes 
if one maintains that here one is at the center of things; one’s 
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theories are then like so many sandbanks on which we stay fast 
without really winning land (Jaspers [1946]/1963:751). 
 
 
The foregoing does not lead to intellectual nihilism in which nothing can ever be 
known. Rather, the unification we seek as far as knowledge is concerned simply 
lies in the search for relationships between everything that is known about the 
human person.  
 
What we do know of the human person is that there is a mysterious, 
transcendent aspect to each individual’s personality. The challenge is to find a 
means by which this aspect can be included in mental health. Frankl’s 
logotherapy is one method by which the spiritual aspect of the human personality 
is affirmed and integrated. 
 
4.8.1 LOGOTHERAPY   
When we turn to mental health it becomes evident that there is a transcendent 
dimension of the human person that is characterized as spiritual. While 
acknowledging that there are multiple psychophysical overlays that present 
themselves, mental health needs to appreciate that there is a free space within 
the human person. This free space is rendered in contemporary vocabulary as 
the spirit. It is referred to as spirit because it does not arise from psychological 
processes. Frankl (2000:34) draws a distinction between psychophysical facticity 
and spiritual existence. Drawing a distinction between the spirit and 
psychophysical facticity in no way implies a quasi-Manichean duality in which the 
spirit is good and the material world (in psychology this would refer to the 
psychophysical facticity) evil. Instead logotherapy involves clearing a 
psychological space for the individuated person’s human spirituality to shine 
through in total freedom by transcending or transforming whatever might be 
weighing the spirit down in the psychophysical facticity. 
  
Frankl refers to this spiritual activity as ‘logos’. Logos is a Greek term originally 
referring to the intelligibility or meaning of the universe that emerges from the 
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mysterious depths of God. In fact, notes Frankl ([1959]/1971:156), logos in Greek 
means not only ‘meaning’ but also ‘spirit’. Thus the human person’s search for 
meaning is by definition in logotherapy a spiritual quest.   
 
In classic Christian Trinitarian theology, there is a distinction but not a separation 
between the intelligibility of God (logos) and the nature of Godhead (cf. John 1:1-
6). Frankl applies this theological notion to the human person. The logos (our life 
meaning) emerges from the mysterious depths of human consciousness as we 
respond to the world. The meaning of one’s life is one that each person must 
come to in the depths of his or her consciousness in response to the demands of 
life. In logotherapy the world is a given – we do not create it. It cannot be 
changed. Our existential response to the given-ness of life is the locus for 
logotherapy. Frankl  (2000:29) writes: 
 
What is the meaning of life? I made this inversion in my first book, 
Arzlich Seelsorge, when I contend that man (sic) is not he who 
poses the question, What is the meaning of life?, but he who is 
asked this question, for it is life itself that poses it to him. And man 
has to answer to life by answering for life; he has to respond by 
being responsible; in other words, the response is necessarily a 
response-in-action…. While we respond to ‘life in action’ we are 
also responding in the ‘here and now’. What is always involved in 
our responses is the concreteness of a person and the 
concreteness of the situation in which he is involved (Frankl 
2000:29).   
 
In logotherapy the psychotherapist is one of liberator. The liberation is an 
awakening to the marvel of the world. In order for this to occur one’s eyes need 
to be opened to see clearly the best way to respond. The philosophy of the 
postmodern Levinas (1969) supports this notion. As discussed in the first 
chapter, spirituality is an unparalleled openness to the secret of the other who is 
disclosed through engagement with the world. In this way logotherapy avoids the 
criticism that all existentialism is ultimately solipsistic. Frankl ([1959]/1971) writes: 
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If the meaning that is waiting to be fulfilled by the human person 
was nothing but a mere projection of the self, it would immediately 
lose its demanding and challenging character; it could not longer 
call forth or summon the human person.    
   
We miss this announcement or call when we do not open ourselves up to 
response. The response is in the deepest sense of the word spiritual. The term 
spiritual refers to the fact that this process lacks a thematic order that can be 
imposed on each experience. For Frankl ([1959]/1971;2000), logotherapy is 
neither teaching nor preaching. Logotherapy facilitates an awakening on the part 
of the client to what Levinas (1969) refers to as the marvel of exteriority. Frankl 
([1959]/1971:175) writes: 
 
I wish to stress that the true meaning of life is to be found in the 
world rather than within man or his (sic) own psyche, as though it 
were a closed system. By the same token, the real aim of human 
existence cannot be found in what is called self-actualization. 
Human existence is essentially self-transcendence rather than self-
actualization….For only to the extent to which man commits himself 
to the fulfillment of his life’s meaning, to this extent he also 
actualizes himself. In other words, self actualization cannot be 
attained if it is made an end in itself, but only as a side effect of self-
transcendence.  
 
4.8.2 THE CHALLENGES OF A CLIENT CENTERERED-SUBJECTIVE APPROACH 
The question that is often raised in emphasizing subjectivity in psychotherapy 
concerns the issue of delusional thinking. A paranoid person, for example, does 
not deny the existence of all reality but does deny the clinician’s view of reality in 
favour of another that he or she believes to be true. As Hersch (2003:30) notes, 
there are patients who are convinced that the hospital is really a secret prison 
and the staff are disguised agents who are part of a government conspiracy. The 
patient may explain how he or she knows or enjoys privileged access to the real 
truth  that others do not have,  by virtue of a special radio receiver planted in his 
or her brain by the resistance movement. A facile turn to subjectivity is clearly not 
an option in this instance. Hersch (2003:114) concedes that while a 
phenomenologically based or otherwise satisfactory general theory concerning 
mental illness is not sufficiently developed at this time, one way to address the 
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problem of subjectivity correctly is by way of a dialogue with philosophy. Hersch 
suggests that two concepts developed by existential philosophy are helpful. The 
first is bad faith as elaborated by Sartre (1943:86). The second is authenticity as 
understood by Heidegger (Hersch 2003:268).   
 
Hersch (2003:268) explains that bad faith is the pejorative label Sartre gives to a 
particular form of self-deception regarding the nature of ourselves (and of many 
other worldly phenomena) that allows them to seem more definite, solid, absolute 
unchanging, or universal than they really are. Reductionistic theories in mental 
health as well as individuals taking refuge in grandiose delusions are each 
examples of bad faith. 
 
(Sartre) contended that I would rather create illusions to the contrary 
and cling to them tightly. Thus, I try (defensively) to convince myself 
that ‘indeed I am a thing,’ an essence, something that is set, fixed, 
determined, and complete. It is this self deceptive process that he 
calls bad faith….Bad faith, then, was Sartre’s psychological 
explanation for our apparently erroneous tendency to describe or 
think of ourselves as if we were mere ‘things’. He believed we take 
comfort in this, since it allows us to hide from both the arbitrariness 
and the uncertainties of life, as well as  - in Erich Fromm’s (1941) 
terms – to ‘escape from freedom’ (Hersch 2003:268).   
 
The notion of authenticity is also an important issue related to moral development 
and psychological integration. Authenticity is generally seen as an ethical and 
psychological goal. Authenticity is not a solipsistic activity. Hersch explains 
authenticity in the context of mental health as follows: 
 
In psychological literature, behaviours that people feel best reflect 
their truest self and that lead them to strongly positive feeling of 
self-cohesion, integrity, and a sense of ‘having done the right thing’ 
are often labeled authentic as well. Yet as the term is used in 
psychology…it sometimes seems to overemphasize the self 
component of authenticity at the expense of the world portion with 
which it supposed to be in harmony. This can reflect or give rise to 
a common misinterpretation of the term whereby authenticity is 
grounded in how a given act feels to the agent carrying it out. Self-
indulgence, self-centeredness, and even selfishness – perhaps 
rationalized under the rubric of ‘self-actualization’ – can all feel 
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quite good and ‘right’ to an individual, yet none of these can be 
seen as authentic in the technical philosophical sense described 
above. Also the realistic basis of the idea ‘that it is better to be 
authentic than to be inauthentic’ is not and cannot be based merely 
on the psychological fact that one way of acting simply feels better 
than another….The concept of authenticity does offer us an 
argument that some possibilities are more in harmony than others 
…It follows that these ‘harmonious’ possibilities are more 
specifically ‘appropriate’ than the rest (Hersch 2003:278).   
 
To encapsulate these notions, Kierkegaard’s category of the aesthete who 
remains in despair and never comes to full self-possession is instructive. The 
aesthete described by Kierkegaard ([1843]/1992) in Either/Or, corresponds to 
what we would call today an oppositional-defiant, narcissistic personality disorder 
[American Psychiatric Association, 1994]. The self never comes into being, 
because there is no spiritual activity springing from the core being of the person. 
The final chapter of Either/Or contains ‘The Seducers Diary’ in which the author 
is seduced by the manipulation of people and situations. The aesthete uses irony 
and artifice in order to transform the boredom of the world into his own image. 
This approach is criticized from the point of view of Kierkegaard’s ethical/religious 
state. The aesthete (Johannes the Seducer) is emptily self-serving and escapist. 
His activity is simply another form of despair since it avoids responsibility and 
commitment and fails to acknowledge social debt and communal existence. 
Furthermore, and worse still, even from an existential point of view, it is self-
deceiving in that it substitutes fantasies for actual states (McDonald 1996:1). 
Tillich ([1957]/1969) comments that Kierkegaardian characters such as Johannes 
represent: 
 
The particular individual who has succeeded in drawing the 
universe into himself in terms of the power to use for himself 
whatever he wants to use. Kierkegaard describes the complete 
inner emptiness of this situation, which leads to the determination 
to bring death to everything he encounters including 
himself….Here, with the same psychological penetration, he shows 
the emptiness and despair of that unlimited sexual striving which 
prevents creative union of love with the sexual partner (Tillich 
[1957]/1969: 53). 
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4.9 BRIEF NOTES ON RELIGION 
Frankl (2000:80-81) draws an important distinction between religion and mental 
health: 
 
Although religion might have a very positive psychotherapeutic 
effect on a patient, its intention is in no way a psychotherapeutic 
one. Although religion might secondarily promote such things as 
mental health and inner equilibrium, its aim does not primarily 
concern psychological solutions but, rather, spiritual 
salvation....Thus we could say that whoever tries to make 
psychotherapy into an ancilla theologiae, a servant of theology, not 
only robs it of the dignity of an autonomous science but also takes 
away the potential value it might have for religion, because 
psychotherapy can be useful to religion only in terms of a by-
product, or side-effect, and never if its usefulness is intended from 
the start. 
 
Having said this, it is a misreading to suggest that religion is a contributor to 
psychopathology. Frankl writes that Freud ([1927]/1961) in The Future of Illusion 
said that religion is the universal compulsive neurosis of mankind. However, if 
there is universal compulsive neurosis of mankind, culture has a great impact on 
its form. Frankl argues that the neurotic person derives their fear and anxiety 
from the zeitgeist of the socio-cultural milieu in which they find themselves. 
Evidence for this is provided in Frankl’s (1967) Psychotherapy and 
Existentialism. Frankl (1967:116) writes, ‘Krantz in Mainz and Von Orelli in 
Switzerland were able to show that the delusional ideas of today are less 
dominated by a feeling of guilt – the guilt of man before God – and more by worry 
over the body, physical health, and working capacity than formerly. We notice 
time and time again how the delusion of sin is replaced by the fear of disease or 
poverty’. In view of the above, Frankl (2000:75) argues, we are tempted to 
reverse Freud’s statement and dare to say compulsive neurosis may well be 
diseased religiousness. Maladaptive religiousness therefore is not the result of 
spiritual expression, per se, but the result of either misappropriation of religion, or 
else a response to a world in which religiousness is explicitly denied and 
suppressed.   
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In any case, the cultural dynamic in our era has changed considerably from that 
of Freud’s time. In our century, deified reason and megalomanic technology are 
the repressive structures to which the religious feeling is sacrificed (Frankl 
2000:74).  
 
An example of a holistic understanding in mental health using notions from 
spirituality is found in White. Turning to a classic Thomistic framework, White 
([1952]/1967:118) writes that subject (person) and objects (divine) are not 
ultimate a prioris. They are conscious data which presuppose a pre-conscious 
identity, a participation mystique in the deepest sense. Spiritual interpretation 
involves presuming divine activity in ourselves and in our world to which we 
respond and participate. This interpretation is, to use Kierkegaard’s language, a 
leap of faith. Frankl (2000:62) writes that the irreligious person who simply 
presumes that the spiritual element of the human person is the psychophysical 
facticity stops short of the fullness of human life. The reason for this is because 
he or she may not want to lose the ‘firm ground under their feet’ which a 
psychophysical approach permits. Perhaps, for them spirituality seems too 
hidden in the fog, and they dare not risk venturing into the uncertainty. Yet from a 
holistic perspective spirituality is part of the drama of human life. It permits 
freedom, openness, hope, meaning and change.  
 
4:10 CONCLUSION 
A holistic understanding of mental health involves permitting space for the innate 
spiritual experience to express itself through conscious choice in free response to 
the world. The spiritual aspect of the human person is one that can be perfectly 
compatible with different orders of scientific knowledge such as neuropsychiatry 
and various psychological theories. Andreasen (2001:675) suggests that 
retaining a fresh, holistic humanism, but not exclusively pharmacological is the 
way forward: 
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Each of us, in whatever way we can, must fight against a variety of 
perverse ideas that denigrate or diminish this unique contribution: 
that a history can be obtained by a computerized checklist, or that 
recording a narrative history is a waste of time, or that the practice 
of psychiatry should be limited to prescribing medications, or any of 
the other injunctions that threaten to destroy the essence of 
psychiatric practice.  
 
The current diagnostic criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Medical 
Disorders (American Psychiatric Association 1994) are useful but need to be 
understood in a holistic sense; that is as descriptive and not prescriptive as 
Kendall and Jablensky (2003) noted.   
 
Jaspers ([1946]/1963:815) writes that success in mental health depends on 
confronting the unconscious depths with enhanced respect. Consequently, we 
have to avoid excessive technological emphases if we are to keep open 
communication with our own nature which can be described as spiritual. This 
open communication with our spiritual nature is what is meant by a holistic 
understanding in mental health. Methods supporting holistic approaches facilitate 
this open communication with our spiritual nature. The practices best suited to 
holistic understandings are existential-styled methods such as logotherapy as 
developed by Frankl.  
 
Frankl (2000:33) argues that within mental health today the problem is spiritual 
existence versus psychophysical facticity. Inasmuch as both contemporary 
spirituality and mental health locate meaning within the subject, sustained 
dialogue is both inevitable and mutually enriching.   
 
A holistic perspective appreciates the spiritual dimension of the human person. It 
is helpful to interpret this phenomenon spiritually since spirituality provides a 
context and language for describing this dimension of human experience. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MYSTICISM AND MENTAL HEALTH 
 
 
The brain is wider than the sky, 
For, put them side by side, 
The one the other will include 
With ease, and you beside. 
 
The brain is deeper than the sea, 
 For, hold them, blue to blue, 
The one the other will absorb, 
As sponges, buckets do.  
 
The brain is just the weight of God, 
For, lift them, pound for pound, 
And they will differ, if they do, 
As syllable from sound.    
 
Dickinson [1894]/1993:24 
 
 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
Dickinson expresses a profound intuition concerning the relationship between the brain 
and the transcendent when she writes, ‘The brain is just the weight of God’. That line 
could serve as a leitmotif for neuropsychiatry’s foray into spirituality. Among the rapid 
discoveries in neuropsychiatry, one of the most surprising is the validation of the notion 
that mystical experience is an inherent aspect of a person’s consciousness, a dimension 
of our natural experience. This concept no longer needs expression solely through 
poetry. It can be observed in the brain itself. Such a discovery is an exciting one for 
researchers in both mental health and spirituality. Many psychiatrists are becoming 
interested in the development of our consciousness from a biological point of view and 
draw on allusions to well-known religious stories to articulate the intuitions of their 
research. For example, Grof (2002:1) in The Madness of Adam and Eve: How 
Schizophrenia Shaped Humanity writes:  
 
[Horribin] postulates that the origins of schizophrenia and the origins of 
humanity are intimately related….The same ancient genetic mutation 
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that is now presumably responsible for schizophrenia did, in other human 
beings, generate exceptional skills and creativity - which defines us as 
human beings and differentiates us from our nearest relatives, the apes 
and the chimpanzees. Taking an evolutionary approach, [Horribin] 
describes how the first humans who originated in Africa and migrated 
over Urasia and Australasia, presumably carried with them the genetic 
gift of inventiveness, as well as the vulnerability to schizophrenia. He 
alludes to the observation that families with schizophrenia have not only 
more problems with family members - such as more dyslexia, more 
bipolar disorders, more sociopathy, and more criminals - but also more 
creative people. He mentions that such families have more high 
achievers in every field, including music, religion, the arts, and science. 
 
Lukoff (1985:155) observes that psychotic and religious experiences have been 
associated since earliest recorded history and undoubtedly before. It is ironic that the 
premodern intuition that madness is linked to creativity is again being explored as we 
plunge ever deeper into the biological and neurological composition of the human person 
and begin to appreciate in richer ways the mystery that such knowledge opens up. Fox 
(1988:7) writes that a radical religious awakening worthy of being called a spiritual 
renaissance is one that critiques both psyche and society.   
 
In the previous two chapters, an analysis and critique of our historical approach to 
madness was offered, while providing a context for further development of a 
contemporary understanding of spirituality in psychiatry. This chapter addresses 
mysticism. It is important to bear in mind, however, that not all self-reports of ecstatic 
divine union indicates that the person is having a profound religious experience. Lukoff 
(1985:156) observes that the similarity between psychotic symptoms and aspects of 
mystical experiences has received acknowledgement and discussion in psychiatric 
literature (Arieti 1976; Buckley 1981; James 1961). In his classic study on mystical 
experiences, Leuba (1929) included psychiatric and epileptic patients in his sample. The 
difference between psychosis and mysticism, therefore, is one that requires careful 
evaluation.  This is important because, as Buckley (1981:521) writes: 
Though the correspondence between the comparatively benign mystical 
experience and the onset of acute psychosis is a limited one, sufficient 
overlap exists to warrant systematic biological and psychological 
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investigation of such altered state experiences in the hope of illuminating 
further the nature of both. 
  
Given the diffusion of the term mysticism in popular culture, mysticism, as interpreted in 
the Christian tradition, it requires some explanation and contextualization.  Illuminating 
the nature of mysticism is the purpose of this chapter. Here, how mysticism has 
historically played, and can continue to play, an important role in shaping a wholesome, 
life-giving, religious consciousness is explored. There are four objectives involved in 
achieving this purpose.  
The first objective is to examine the data surrounding the frequency of the mystical 
experience in our time. The second is to explore how mysticism has been utilized 
historically to address suffering and facilitate meaning in life. As Jaspers 
(1946]/1963:806) notes, the greatest successes in mental health have not belonged to 
psychiatrists but to shamans, priests, leaders of sects, wonder-workers, confessors and 
spiritual guides of earlier times. 
The ‘exercitia spiritualia’ of Ignatius Loyola were enormously successful 
and provide us with examples of real psychic cure; they were aimed at 
the control, arbitrary production and repression of every kind of emotion, 
affect or thought. Yoga techniques and the meditative exercises of 
Buddhism are also extraordinarily effective (Jaspers [1946]/1963:805). 
 
It is not possible to understand mysticism in the Christian tradition unless it is 
contextualized in its historical and cultural context. Christian mysticism is integrally linked 
to both its Hebrew and Greek roots. Within Christianity we have, as Tyrrell (1907a:44) 
notes, two religious traditions running together that eventually became a singular 
expression. Judaism, reformed and spiritualized by the prophets, and universalised by 
the philosophy of Alexandria, was perfected in both respects by Christ. It was later 
preached and proclaimed explicitly as a world religion by Paul. This world religion which 
became known as Christianity was not primarily concerned with drafting legislative 
observance. It had an inner-directed, experiential focus. Watts and Williams (1988:94) 
note that Paul describes a new kind of inner religious experience. There seems to be a 
theological point being made about psychological development towards greater 
inwardness and subjectivity in Paul’s writings. Paul describes a shift in this general 
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direction when he contrasts the moral and religious thinking of the Old and New 
Testament periods, the contrast between ‘the letter that kills’ and the ‘spirit that gives life’ 
(2 Cor 3:6). This history formed the basis for more systematic mystical developments in 
the Middle Ages. In terms of methodological considerations of the Christian mystical 
experience as it developed in the later medieval period, exemplars of divergent apophatic 
and kataphatic approaches will be offered. Specifically, the mystical thought of Ignatius of 
Loyola (d.1555 CE) and Meister Eckhart (d. 1328 CE) will be offered.  
 
The third objective of this chapter is to evaluate the mystical experience represented in 
the approaches of Eckhart and Loyola from a neuropsychiatric perspective. This objective 
will involve establishing the neurological basis for the mystical mind. In order to achieve 
this end, the groundbreaking work of neuropsychiatrists D’Aquili and Newberg (1999), 
who have researched the mechanics of the brain and, as a result, have developed what 
they term neurotheology, will be explored. D’Aquili (1999:217) uses advances in 
neuropsychiatric research to suggest that with the advent of improved technologies for 
studying the brain, the mystical experience may be differentiated from any type of 
psychopathology.   
 
The fourth objective is to develop a contemporary understanding of mysticism in the area 
of mental health by drawing on the important contribution of psychology in evaluating the 
experience. To this end, the work of Siglag (1986) with respect to the similarities and 
differences of schizophrenic and mystical experiences will be analyzed. The significance 
of such work is that if it is possible to differentiate psychosis from the mystical process, 
therapy could be directed at integration of the ‘knowledge’ acquired -utilizing the growth-
potential of the mystical experience (Stahlman 1992:1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 134
5.1 FREQUENCY OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE 
Hood and Morris (1981:82) note that a consistent theme runs through more popular 
treatments of mysticism, namely, the frequency of mystical experience and the 
commonality of the description has caught both scientists and religious leaders by 
surprise. Scientists and religious leaders may be surprised for different reasons. From 
the social scientist domain, Prince (1979:68) notes that up until a few years ago we had 
very little idea of the frequency of mystical experience. That has changed as this area 
becomes more rigorously studied.  Prince (1979:86) observes that of three surveys 
done separately, each reported that some 20% to 40% of the population claimed 
mystical or religious experience. Similarly, Hood and Morris (1981:76) note that studies 
of mysticism are consistent in finding approximately one-third of persons sampled 
affirming that they have had a mystical experience. This figure holds whether data is 
obtained from survey research in the United States or Great Britain. Studies include 
Back and Bourque (1970); Bourque and Back (1968;1971); Greeley (1974); Hay and 
Morrisy,(1978), Thomas and Cooper (1978;1980) and Withnow (1978). Sampling from 
volunteer population yields similar results. These include Brown, Spilka and Cassidy 
(1978); Hood (1973a;.1973b; 1975; 1977a; 1977 b; 1978); Hood and Hall (1980) and 
Margolis and Elifson (1979).  
 
In addition to the frequency of mystical reports, the research also demonstrates that 
there is a psychodynamic context in which people can make judgments with respect to 
mystical experience. Contrary to other studies suggesting that the mystical experience 
is so ambiguous that it cannot be measured by structured questionnaires (e.g. Thomas 
and Cooper 1977;1980), Hood and Morris’ (1981:79) research indicates that persons 
can knowledgably apply mystical criteria to experiences they have had. They conclude 
that not only is mysticism relatively common, but it is knowledge-based. In other words, 
people are aware that they are having an existential experience of the transcendent that 
can be contrasted from other types of life experiences. Hood and Morris (1981:82) 
conclude that  ‘persons do not indiscriminately identify themselves as having had a 
mystical experience; hence, confrontation with such common experiences appears a 
task for more serious consideration by contemporary religious leaders’.   
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For their part, religious leaders generally circumscribe the mystical experience within a 
relatively narrow range of religious experiences. Historically, Christian leaders have 
expressed some reticence concerning claims of mystical experience. Aside from the 
understandable concern that some experiences may be self-delusion at best, or a form of 
uncritical superstition at worst, issues of authority arise. As Allen (1999:29) writes, official 
Catholicism has always taken a cautious, even oppositional, stance toward mystical 
experience and claims of direct, divine inspiration - especially in cases where mystics 
have insisted that what they learned in their private revelations supersede Church law 
and authority.   
 
It is clear that the frequency of mystical experience has implications for both religious 
leaders and people in the field of mental health since, notwithstanding the 
aforementioned issues, authentic mystical experience has historically been able to unify 
the deep structures of exteriority and interiority, otherness and sameness, the Divine and 
the human. For this reason it is beneficial to open up the received wisdom of the mystical 
tradition of the Church in order that it becomes more widely diffused within the world, and 
particularly within the area of human psychiatry.   
 
 5.2 MYSTICISM IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION – HEBREW ROOTS 
Christianity was born out of the Hebrew culture. In the Hebrew Scriptures, the world is 
presented as the field of humankind’s experience, the stage on which one’s work and 
destiny are played out. The human being is not interpreted in the light of the world, but 
the world in the light of the human being (Bultmann [1956]/1966:20). History is the major 
theme of Hebrew literature. History is not, as in Greek literature, the scientific study of the 
past as a means of finding out the eternal laws which govern all events.  Rather, it looks 
toward the future, to a divinely appointed goal (Bultmann [1956]/1966:21). The 
culmination of human history rests in the notion of a messiah. Messianism is of ancient 
Hebrew origin and is the contribution of the Hebrew people to world history.   
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Berdyaev (1957:200) notes that messianic hope is born in suffering and unhappiness.  
Suffering is to be distinguished from pain. According to Woods (2005:6), pain is primarily 
some form of acute physical discomfort, the capacity for which people share with animals 
and, according to several researchers, even some form of plant life.  Suffering, however, 
entails not only an awareness of pain, but its meaning, or lack of meaning, in the scheme 
of life as a whole. It may well be that higher forms of animal life suffer in addition to 
experiencing pain, but as generally understood, suffering is both distinctively human and 
also largely a psychological and spiritual event. In the Hebrew frame of reference, the 
experience of suffering has two dimensions; a positive and negative one. On the negative 
side, suffering is meant to punish and correct a recalcitrant people, and must therefore be 
willingly borne; the nation must turn so that God can turn to it again. On the positive side, 
it also signals the possibility of hope. This dual nature of suffering is reflected in the 
Hebrew Scriptures. Besides negative admonitions, there are also passages which 
promise a good time coming, when God will create his people anew (Bultmann 
[1956]/1966:33). From a subjective psychological perspective, as Brown (1988:31) points 
out, this approach to the experience of suffering means that: 
 
Every believer (confronts) God not as a soul committed, for a time, to the 
necessary if thankless task of bringing order to an alien body, but rather as the 
possessor of a ‘heart,’ that is, of a hidden core of the self, that might harden: it 
could become a heart of stone, clenched in a state of mute rebellion to God’s 
will. Or it might open itself to fully receive His command and to respond 
without reluctance to His fatherly love… While a ‘good inclination’(urges) them 
to obey God, an ‘evil inclination,’ a deep set tendency to hold back from 
following His will, also lay close to their own hearts. The evil inclination 
(appears) to suffuse the human person as a whole, like an ‘evil yeast’ working 
deep within the dough of human nature.  
 
It is not for human beings to reason why, but to make their submission to God (Bultmann 
[1956]/1966:31). Such acquiescence is allied with a confidence that God will redress the 
situation in the future. From the psychological point of view, this is compensation. The 
consciousness of messianic election, the hope of a better and more meaningful life, 
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compensates for the experience of suffering (Berdyaev 1957:200). It was in this historical 
context and within this culture that Jesus of Nazareth emerged.   
 
Jesus turned away from certain nationalistic interpretations of messianism current at the 
time and offered a more inner-directed, subjective interpretation. 
 
Jesus agrees with Judaism that God no longer reveals himself in the 
history of the nation. When he speaks of his judgment, he is not thinking 
of disasters in history – wars between nations and the like – as was the 
case with the ancient prophets, any more than he expects the Reign of 
God to take the form of a magnificent terrestrial empire for Israel…The 
coming salvation will bring bliss to the individual. Since judgment and 
salvation are thus detached from history, Jesus’ conception of God is 
similarly non-historical, just as in Judaism, as also his conception of man.  
But there is an all-important difference between them at this point.  For 
Judaism God has become remote. He governs the world by means of 
angels, while his relations with man are mediated by the book of the 
Law….For Jesus, however, God’s distinction from and transcendence 
over the world means that he is always the God who comes. He meets 
man not only in the future judgment, but already here and now in daily 
life, with its challenges and opportunities (Bultmann 1956[1966]:175). 
 
While maintaining its anthropocentric, humanistic character inherited by Jesus’ 
appropriation of Hebrew culture, Christianity’s mystical character derived from its 
interaction with Greek culture.   
 
5.2.1 GREEK ROOTS 
Greek culture in the centuries just prior to Christianity developed a definite form of 
mysticism. It came to mean a particular sort of approach to the whole problem of reality in 
which the intellectual, and more especially the intuitive faculties, came into play (Happold 
[1963] /1971:18). This approach to reality was known as Neoplatonism and it had a 
substantial impact in the early centuries of the Christian era. A system of mystical 
spirituality rooted in strains of Neoplatonism, which was one of the main foundations of 
Christian mysticism, came into existence. Happold ([1963]/1971:18) outlines some of the 
characteristics of Neoplatonism: 1) The phenomenal world of matter and individual 
consciousness is only a partial reality and is the manifestation of a Divine Ground in 
 138
which all partial realities have their being; 2)  It is of the nature of the human person that 
not only can they have knowledge of this Divine Ground by inference, but also realize it 
by direct intuition, superior to discursive reason, in which the knower is in some way 
united to the known; 3) The nature of the human person is not single but dual.  The 
person has not one but two selves, the phenomenal ego, of which he or she is chiefly 
conscious  and which he or she tends to regard as the true self; and a non-phenomenal, 
eternal self, an inner person, the spirit, the spark of divinity, which is the true self.  It is 
possible for a person, if he or she so desires and is prepared to make the necessary 
effort, to identify with the true self and so with the Divine Ground, which is of the same or 
like nature; 4) It is the chief end of humanity’s earthly existence to discover and identify 
with their true self. By so doing, they will come to an intuitive knowledge of the Divine 
Ground and so apprehend Truth as it really is, and not as it appears to be to our limited 
human perceptions. Not only that, they will enter into a state of being which has been 
given different names: eternal life, salvation, enlightenment, etc.   
 
As Christianity evolved, it began to find itself entrenched in a Hellenistic milieu. Ratzinger 
(1970:95) writes that the early Christians found themselves once again in an environment 
teeming with gods, and thus once again facing the problem with which Israel had been 
confronted in its original situation and in its debate with the great powers of the exilic and 
post-exilic period. Realizing that the return of Jesus may not happen in their lifetime, the 
early community began to interpret its experience in a different fashion. The messianic 
idea was foreign to the Greeks but they were nonetheless acknowledged as having a 
unique intellectual vocation (Berdayaev 1957:200).  Consequently, between the Judaic 
and Hellenistic worldviews, there was a rapprochement. No longer was the imminent 
return of Jesus the driving force, but an interpretation of the inner life of the spirit (i.e., 
mysticism) began to develop. Christian theologians drew heavily on Greek philosophical 
notions while distancing themselves from their religious mythology.  The response of the 
early Church to Greek paganism was to demythologize their religion. This meant 
proceeding in a more humanistic fashion while at the same time using Greek notions to 
articulate the mystery of their religious experience. 
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It would be a mistake to present mystical theology as a strictly philosophical and 
intellectual pursuit. One of the earliest and most influential neo-Platonic Christian mystics, 
Augustine of Hippo (d. 371 CE) presents a strong psychological exposition of mysticism 
drawn from his personal experience. As Woods (1989:104) notes, Augustine’s 
contribution in shaping the inner-directed, existential and psychological focus of Western 
mysticism lay in his awareness of the presence of God in the deepest level of human 
consciousness. While religious feeling had figured in the earlier teaching of Evagrius (d. 
399 CE), Augustine’s deep personal experience surfaces as the troubled ground of the 
human spirit itself, often wrought with the desire for total communion with God, but 
equally bereft of the felt sense of that presence.   
 
5.3 APOPHATIC AND KATAPHATIC APPROACH 
Two approaches to mysticism began to evolve in early Christian mysticism which can be 
interpreted psychoanalytically to the extent that they involve cognitive processes or the 
deliberate suspension thereof. These are the apophatic and kataphatic approach. It is 
useful to use the apophatic and kataphatic schema as these approaches represent 
variant theological emphases and methods. The mystical experience, in either its 
apophatic or kataphatic form, leads to what is referred to in classic spiritual vocabulary as 
the unio mystica. That is, there is a unity between the I and the Other and the self-Other 
dichotomy is obliterated    
 
The mystical process is relevant to the area of psychology since it has implications for the 
integration of the self. From an existential psychological perspective, the ‘I’ (or the ‘self’) 
is not a continuous, fixed entity. Kierkegaard, for example, held that the true self is not 
discerned in advance but discovered in ‘becoming’. As outlined in the first chapter, for 
Kierkegaard, the ultimate stage of human development is the religious or mystical stage. 
It is this stage that provides ultimate meaning and integration. Some analysis of the 
spiritual approaches utilized in the facilitation of human integration and existential 
meaning is therefore beneficial. The apophatic approach has dominated among mystics 
in the Church, particularly in the medieval period with Ignatius of Loyola (d. 1555 CE) 
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being a notable exception. Ignatian spirituality, given its kataphatic character, translates 
itself into the activist impulse of Ignatian spirituality.    
 
5.3.1 KATAPHATIC MYSTICISM – IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA (D. 1555) 
The Spiritual Exercises are the fruit of Ignatius of Loyola’s spiritual journey to maturity. In 
the Exercises, Ignatius’ personal insights into spirituality find their clearest expression 
(Gleason 1989:17).The genesis of the Spiritual Exercises is drawn from the well of 
Ignatius’s own mystical experience. After finally recovering in Montserrat from wounds he 
received in battle, Ignatius had a conversion experience and discerned that he needed to 
change his life direction.   
 
From Montserrat in 1522 CE, Ignatius journeyed toward Barcelona but stopped along the 
river Cardoner at a town called Manresa. Intending to stay only a few days, he remained 
there for ten months. O’Neal writes that on the banks of this river, Ignatius had a vision 
which he regarded as the most significant in his life: 
 
The vision was more of an enlightenment about which he later said that he 
learned more on that one occasion than he did in the rest of his life…. 
Ignatius never revealed exactly what the vision was, but it seems to have 
been an encounter with God as He really is so that all creation was seen in a 
new light and acquired a new meaning and relevance, an experience that 
enabled Ignatius to find God in all things. This grace, finding God in all 
things, is one of the central characteristics of (Ignatian) spirituality (O’Neal 
1993:3-4). 
 
From these and other experiences, Ignatius gradually developed a systematic method of 
sharing with others his insight into the mystical life. This method became Ignatius’ 
magnum opus, the Spiritual Exercises. The Exercises are unique in the history of 
Christian mysticism in that they are simultaneously deeply experiential, but also 
systematic and structured.   
 
The transference of his previous life context, which was militaristic and feudal, to a 
mystical one brought with it a creative use of imagery. Images associated with battle (e.g. 
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the ‘Two Standards’)1, chivalry as well as feudal theological images (e.g. imagining 
oneself in the heavenly court, before the divine Majesty, etc), figure prominently. Ignatius 
uses secular images from his own historical, social and cultural context to point to 
spiritual realities. Many of the images are dated. Consequently, some appreciation of the 
historical context of his choice of symbols is important in order to appreciate his insights. 
Most spiritual directors using the Exercises use more contemporary symbols that are 
analogous to Ignatius’ medieval imagery. Symbols ought to be readily recognizable and 
resonate with our contemporary mind in order to have the desired effect and achieve the 
purpose for which the Exercises were designed.    
 
Ignatius begins the Exercises by writing that its purpose is to help the exercitant conquer 
the self and to regulate one’s life so as not to be influenced by any inordinate attachment 
(Gleason 1989:48). This freedom facilitates the understanding of one’s destiny and 
assists in providing the courage to carry it out. In psychodynamic vocabulary, destiny is 
an unconscious aspiration that a person intuitively feels will be realized. Psychological 
crisis or existential angst is often an unconscious desire to break free of one’s fate; the 
opposite of destiny. According to Freud, fate is that which sets one’s personality on 
course.  It can become the tragic element in one’s character. It is, in Jungian vocabulary, 
the shadow side of the unconscious. While both destiny and fate are internal and part of 
the unconscious, they are quite distinct. Indeed, in Freudian terms, conflictual patterns 
within one’s unconscious are often various libidinous ‘ids’ (or drives) vying for domination 
of the ego. The ego is the ‘I’ that must reconcile all of these parts in a harmonious unity. 
Harmony and a general psychic élan ensue as a consequence of activity springing from 
destiny, while dysfunctional neuroticism and hyper-anxiety spring from the ego’s 
surrender to fate. 
 
For Ignatius reflection on one’s life context is a critical component in breaking free of fate 
so as to live out of destiny. Ignatius believes that one’s destiny is discovered in the call of 
                                                 
1 The two standards is an exercise in which the excertants imagines themselves in a vast plain where under 
one standard (or flag) stands Lucifer and under the other stands Christ.  The idea is to have an image of 
being under the standard of Christ being able to withstand the demons who are sent from the other standard 
(Gleason 1989:75). 
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Christ the King. This call is discerned in the second week of the Exercises. Once found, a 
person will begin to fashion daily life according to one’s destiny. This lies deep within 
one’s unconscious and presents itself in a variety of ways. Our task in discerning our 
destiny is to interpret the action of the good and bad spirit.  
 
Ignatius describes destiny as a battlefield on which our soul (the ‘I’) is engaged in a 
struggle. There are shadow forces (bad spirits) frustrating the integration of our destiny 
within ourselves. Drawing on classic Christian vocabulary, Ignatius refers to these 
shadow forces as the devil or Lucifer. In the original translated text of the Exercises, 
Ignatius refers to Lucifer symbolically as the ‘enemy of our human nature’ (Gleason 
1989:75). May (1969:139) notes that the devil comes from the Greek word diabolis, which 
literally means ‘to tear apart’ (dia-bollein). In a passage (The Two Standards) which can 
easily be interpreted as the libidinous id seeking to dominate the ego, Ignatius writes: 
 
The third point is to listen to the harangue which he (the devil) delivers to 
them, how he spurs them on to ensnare men (sic) and to bind them in 
chains.  He bids them first to tempt people with the lust of riches (as he is 
most accustomed to do), that they may thereby more easily gain the 
empty honor of the world, and then come to unbounded pride. The first 
step in his snare is that of riches, the second honor, the third pride. From 
these three steps Satan leads on to all other vices (Gleason 1989:76).   
 
 To counter these ids, the superego (Christ consciousness) presents to the ego another 
alternative. Christ is offered symbolically as that which will hold the ‘I’ together. May 
(1969:139) notes that the term symbolic is the antonym to diabolic. Symbolic comes from 
sym-bollein and means ‘to throw together’.   
 
The third point is to listen to the discourse which Christ our Lord makes 
to all His servants and friends whom He sends on this mission, charging 
them that they should seek to help all men; first by encouraging them to 
embrace the most perfect spiritual poverty, and if it should please His 
Divine Majesty, to choose them for it, also to embrace actual poverty.  
Secondly, by encouraging them to desire insults and contempt, for from 
these two things come humility.  So then there are three steps: the first, 
poverty opposed to riches; the second scorn or contempt, opposed to 
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worldly honor, the third humility, opposed to pride.  From these three 
steps let them lead all people to all virtues (Gleason 1989:76). 
 
For Ignatius, one of the ways for the realization of destiny to occur is to pay attention to 
the symbolic nature of dreams and images that occur in different states of 
consciousness. This paying attention, in a critical manner, to details of visions and 
images is an important dimension of the kataphatic approach. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the Ignatian method of ‘composition of place’.    
 
‘Composition of place’ is related to the kataphatic method and refers to the method that 
the exercitant is asked to practice when meditating on particular texts. Ignatius suggests 
in the first preludes to the Exercises, which are often meditations on Biblical scenes, that 
the exercitant create a mental image of the place. ‘It should be noted,’ Ignatius writes ‘at 
this point that when the meditation or contemplation is on a visible object, for example, 
contemplating Christ our Lord during His life on earth, the image will consist of seeing 
with the mind’s eye the physical place where the object we wish to contemplate is 
present’ (Gleason 1989:54). Ignatius has an intuition into the importance of conscious 
images and their effect on the unconscious. Conscious images can direct deep 
unconscious stirrings. In the kataphatic approach, as attention is paid to the development 
of conscious images and symbols, these images in turn name and direct unconscious 
movements.  
 
Unlike kataphatic mysticism, apophatic mysticism eschews subjective images, desires 
and dreams, deliberately suspending conscious reflection on them.  It is useful to turn to 
one of the most prominent of the apophatic mystics, Meister Eckhart (d. 1328 CE), to 
explore how this approach has been interpreted historically in the Christian tradition. 
 
5.3.2 APOPHATIC MYSTICISM – MEISTER ECKHART (D. 1328) 
Meister Eckhart has been known as the father of German mysticism and the greatest of 
all mystics. Several authors refer to him with honour as ‘the man from whom God hid 
nothing’ (O’Neal 1996, Brown 2005, McGinn 2003). He is known as a philosopher and a 
theologian, but it was as a mystic that Eckhart excelled. In his day, Eckhart enjoyed 
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success as a popular preacher and churchman of high rank in his order, the Dominicans. 
However, Eckhart was the one of the most prominent theologian of the medieval period 
to be formally charged with heresy. The shock of his trial for heresy and the 
condemnation of some of his work by Pope John XXII (d. 1334) in Agro Dominco (1329) 
cast a shadow over his reputation and a lingering suspicion over his orthodoxy that has 
lasted to this day.2  Ratzinger (1989:12) in a Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church 
on Some Aspects of Christian Meditation referenced Meister Eckhart and wrote, ‘Still 
others do not hesitate to place that absolute without images or concepts, which is proper 
to Buddhist theory, on the same level as the majesty of God revealed in Christ, which 
towers above finite reality .... Thus they propose abandoning not only meditation on the 
salvific works accomplished in history by the God of the Old and New Covenant, but also 
the very idea of the One and Triune God, who is Love, in favour of an immersion in the 
indeterminate abyss of the divinity.’  
 
Interior renewal and the indwelling of God were key elements in Eckhart’s mysticism.  
According to Eckhart, Christ became a child of a human being in order that we might 
become children of God. Eckhart states, ‘Why did God become man?  So that I might be 
born of the same God’ (Fox [1980]/2000:356). 
  
To enter into the apophatic experience, a certain degree of asceticism is necessary. Like 
all of Eckhart’s spirituality, asceticism is not understood as external practice. It is primarily 
psychodynamic. Indeed, Eckhart’s resistance to, perhaps even rejection of, exterior 
penance as unhelpful in leading towards union with God is outlined clearly in the Talks of 
Instructions: 
                                                 
2 Since 1980. the Dominican Order and the International Eckhart Society have tried to obtain an 
official declaration from the papacy to acknowledge ‘the exemplary character of Eckhart’s activity 
and preaching and to recommend his writings…as an expression of authentic Christian mysticism 
and as trustworthy guides to the Christian life according to the spirit of the gospel’ (cf McGinn 
2001:193, n2) To date no such statement has appeared, although Pope John Paul II quoted 
Eckhart with approval in an address  in 1985. In 1992, then Master of the Dominican Order 
Timothy Radcliffe noted that the Order had tried to have the censure on Eckhart lifted and were 
told that there was really no need since he had never been condemned by name, just some 
propositions which he was supposed to have held, and so we are perfectly free to say that he is a 
good and orthodox theologian (Mills 2003:63) 
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Many people think that they are performing great works by outward things 
such as fasting, going barefoot, or other such things which are called 
penance. But the true and best penance is that whereby one improves 
greatly and in the highest degree; and that is that a person should 
experience a complete and perfect turning away from whatever is not 
entirely God and divine in themselves and in all creatures, and have a full, 
perfect and complete turning towards their beloved God in unshakeable 
love, so that their devotion and yearning for Him are great (McGinn and 
Colledge 1981:33-34). 
 
Central to Eckhart’s ascesis is detachment. Detachment is a central component in the 
apophatic approach. Detachment is a well winnowed term and popularized in recent 
times by the interest in Eastern religions. Eckhart, articulating a fairly common Buddhist 
theme, writes, ‘all suffering comes from love and attachment.  So if I suffer on account of 
transitory things, then I and my heart have love and attachment for temporal things, I do 
not love God with all my heart and do not yet love that which God wishes me to love with 
Him’ (Woods 2005:19). Detachment, or as Eckhart described it in the vernacular German 
of his day abegescheidenheit, is an integral aspect of apophatic spirituality. It  forms the 
praxis of apophatic mysticism and speaks in a practical way to appropriate 
psychodynamic disposition. Schurmann (2001:81-82) examines the etymology of the 
term abegescheidenheit, in order to better understand its meaning. Abegescheidenheit 
(in modern German Abgeschiedenheit) is formed of the prefix ab- which designates a 
separation3 and the verb scheiden or gescheiden.  In its transitive form, this verb means 
‘to isolate’, ‘to split’, ’to separate,’ and in its intransitive form, ‘to depart,’ ‘to die’. The word 
abegescheidenheit evokes, in the illusive thought of Meister Eckhart, a mind that is on 
the way to dispossession from all exteriority which might spoil its serenity. The difficulty in 
interpreting Meister Eckhart stems from the necessity of reproducing in ourselves the 
disposition that allows such an encounter to occur. Some analysis of the notion of 
detachment, therefore, is helpful in order to understand the apophatic approach. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 abetuon: to rid oneself of something; abekêre: turning away, apostasy 
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5.3.3 DETACHMENT (ABEGESCHEIDENHEIT) 
Eckhart did not develop any specific techniques to facilitate detachment. As Lancaster 
(2001:41) writes, Eckhart eschews technical practices warning that whoever seeks God 
with a special technique gets the technique but misses God, who lies hidden in it.  
Eckhart’s writings are invariably directed to the ends and not the means. Eckhart, as 
Merton ([1968]/1989:54) notes, did not have the kind of mind that wasted time being 
cautious about every comma: he trusted people to recognize that what he saw was worth 
seeing because it brought obvious fruits of life and joy. The peace that detachment offers 
is the peace that comes from taking every moment without expectation, anxiety or 
promise (Stephens 2005:36). Eckhart states: 
 
Every attachment to every work deprives one of the freedom to wait upon 
God in the present and to follow him alone in the light with which he would 
guide you in what to do and what to leave alone, free and renewed in every 
present moment, as if this were all that you had ever had or wanted or 
could do.  Every attachment or every work you propose deprives you again 
and again of this freedom (McGinn  and Colledge 1981:178).  
 
Abegescheidenheit becomes key in terms of receptivity of the Divine truth and becoming 
one with God (unitas indistinctionis). Eckhart’s abegescheidenheit is a ‘cutting away’ or 
‘letting go’ of things. (McGinn 2000:4). A somewhat contemporary understanding of 
Eckhart’s understanding can be found in the expression of Thoreau ([1854]/1985:75): 
 
I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the 
essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and 
not, when I came to die discover that I had not lived.  I did not wish to live 
what was not life, living is so dear...I wanted to live deep and suck out all 
the marrow of life, to cut a broad swath and shave close..... 
 
Eckhart frames abegescheidenheit in two ways (biblical and philosophical) - both of 
which speak to the same psychodynamic reality. Schurmann (2001:18) writes, 
‘Detachment has been described as a passive attitude: the receptive intellect and virginity 
- one a philosophical figure of thought, the other biblical - both speak of the absence of 
any determination of the mind.’  Such a passive disposition does not lead to withdrawal, 
quietism or resignation. On the contrary, it forms a pointe vierge for action. For medieval 
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women and monastics, virginity, properly understood, had less to do with physicality than 
it did with interior disposition. The narrow sexual resonances that we associate with the 
concept of virginity in our modern era spring, as Dworkin (Norris 1996:200) writes, ‘from a 
male frame of reference which sees virginity as a state of passive waiting or vulnerability; 
it precedes and is antithetical to wholeness. But in the women’s frame, virginity is a fuller 
experience of selfhood and identity. In the male frame, virginity is virtually synonymous 
with ignorance; in the woman’s frame, it is recovery of the capacity to know by direct 
experience of the world.’ It is in this positive, spirit-affirming perspective that Eckhart 
speaks of the ‘negative’ concept of abegescheidenheit. Eckhart’s feminine conceptions 
and practical applications of his spirituality were shared by other apophatic mystics of the 
period such as Marguerite Porete (d.1310), who echoed these themes. 
 
Lichtmann (1994) points out the similarity between Eckhart and Porete concerning 
abegescheidenheit. Eckhart’s abegescheidenheit like Porete’s aneantissement, or 
annihilation, relentlessly purifies the soul of attachment to works, to the will of God, or to 
heavenly reward. Yet, where Eckhart has an abegescheidenheit that is literally a cutting 
away, Porete has an aneantissement, a gradual ‘becoming what one is most deeply’ 
(Lichtmann 1994:84)  For both Porete and Eckhart, the apophatic approach facilitates 
becoming what one is most deeply. There is a mistaken notion that the more quiet 
apophatic approach makes one remote and distant. This is mistaken. The apophatic 
approach is not at all contrary to human passion.  Eckhart writes: 
 
Our upright people, however, say that we must become so perfect that no kind of 
joy can move us any longer that we must be immoveable to joy or sorrow.  They 
are wrong in this matter.  But I say that there was never a saint so great that he 
or she could not be moved ....This was not the case even for Christ.  He let us 
know this when he said: ‘My soul is grieved to the point of death’ (Mt. 26:38) (Fox 
[1980]/2000:484).   
 
For Eckhart, living fully out of the consciousness of truth that is derived from the 
apophatic approach is more important than memorizing dogmas. In that respect Eckhart 
is thoroughly contemporary and speaks to the postmodern passion for a living experience 
over static formula.  Berdyaev (1957:v) put it well when he wrote: 
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My philosophical thinking does not take a scientific form: it is not ratiocinative, it 
belongs intuitively to life. Spiritual experience lies at the very foundation of it, and 
its driving power is a passion for freedom.  I do not think discursively.  It is not so 
much that I arrive at truth as that I take my start from it. 
 
For Eckhart, the unconscious landscape is where God’s activity takes place. By focussing 
mysticism within the unconscious landscape, Eckhart and Ignatius, while representing 
different mystical traditions and psychodynamic movements, nonetheless exemplify that 
mysticism is an inherent part of the human psyche as it crafts meaning and purpose in 
life.  
 
Recently, the mystical phenomenon has been studied with respect to the brain; leading 
researchers such as D’Aquili and Newberg (1999) to develop what they refer to as 
neurotheology. As mentioned at the outset of the chapter, this discovery is an exciting 
one for those involved in both spirituality and mental health. 
 
5.4 NEUROTHEOLOGY 
D’Aquili and Newberg (1999) argue that the neuropsychiatric approach to the mystical 
experience establishes that there are certain core elements that appear to be universal 
and that can be separated from particular cultural matrices. From a strictly 
neuropsychiatric perspective our God consciousness is necessarily interpreted by the 
brain which gives us our sense of all reality.  
  
Neuroscientists have divided the brain into two main subdivisions. These subdivisions 
have implications in terms of understanding the neurological basis for the difference 
between apophatic and kataphatic mystical approaches. Additionally, observation of 
these hemispheres has given researchers insight into the neurological basis of the 
‘mystical’ mind allowing us to appreciate the fact that mystical experience is a constitutive 
aspect of our natural human life.   
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5.4.1 LEFT AND RIGHT HEMISPHERES AS THEY RELATE TO APOPHATIC AND KATAPHATIC MYSTICAL 
APPROACHES 
From classic research in brain chemistry we know that the main subdivision of the brain 
is that of the left and right hemisphere. Each hemisphere contains a cerebral cortex, 
which is generally considered to be the seat of higher level cognitive functions as well as 
sensory and motor control. The left cerebral cortex receives and analyzes sensation 
from, and generates movement in, the right side of the body, and the right cerebral cortex 
receives and analyzes sensation from, and generates movement in the left side.  The 
classic teaching is that the left hemisphere is more involved with analytical and 
mathematical processes, as well as the time sequential and rhythmical aspects of 
consciousness. The left hemisphere is also the usual site of the language center, which is 
that part of the brain that understands and produces written and oral language (D’Aquili 
and Newberg 1999:28). 
 
The right hemisphere is usually more involved with abstract thought distinct from 
language, non-verbal awareness of the environment, visual-spatial perception and the 
perception, expression and modulation of most aspects of emotionality (D’Aquili and 
Newberg 1999:28). While each of these left and right centers operate independently and 
can create what appear to be two separate consciousnesses we also need to see how 
they work together. In examining the left and right brain hemispheres it is important to 
realize that each hemisphere has a relationship with the other. For example, even though 
the major language center may be in the left hemisphere, the right hemisphere also has 
an area that concentrates on language. The language area in the right hemisphere 
comprehends and generates emotional inflection in the language. Thus, the left and right 
hemisphere work together in such a manner that the left hemisphere can understand 
what is being said, and the right hemisphere can understand how it is being said in terms 
of emotional nuance (D’Aquili and Newberg 1999:28). Additionally the right hemisphere 
provides the ‘space’ in which the stimulus from the left is placed. This has relevance for 
what occurs neurologically with different mystical approaches.   
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5.4.2 APOPHATIC MYSTICISM FROM A NEUROLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
When deliberate suspension of cognitive activity occurs in apophatic styled mystical 
meditation, definite neurological reactions can be observed. In apophatic mysticism, one 
starts with the intent to clear the mind of thoughts and words. This results in a partial 
deafferentation of the right orientation association area located in the right hemisphere.  
Deafferentation is a technical term, which refers to the process whereby incoming 
information (i.e. afferents) into the brain are ‘cut off’ (i.e. de-afferented). This cutting off, 
which is generated through meditative techniques, is an actual physiological process. In 
apophatic states, there is a deliberate attempt not to pay attention to direct sensory input 
(D’Aquili and Newberg 1999:111). The deafferentation of the right orientation association 
area consists of blocking input from the verbal-conceptual association area as well as 
from specific sensory modalities of the left area. Since the right orientation association 
area is concerned with generating a sense of space in which to orient incoming stimuli, 
the deafferentation of this orientation (which is the point of apophatic meditation) does not 
result in unusual visions, sounds or tactile sensations. Hence one rarely hears description 
of ecstasies reported from apophatic mystics. Instead, the deafferentation that occurs in 
apophatic mysticism results in an absolute subjective sensation of pure space (D’Aquili 
and Newberg 1999:112). At the same instant that the right orientation association area is 
totally deafferented, the left orientation association area is likewise deafferented. This 
process results in the obliteration of the self-other dichotomy at precisely the same 
moment that the deafferentation of the right orientation association area is associated 
with a sense of absolute transcendent wholeness. D’Aquili and Newberg (1999:112) 
believe that this results in the subject’s attainment of a state of rapturous transcendence 
and absolute wholeness that conveys such overwhelming power and strength that the 
subject has the sense of experiencing absolute reality. How this process has been 
described in mystical language by some Christian apophatic mystics will be described 
below.   
 
5.4.3 KATAPHATIC  MYSTICISM FROM A NEUROLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In kataphatic mysticism, one begins with the subject willing or intending not to clear the 
mind but to focus either on a mental image or external physical object. Because the 
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person is calling forth an image from memory, whether it be a religious symbol or a past 
memory, it is affected by the stimulatory impulses running from the right attention 
association area since, as was stated above, the right hemisphere generates emotional 
nuance in what is being said or thought. Because attention is focussed so intensely on a 
particular image or memory, there is a corresponding ongoing and powerful stimulation 
(not deafferenting) coming from the right association area. In this way the left and right 
areas are working together. However, in the case of kataphatic mysticism the impulses 
are facilitatory and stimulating, not inhibiting or deafferenting, as in apophatic mysticism 
(D’Aquili and Newberg 1999:114). The result is nonetheless the same; self-other 
dichotomy is obliterated during this period of time (D’Aquili and Newberg 1999:116).  
However, the feeling is different. It is ecstatic. The person feels absorbed into the object, 
or is one with the object (D’Aquili and Newberg 1999:116). How this process has been 
described in mystical language by some Christian kataphatic mystics will be described 
below.   
 
5.4.4 THE DIFFERENCES IN GOD CONSCIOUSNESS AS A RESULT OF THE APOPHATIC AND 
KATAPHATIC METHOD 
The diverse ‘God’ consciousness that is produced in apophatic and kataphatic 
approaches is related to different methodological approaches. Either method leads to 
differing experiences of what D’Aquili and Newberg (1999:109) describe as ‘absolute 
unitary being’.  For example, most mature mystics who practice apophatic mysticism tend 
to experience a quiescent effect, while those who practice kataphatic mysticism tend to 
experience an ecstatic effect. In terms of God imaging, the quiescent experience tends to 
be interpreted impersonally, as the peace and emptiness of the absolute ground of being 
(the nameless or no-thing God), while in the ecstatic experience, the person feels 
absorbed into the object of meditation (God is everywhere).  
 
Neuropsychiatric analysis sheds light on why there is a difference in articulation (and 
consequently a different approach to prayer and meditation) concerning mystical 
experience, even among mystics of the same religious confession. For example, the 
apophatic experience lends itself to a certain depersonalization of the Divine while the 
kataphatic experience lends itself to seeing the divine in all things. The apophatic 
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experience described by D’Aquili and Newberg is clearly seen in the apophatic mystic 
Mechtild of Magdeburg (d.1279) and Meister Eckhart. The kataphatic experience is 
clearly seen with Ignatius of Loyola. A brief overview of these mystic’s spiritual 
experience will serve to illustrate how the mystical mind described neurologically by 
D’Aquili and Newberg is described in classic religious language. 
 
Mechtild frequently employs the image of the desert in describing her mystical thought.  
The desert is the landscape of consciousness which when emptied receives the fullness 
of God. Mechtild (Tobin 1994:49) writes that God whispers to His beloved within the 
confines of this desert. It is our clinging to external forms, ideas and multiplicity that 
keeps us from entering the desert. One lives in the true desert if one loves das niht 
(nothing) and flees das iht (something). For Mechtild, one must stand alone, not seek 
consolation, console others, keep busy but be free of all things (Tobin 1994:49). In this 
way, through detachment as described by Eckhart, the mind experiences a breakthrough, 
where, ‘I am unborn, and following the way of my unborn being I can never die.’ The Lord 
then leads the noble detached mind into a desert and speaks, ‘One with one, one of one, 
one in one, and in one forever’ (Tobin 1994:50). The apophatic experience is described 
by Mechtild as ‘sinking’, a kind of psychological descent. However this descent does not 
provoke anxiety or fear. On the contrary, ‘the more deeply she sinks - the more sweetly 
she drinks’ (Tobin 1994:51). It is interesting that Mechtild uses the word ‘sink’ to describe 
her experience. This is not ecstatic language.  
 
For Ignatius, the experience is similar but it culminates in an active, personal and ecstatic 
apprehension of the Divine in all of creation. Ignatius suggests as a meditation in the 
fourth and final week of the Spiritual Exercises: 
 
The second point is to consider how God dwells in His creatures: in the 
elements, giving them being; in the plants, giving them life; in the animals, giving 
them sensation; in men, giving them understanding. So He dwells in me, giving 
me being, life, sensation, and intelligence, and making a temple of me, since He 
created me to the likeness and image of His Divine Majesty (Gleason 1989:104). 
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Ignatius suggests that the exercitant think about God as an active worker in the world. 
 
The third point is to consider how God works and labours for me in all 
created things on the face of the earth, that is, He conducts Himself as 
one who labours; in the heavens, the elements, plants, fruits, flocks, etc.  
He gives them being, preserves them, grants them growth, sensation, 
etc.  Then I will reflect on myself (Gleason 1989:104). 
 
 
These differences suggest that diverse methods produce differing orientations. Rohr 
(1992:226), for example, suggests that apophatic styled meditation is more natural for the 
‘gut centre’ types. The latter refers to people who operate out of sensation and instincts. 
It is one of the three typologies in the Enneagram (the other two being mind centered and 
emotional centered). Rohr notes that meditation practices in which they are entirely by 
themselves and in their body are best for these people (Rohr 1992:226). The reason for 
this is because apophatic styled mysticism will facilitate a space in which to contextualize 
and calm the raw emotional response to life typical of ‘gut centre’ types. 
 
Irrespective of the method, meditation of either type has its benefits. Newberg (2006) 
refers to academic literature that shows that people who meditate tend to have better 
mental states, lower levels of depression and anxiety and decreased drug and alcohol 
abuse. Clearly, opening up the mystical literature of the Christian tradition is a useful 
means to assist people in their personal integration. Mysticism, in either its kataphatic or 
apophatic form, does not seek to rupture the person but to assist in deepening the 
experience of what it means to be fully human. This process entails a change in 
perceptual experience; however, that change does not lead to the dissolution of the 
integrity of the human person. As Merton ([1961]/1990:166) writes: 
 
In mystical experience the spirit of the person is indeed aware of the 
reality of God as ‘Other’ immanently present within itself, but the more 
conscious it becomes of His reality and of His ‘otherness’ the more it (the 
spirit of the person) also becomes conscious of the union and 
‘sameness’ which unite Him to itself. And this is the great paradox 
without which mysticism would become schizophrenia, splitting man’s 
(sic) whole personality and destroying him, instead of unifying and 
integrating and perfecting him in the highest degree.      
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5.5 DIFFERENTIATING MYSTICISM AND PSYCHOSIS 
Psychosis and mysticism need to be seen separately. Unlike the mystical experience, in 
psychosis the perceptual change in experience leads to increasing fragmentation and 
confusion: 
In psychosis (and drug experiences that go wrong, or shade into 
psychosis), the orderly return does not happen. The individual finds 
themselves (sic) stranded beyond the reach of their constructs or 
propositional subsystem, trying to operate in the world. Not surprisingly 
this is extraordinarily difficult. The familiar boundaries between people, 
events, time and space are not accessible as before. Telepathy seems 
normal. Other people can read, and worse, interfere with, the individual's 
thoughts. Coincidences abound - everything is connected and everything 
is disconnected. Everything is possible and nothing is possible. Where 
this new reality might be exhilarating for a short while, the sustained 
experience is terrifying. The desperate sufferer tries to make sense of 
the unfamiliar environment, clutching at whatever connections come to 
hand. In this way delusions, which usually have their origin in the early 
stage of the breakdown, are born. In another dissolution of normal 
boundaries, internal concerns are experienced as external 
communication, and the person hears voices. Normal thought is 
disrupted - or as the psychiatrist would say, disordered (Clarke 1998:1). 
One of the major differences between psychotic states and mystical states is that 
phenomena that may occur in acute psychotic states, such as self-destructive acts and 
aggressive and sexual outbursts, are not part of the mystical experience, though the 
latter have been observed in some states of ‘possession’ (Buckley 1981:521). Another 
noticeable difference between the psychotic and mystical experience is the experience of 
terror and fear. It was observed that people with schizophrenia who reported mystical 
experience also reported a significantly higher incidence of terror and fear. These results 
are notable because scholars such as Hood (1975) do not include these emotions as 
characteristic of mystical states. Those who do include these emotions in their description 
of mystical states often speak of a developmental process in which these negative 
emotional states are eventually extinguished (Siglag 1986:134).  
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To address this issue more specifically, the work of Siglag (1986) whose research was 
conducted on a group of seventy-five adult people experiencing schizophrenia. The study 
was intended to address specific questions about the relationship between schizophrenic 
and mystical states. 
 
On of the purpose’s of Siglag’s study was to determine whether those people 
experiencing schizophrenia who claim to make a claim that they have undergone a 
mystical experience differ from those who do not make such a claim. Siglag (1986:130) 
found that individuals who experienced a mystical state are more likely to see a sense of 
oneness and unity within the world. They are also more likely to see their experience as 
valid and meaningful. One of the differences identified between the schizophrenic 
experience and the mystical one was that experiences having to do with sexuality are 
more central to schizophrenic experience than mystical experience. Siglag (1986:133) 
suggests that one way of explaining the emergence of sexuality as a factor for individuals 
experiencing schizophrenia is that they re in a state of consciousness where they are 
struggling with issues of sexuality and sexual identity whereas mystical experiencers, 
presumably, do not have the same need to deal with similar issues pertaining to 
sexuality.  
 
Siglag (Siglag 1986:137) finds that the mystical experience questionnaire used in his 
research showed sensitivity in distinguishing qualities of schizophrenic states which are 
similar to mystical states, and highlighting types of experiences which are central for 
schizophrenic states but not for mystical states. This is important since we now have 
appropriate tools for measuring characteristics of mystical states and can empirically 
assess questions about the relationship between mystical and other states of 
consciousness.  
 
A second central finding was that individuals with schizophrenia who had a mystical 
experience were more likely than individuals who had not had not undergone a mystical 
experience to have experienced a sense of unity, oneness or connectedness with the 
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world. They were more likely to report a range of affective experiences, and are more 
likely to have experienced joyful, peaceful states of consciousness. They are more likely 
to experience a sense of sacredness and holiness. Finally they are more likely to see 
their experience as valid and meaningful than other individuals with schizophrenia (Siglag 
1986:138).  
 
Many researchers have observed that both schizophrenic and mystical states reflect the 
manner in which individuals respond to extreme stress or the need to reorganize their 
lives (Karon and Vandenbos 1981; Boisen 1936; Laing 1967). The mystical experience 
offers coherence, clarity and peace; this is in contrast to the schizophrenic experience 
which produces further confusion and disintegration. By clearly understanding the nature 
of the mystical experience, mental health professionals are now in a better position to 
distinguish mystical experiences from psychotic ones. This differentiation allows mental 
health practitioners to appreciate the integration that can be facilitated by a mystical 
approach. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
Given the frequency of reported mystical experience, the scientific exploration of this 
dimension of human experience is important. While psychiatry and spirituality function in 
distinct domains, there are significant areas of overlap. Neuropsychiatric research is 
validating from a neurological perspective the benefits of mysticism for the human 
person. Additional research concerning the differences between schizophrenia or 
psychosis and mysticism also helps to clarify the nature of mysticism. Research is 
pointing to the conclusion that the mystical quest has profound relevance for achieving 
meaning and purpose in life.    
 
Given the research that illustrates that mystical experience is an integral aspect of the 
human person, a recovery of the mystical tradition will fill a much-needed void in society. 
As Fox (1988:46) notes, a society that denies the mystical and lacks a prophetic religion 
that insists on the primary role of the mystical within the psyche will fall into various forms 
of pathological pseudo-mysticism. Indeed, in our contemporary era, we have seen the 
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ascendancy of various forms of pseudo-mysticism such as nationalism, militarism, 
fascism, technology, consumerism, fundamentalism, new ageism, asceticism, and 
psychologism. It is urgent therefore that spirituality should find creative ways to offer what 
is unique in their tradition to the world. As Tyrrell (1904:26) observed, if true religion does 
not feed the mind’s craving for the mysterious, the wonderful, the supernatural, then the 
mind will feed on the garbage of any superstition that is offered it. But this is false 
mysticism and no more discredits the true mysticism of an Eckhart or an Ignatius, than 
spiritualism discredits spirits or jugglery discredits the miracles of Christ.   
 
This chapter illuminated the nature of mysticism by describing how historically it has been 
(and continues to be) the spiritual process by which integration and wholeness can be 
achieved. Historically, there has been some reticence in psychiatry with respect to 
addressing the mystical dimension of the human person. In recent decades, as new 
research emerges, we see that this is plainly no longer the case.  Neuropsychiatry and 
the social sciences have joined with spirituality in the articulation of mysticism. This 
dialogue is leading to an emerging consensus with respect to the efficacy of the mystical 
experience in people’s lives and a renewed interest in how these mystical states might be 
achieved. There are no better guides than the great saints, mystics and Doctors of the 
Church whose experience has guided people for well over two millennia. Appropriating 
their insights in a contemporary context is an important contribution that the speciality of 
Spirituality can make to mental health. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
If I can stop one heart from breaking,  
I shall not live in vain; 
If I can ease one life the aching, 
Or cool one pain, 
Or help one fainting robin 
Unto his nest again, 
I shall not live in vain. 
 
Dickinson [1894]/1993:39 
 
In exploring the value of spirituality in the field of mental health, the ambiguity 
attached to the term spirituality is clarified. The purpose of spirituality is not to 
eschew mystery but to ensure that it is articulated in forms that are 
comprehensible. Spirituality has two dimensions. The first is the person’s 
subjective experience of transcendental meaning. The second is a corporate 
dimension expressed through cultural and social institutions. These two 
dimensions have a dialectical relationship each nurturing the other. Historically, 
religion has provided the categories and language for people to understand and 
integrate spirituality in their lives. As religious practice has waned new symbols 
have not emerged to speak to contemporary spirituality. However, spirituality as 
a human phenomenon remains. Personal and communal spirituality precedes the 
development of religious institutions. Today religious institutions are only one of 
the many places where personal spirituality is lived out. The task of the present 
research has been to understand our historical context and articulate the 
experience of spirituality according to the ethos of our age. Subjectivity, 
personalism and plurality are strong cultural paradigms in our world today. 
Consequently, it is important to articulate a contemporary understanding of 
spirituality along more existential as opposed to theoretical lines. Existential 
spirituality is that spirituality originally inspired by Kierkegaard (d. 1855) and 
Nietzsche (d. 1900) which takes human existence as its point of departure and 
tries to understand it in terms of transcendental meaning. In the contemporary 
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understanding of the term, spirituality is interpreted phenomenologically and 
understood according to existentially derived notions. The affirmation of the 
external, created world as the theatre for the operation of the divine is a strong 
aspect of contemporary spirituality. The incarnational perspective that the Divine 
discloses itself in creation and in secular experience is a powerful current in 
contemporary spirituality. Through reflection on our experience in the world, the 
world itself discloses the Divine.   
 
Affirmation of the created world as ’other’ than ourselves is the starting point for 
all spiritual reflection. Contemporary spirituality is not an interior construct applied 
to the world but is an unparalleled openness to the world, to others. Spirituality is 
disclosed through our own ethical response in human relationships. 
Contemporary spirituality grants primacy to the ethical. The postmodern 
philosopher Levinas (1969:79) articulates a contemporary spirituality well when 
he writes that ethics is the ‘spiritual optics’. There can be no ‘knowledge’ of God 
separated from the relationship with people. The Other is the very locus of 
metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for a relationship with God. 
 
Spirituality has now evolved towards a holistic orientation. Traditionally, ascetic 
or mystical theology covered much of what is intended by the term spirituality. 
Given the emphasis on community, culture, anthropology, language, and mental 
health, spirituality must broaden its scope to account for the presence of the 
afore-mentioned. The holistic approach makes the study of spirituality infinitely 
more complex than its dichotomous nineteenth-century forebear. It is no longer 
possible for us to fragment the human person into parts and faculties, into inner 
and outer, into personal and social. We are all of these things at once and much 
of the spiritual task consists precisely in bringing this rich multi-facetedness into 
unity. The value of spirituality is qualitative. It is actualized in the secrecy of the 
person’s own subjective consciousness, but lived in concrete action. All of the 
historical factors with respect to religion and culture are brought to bear in the 
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study of spirituality but not in such a way as to try to create some kind of meta-
spiritual ‘over-system’. In our contemporary age it is not unusual to hear people 
say that they consider themselves spiritual but not religious. Spirituality 
represents something personal, positive, and liberating while religion is perceived 
as institutional, dogmatic and doctrinaire. Consequently, there exists an 
inevitable and seemingly unbridgeable chasm between religion and spirituality. 
This chasm is bridged by making an important distinction between religion and 
spirituality. While religion has provided an important place wherein people are 
able to express their deepest desires and be nourished by important traditions, 
the identification of spirituality with the institutional structure of the church is a 
misunderstanding of both the nature of spirituality as well as the nature of 
religion. Spirituality is not a categorical object imposed on a group by monolithic 
religious institutions. Instead spirituality is disclosed through the particularities of 
the local community’s self-understanding derived from its own historical culture, 
tradition and the prophetic voices and charismatic leaders that emerge from 
these communities.  
 
Spirituality concerns itself with what is most human and what is most human 
transcends categorization. It is disclosed. Scientific disciplines, particularly those 
scientific disciplines such as mental health, that have as their subject the human 
person, need to allow  space whereby the animating and transcendent principle 
present within the human person may ‘come to presence’ in  consciousness. The 
major question addressed in this dissertation has been: How is spirituality 
understood scientifically and clinically within mental health? The results of this 
enquiry are now elucidated. 
  
Most people would agree with what seems like a common sense proposition, 
namely, the reality of people with mental health problems. Indeed, In General 
Psychopathology, Jaspers ([1946]/1963:778) writes that the various 
manifestations of psychosis are the unsolved problems of human life. The fact 
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that they exist is the concern of everyone. This concern is one of the mainsprings 
of our desire for greater understanding of mental health. The paradox is that the 
understanding of what constitutes mental health is largely determined by the 
cultural mores of any given society in history. As Jaspers ([1946]/1963:780) 
notes, the meaning of ‘sick’ in general terms depends largely on the prevailing 
conceptions of contemporary culture. With the great majority of physical 
disorders, this dynamic not so noticeable, but with mental health disorders, it is 
very evident. Consequently it is useful to think of mental health in terms of the 
history of the ‘manufacture’ of madness, that is, the idea that labeling insanity is 
primarily a social act, a cultural construct. The research concludes that one can 
show that the medicalization of madness, in other words, the organization of 
medical knowledge around individuals designated as mad, is connected to a 
series of social and economic processes at a particular time in history, and also 
with institutions and practices of power. 
 
Historically, madness was perceived as one pole of a spiritual experience. It 
contained both divine and destructive elements. Madness, prophecy and creative 
genius were linked to the same spirit. The embrace of the irrational (or madness) 
is connected with art and truth. Indeed, Plato has Socrates connecting madness 
with art. The term used by the Greeks to describe the spirit of madness was 
daimon. May (1969:123) defines the demonic as any natural function which has 
the power to take over the whole person. Sex and eros, anger and rage, and the 
craving for power are examples. The demonic is either creative or destructive 
and is normally both.  When the power goes awry and one element usurps 
control over the total personality, we have ‘demon possession’, the traditional 
name throughout history for psychosis. Among the ancients, restoration from 
mental agitation to a sense of equilibrium was connected to both the art of 
medicine and/or the practice of spirituality.   
 
The later medieval period in Western culture adopted a biblical cosmology 
influenced both by the New Testament and Greek philosophical thought, which 
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eventually accepted ‘demons’ as the culprit for all manner of deviant behaviour, 
including madness. Demonology became the psychiatry of the day. The medieval 
period understood some aspects of madness as religious; derived directly from 
God and manifested in ecstasies or in prophetic powers and others as evil and 
destructive influenced by Satan requiring the agency of exorcists. May 
(1969:167) notes that the way we have historically overcome the demonic is by 
naming it. In this way, the human being forms personal meaning out of what was 
previously merely a threatening impersonal chaos. While ‘demons’ and 
‘diagnoses’ are not altogether synonymous terms, in point of fact spiritual and 
psychological constructs are not mutually exclusive. They are differing names 
given to similar manifestations of behaviour or thought. 
 
In the age of reason, that is the period of the Enlightenment, madness was 
dissasociated from any transcendent source. The growing importance of science 
and technology, the development of bureaucracy, and the formalization of the 
law, each made their contribution to an amorphous but inexorable process of 
prizing rationality, as understood by those ‘right-thinking’ members of society who 
imposed social norms. In terms of the cultural impact, from around the mid-
seventeenth century, a similar process of redefinition was afoot tending to deny 
the validity of religious madness. The Modern period saw a fundamental change 
in how medicine was understood and practiced. As a consequence of modern 
medical evolution (which preceded the emergence of mental health but is 
nonetheless related), we should not be surprised, as Rose (1994:68) points out, 
that health has replaced salvation in our ethical system; that the doctor has 
supplanted the priest. 
 
‘Our own age,’ writes Jaspers ([1946]/1963:807), ‘is characterized by the fact that 
psychiatrists are now performing in secular fashion what earlier was performed 
on the grounds of faith. The basic medical knowledge of the doctor derives from 
the natural sciences and constantly colours the situation but, whether he (sic) 
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wants to or not, he (sic) is always exercising some psychological and moral 
influence.’  
 
The modern approach to mental health is no longer viable. Postmodern 
philosophers such as Lyotard (1992:79) identify technoscientific development, 
characteristic of the Enlightenment and the modern period, as being a cause of 
deepening our malaise rather than being an agent in allaying it. It is clear that 
there is a meaningless and oppressiveness attached to a purely technological 
approach to mental health. Development in modern mental health, including 
strides in pharmacology, has had its benefits. However, these developments are 
accompanied by an obscuring of core human values. The research concludes 
that in our contemporary landscape the discourse of medicine has become 
saturated with questions concerning the meaning of life. Consequently, it is 
precisely with respect to the existential question of values that the dialogue 
between spirituality and mental health takes place  
  
Therefore, as stated, mental health is now moving beyond its modernist 
framework. Faith in the ability of psychology and psychiatry alone to resolve 
human problems is diminished. Researchers refer to this dynamic as ‘post-
psychiatry’. As a means of distinguishing it from the modern period, it is referred 
to in the present research as ‘postmodern mental health’. Postmodern mental 
health emphasizes social and cultural contexts. No discipline can be an island 
unto itself nor claim totality over the range of human experience. Consequently, 
postmodern mental health invites a vital and critical dialogue between various 
disciplines including spirituality. Spirituality places ethics before technology. With 
spirituality our attention is directed towards ethics – towards justice and love, and 
it is above all these realities that are manifestations of the divine. Indeed, the 
present research concludes that spirituality is disclosed through our own ethical 
response in human relationships. Spirituality has concrete implications in the field 
of mental health.  
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One word provides the context in which the value in spirituality in the field of 
mental health can be succinctly expressed. That word is holistic. A contemporary 
understanding of spirituality in the field of mental health presumes a holistic 
approach. Simply put, holism means that the ‘whole’ is greater than the sum of all 
its parts. It is the opposite of reductionism. Reductionism is basically the view 
that complex phenomena are reducible to simpler ‘building block’ elements from 
which they were constructed (Hersch 2003:155). A holistic understanding does 
not objectify the human person but is instead a search for the appropriate 
relationships between the various elements and aspects of the person. A holistic 
understanding does not close the horizon of our knowledge as reductionism 
does. In contradistinction to reductionism, holisim is ready to adopt any method 
and asks only for those universal scientific criteria: general validity, convincing 
insights (which can be proved), clarity of method and the possibility for 
meaningful dialogue. Perspectives and approaches are limitless. Each has their 
value but none can ultimately be totalizing. A holistic approach to mental health 
takes the data of the particular discipline (such as psychiatry, sociology, 
psychology, neurology, spirituality, etc.,) and seeks ways to integrate that data 
with new knowledge and interpretations that surface. The nature of holism 
requires creativity with keen attention to current research.  
 
Modern scientific advancement in mental health has tended to support 
discourses whose function is to repair that which is broken (technology) as 
opposed to awaken that which is latent. The human person is a mechanism that 
with proper manipulation can be repaired in order to function properly within 
society. It is the goal of the doctor with increasing technical skill to unlock the 
perplexing problem of mental illness and repair the person.  Irrespective of the 
mode of treatment, the person is viewed mechanically. As a result of 
contemporary research in mental health such a mechanistic approach 
characteristic of the modern era is no longer viable. The fundamental structure of 
human consciousness is being looked at differently as a consequence of holistic 
approaches.   
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Consciousness is not simply a product of the brain but a primary principle of 
existence and reflective of the cosmic principle itself. Supporting a holistic 
approach, Jaspers ([1946]/1963:753) writes: 
 
The individual possesses something in addition which is not found 
in the hereditary connections…At some decisive point every 
individual is as it were, in theological language ‘created’ from a 
source of his own and not merely a processing of a modified 
hereditary substance…Far from being the sum of his hereditary 
factors (which would be quite correct for his material preconditions 
and determinants) the individual is directly created of God  
  
Specific methods such as Frankl’s logotherapy lend themselves to a holistic 
approach. According to Frankl, logotherapy is a therapy that dares to enter the 
spiritual dimension of human existence.  In fact, logos is a Greek term that refers 
not only to intelligibility but also to ‘spirit’ - to a universal divine reason, immanent 
in nature, yet transcending all oppositions and imperfections in the cosmos and 
humanity. Logotherapy emerged from an awareness of this spiritual dynamic at 
work in the unconscious, based on Frankl’s personal perspective and his 
experience and observation.  With logotherapy the role of the psycho-therapist is 
one of liberator and not as one who imposes discourses derived from 
psychoanalytic theories onto a passive client. The liberation fostered by holistic 
therapies such as logotherapy is an awakening to the marvel of the world. The 
way in which the logos of the human person is discovered is by paying attention 
to the hopes, dreams and desires of the client which is disclosed and clarified 
through the psychotherapeutic relationship. If the human person can find a ‘why’ 
to their existence, then they will discover a ‘how’ to live out that meaning to the 
fullest.    
 
The inclusion of mysticism is an important aspect of a holistic approach to mental 
health. While spirituality assists in crafting meaning, purpose and change in life, 
mysticism goes deeper. The mystical experience carries with it an existential and 
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transformative change in the person in whom it occurs. The world itself is 
perceived anew. Authentic mystical experience has historically been able to unify 
the deep structures of exteriority and interiority, otherness and sameness, the 
divine and the human. For this reason it is beneficial to open up the received 
wisdom of the mystical tradition of the Church in order that it becomes more 
widely diffused within the world, and particularly within the area of mental health. 
Afterall, as Jaspers ([1946]1963:806) notes the greatest successes in mental 
health have not come from psychiatrists but to shamans, priests, leaders of 
sects, wonder-workers, confessors and spiritual guides of earlier times. 
Neuropsychiatry has joined with spirituality in the articulation of mysticism. This 
dialogue is leading to an emerging consensus with respect to the efficacy of the 
mystical experience in people’s lives and a renewed interest in how these 
mystical states might be achieved. 
 
Mysticism is, in a certain sense, ‘hardwired’ in our brains and is a natural 
constituent of human personality. The mystical basis of the human mind can be 
demonstrated neurologically by researchers in the field of neuro-psychiatry. 
Neuroscientists have divided the brain into two main subdivisions. From classic 
research in brain chemistry we know that the main subdivision of the brain is that 
of the left and right hemisphere. Each hemisphere contains a cerebral cortex, 
which is generally considered to be the seat of higher-level cognitive functions as 
well as sensory and motor control. The left cerebral cortex receives and analyzes 
sensation from, and generates movement in, the right side of the body, and the 
right cerebral cortex receives and analyzes sensation from, and generates 
movement in the left side.  The classic teaching is that the left hemisphere is 
more involved with analytical and mathematical processes, as well as the time 
sequential and rhythmical aspects of consciousness. The left hemisphere is also 
the usual site of the language center, which is that part of the brain that 
understands and produces written and oral language.  The right hemisphere is 
usually more involved with abstract thought distinct from language, non-verbal 
awareness of the environment, visual-spatial perception and the perception, 
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expression and modulation of most aspects of emotionality (D’Aquili and 
Newberg 1999:28). While each of these left and right centers operate 
independently and can create what appear to be two separate states of 
consciousness we also need to see how they work together. In examining the left 
and right brain hemispheres it is important to realize that each hemisphere has a 
relationship with the other. For example, even though the major language center 
may be in the left hemisphere, the right hemisphere also has an area that 
concentrates on language. The language area in the right hemisphere 
comprehends and generates emotional inflection in the language. Thus, the left 
and right hemisphere work together in such a manner that the left hemisphere 
can understand what is being said, and the right hemisphere can understand 
how it is being said in terms of emotion.  Such research is profoundly relevant for 
the study of mysticism. 
   
The observation of the left and right hemispheres has given researchers insight 
into the neurological basis of the ‘mystical’ mind allowing us to appreciate the fact 
that mystical experience is a constitutive aspect of our natural human life. The 
classic left and right brain subdivisions have implications in terms of 
understanding the neurological basis for the spiritual distinction drawn between 
apophatic and kataphatic mystical approaches. Neuropsychiatric research has 
established that there are certain core elements of mysticism that appear 
universally. These core elements present themselves in various cultures and 
religious traditions under differing forms of spiritual practice. As mentioned 
above, differing forms of spiritual practice can be divided into two main 
approaches – namely apophatic and kataphatic. In the Christian tradition, these 
divergent approaches are illustrated in the doctrine of great apophatic mystics 
and saints such as Meister Eckhart (d. 1327 CE) and Mechtild of Magdeburg (d. 
1297 CE) and kataphatic mystics such as Ignatius of Loyola (d. 1556 CE). Each 
type of mysticism produces differing states of consciousness with respect to the 
relationship between the self and Other. The kataphatic approach produces a 
more ecstatic effect while the apophatic approach produces a more quiescent 
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effect. Extroverted personalities experiencing intense and visceral reactions to 
life may benefit from a quiescent experience and so apophatic styled meditation 
may suit them best. Introverts experiencing difficulty connecting with their 
emotional life may benefit from an ecstatic experience and so kataphatic 
meditation may suit them best. It is not unusual today to find retreat houses, 
monasteries and convents offering spiritual programs modeled on the apophatic 
and kataphatic traditions. Examples of the former include contemplative, 
centering prayer as popularized by the Cistercian monk Fr. Keating as well as 
prayers of quiet influenced by Eastern Orthodox traditions such as Hesychasm. 
Examples of the latter include various forms of the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius 
of Loyola which are offered in modified and contemporary forms. These 
traditional mystical approaches correspond to the difference that researchers in 
neuropsychiatry have discovered in the left and right operations of the brain. The 
benefit of contemporary neuropsychiatric research is that it sheds light on the 
neurological basis for mystical experience and bolsters the conclusion of the 
present research that mysticism is in fact a natural response to life that lends 
itself to wholeness and integration. Something mystics have known for millennia. 
Hood and Morris (1981:82) conclude that people do not indiscriminately identify 
their mystical experiences; hence, further investigation into such common 
experiences is necessary. This could be an area for further research in the field 
of spirituality and mental health. Not surprisingly mental health is increasingly 
turning to the ancient mystics for clues as to how to harness such experiences 
for people suffering from psychological trauma and distress. It is clear that the 
mystical dimension of life is an integral component of human nature. Research 
has confirmed that not only is mysticism relatively common, but it is has a noetic 
element.  
 
Indeed, the present research demonstrates that mysticism can be distinguished 
from different kinds of psychosis. The pattern of experiences reported by 
individuals undergoing psychosis differs in identifiable ways from what is 
generally described as classical mystical experience. For example, the lack of 
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any distinct unity factor which is present in the mystical experience is not present 
in the psychotic one. Those experiencing psychosis do experience the common 
mystical experience of loss of orientation and thoughts from one’s mind. 
However, what is noticeably absent is the ability to sense unity in one’s world or 
to organize one’s world. The mystical experience in either its kataphatic or 
apophatic form leads to a profound sense of integration While mysticism and 
psychosis each lead to perceptual changes, one of the starkest differences 
between the mystical experience and the psychotic experience is that the 
perceptual change in experience in psychosis leads not to deeper integration and 
wholeness but instead to fragmentation and confusion. There is an order and 
structure to the mystical experience that manifests itself in external behaviour.       
 
Emotions such as terror and fear are not characteristic of mystical states. 
Additionally, phenomena that may occur in acute psychotic states, such as self-
destructive acts and aggressive and sexual outbursts, are also not part of the 
mystical experience. The mystical experience offers coherence, clarity and 
peace; this is in contrast to the psychotic experience which produces further 
confusion and disintegration. By clearly understanding the nature of the mystical 
experience, mental health professionals are now in a better position to 
distinguish mystical experiences from psychotic ones. Not only can mental illness 
and mysticism be set apart conceptually, we now have criteria available as to 
how this distinction can be clinically made. Given the foregoing, a further 
conclusion of the present research maintains that mystical experience is an 
integral aspect of the human person; therefore, a recovery of the mystical 
tradition will fill a much-needed void in mental health. 
 
Through continued and sustained inter-disciplinary dialogue, spirituality and 
mental health continue to converge particularly in the area of mysticism. A clear 
consensus emerges that through continued research by professionals in both the 
field of mental health and spirituality the vital change wrought by the mystical 
experience can be realized. By clearly understanding the value of spirituality for 
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mental health and by utilizing the tools of the latter we can harness the 
constructive and positive benefits of mysticism in order to facilitate the full 
integration of people so that they may have life and have it more abundantly.   
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